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The introduction of the automobile into the American scene
in the early part of this century irrevocably altered the face and
character of our society. The significance of its contribution
toward our economic and social progress in the intervening years
is beyond question, but as with every major technological innova-
tion, the vehicle carries with it the inherent potential for misuse.
As early as 1923, the eminent legal scholar Roscoe Pound ob-
served that "the coming of the automobile has begun to make
new chapters both in the civil and in the criminal law, and is
making over other chapters. Indeed, the general use of motor
vehicles is affecting the conditions that make for crime, the dif-
ficulties of preventing and detecting crime, and the administration
of punitive justice."'
Dean Pound's vision was prophetic. Criminal offenders
quickly grasped the myriad possibilities which the automobile of-
fered as a tool for success in crime. Rapid transportation to and
from the crime scene made criminal acts easier to commit, thwarted
detection, and often placed the violator beyond the jurisdictional
reach of local police. The effect of such illicit travel proved to
be so injurious to the national welfare that federal legislation
was soon passed empowering the Government to act in certain
cases involving interstate commerce.
With the advent of the Prohibition Era, the adaptability of
the motor vehicle as a tool for crime became obvious to everyone.
Its effectiveness to transport contraband and to frustrate the en-
forcement efforts of local and federal officers who sought search
warrants did not go unnoticed by the courts. In response to this
dilemma, the Supreme Court of the United States judicially
adopted one of the few exceptions to the warrant requirement
of the fourth amendment by allowing a search to be made of a
mobile vehicle on probable cause alone.2 Yet the bootlegger's
use of the vehicle as a means of violating the laws set the pat-
tern for many of the criminal problems which we face today.
A recent poll of major law enforcement agencies in the United
States and Canada, for example, indicates that automobiles are
involved in some manner in over 75 percent of all criminal of-
1. R. POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 18 (1929).
2. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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fenses. Thus, the motor vehicle has come into its own as a prin-
cipal instrumentality of crime.
Aside from their employment as implements of crime gen-
erally, automobiles are favored objects of theft as well. In 1965
over 486,000 automobiles were stolen, with a total financial value
to the public in excess of half a billion dollars. Twelve per cent
of these vehicles were never recovered, constituting a loss of $60
million to car owners and insurance companies. It is not possible
to measure the overall effect in terms of personal injury or death,
but it is known that auto theft activity, regardless of theft pur-
pose, frequently results in injury or death to perpetrators, inno-
cent bystanders, and police officers, to say nothing of other losses
involving inconvenience and personal hardship to innocent cit-
izens. 3
Since automobiles play a prominent and varied role in the
national crime picture, the search and seizure problems they have
engendered have been discussed separately from those concerning
the search of persons or premises. In most instances the general
decisional law developed in the latter areas is also applicable to
motor vehicles. It is well settled that an automobile is a personal
"effect" within the express protection of the fourth amendment. 4
But because an automobile can be moved quickly to an unknown
location or beyond the jurisdictional reach of the officer, the gen-
eral warrant requirement has been modified. Thus, the federal
courts have long allowed a search to be made on probable cause
where circumstances make it impracticable to obtain a warrant.
Yet this accommodation alone does not meet all the problems
created by use of automobiles in criminal activities, for, unlike
fixed premises, a mobile vehicle can be at one and the same time
an implement of crime, a fruit of the offense, and a form of
derivative contraband. While a fixed structure is most frequently
the subject of a search for evidence of crime, an automobile may,
in addition, be the specific object to be seized. Despite these and
other obvious differences, most questions involving the search or
seizure of automobiles have been dealt with in precisely the same
manner and under the same limitations as searches of premises,
with the result that frequently the law restricts an officer more
than conditions of public safety should require.
3. FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS (1965).
4. Brinegar v. United States, 388 U.S. 160, 182 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
5. See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Plymouth, 380 U.S. 693, 699
(1965).
No attempt is made in this document to set out an exhaustive
listing of the decisional law on any particular issue, or to discuss
every unresolved problem to the limit of its dimensions. Rather,
the purpose here is to highlight the major methods of search and
seizure available to enforcement officers and, in some instances
where the law is confused, to offer what are considered to be the
most acceptable of the available alternatives.
II. SEARCH UNDER THE AUTHORIrry OF A WARRANT
It is the intent of the fourth amendment that the right of
privacy one enjoys in his person, house, papers, and effects shall
yield only when a judicial officer issues a warrant for a search
based upon probable cause. In actual fact, warrants support but a
small percentage of all searches conducted in administration of the
criminal law.6 The gulf between the constitutional ideal and the
current practice is partially explained by the circumstance that
other more attractive alternatives are available to an officer.
Searching incident to arrest or with the consent of suspect, an
officer need not specify in advance, for example, either the area
to be searched or the objects to be seized. Nor is he required
to support the search through any prior showing of probable
cause. But the most obvious reason for the nonuse of a warrant
where vehicles are concerned is apparent-any delay in the search
may result in removal of the automobile to an unknown location.
Because of the ease with which these alternative procedures can
be employed, some officers have unwisely assumed that a warrant
is a mere formality to be dispensed with simply for expediency.
Quite the contrary is true. It is important to understand that a
warrantless search is tolerated by the courts in deference to police
needs and solely as an exception to the basic constitutional re-
quirement.7 For this reason the practice is certain to be examined
carefully relative to any evidence of abuse.
In an obvious effort to encourage strict reliance upon the use
of warrants, the courts have indicated they will not review a
magistrate's determination of probable cause as closely as they
would a judgment made by an officer. The Supreme Court has
emphasized that " . . . substantial deference is to be paid by the
reviewing courts to the decision of the issuing magistrate and
unless his judgment was arbitrarily exercised, the finding that
probable cause existed will not be disturbed."8 An affidavit filed
in support of a warrant, as noted by the Court, is generally drafted
by nonlawyers in the haste of a criminal investigation, and con-
sequently it should be read in a commonsense and nontechnical
6. See Collings, Toward Working Rules of Search and Seizure:
An Amaicus Curiae Brief, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 421, 456 (1962).
7. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
8. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964).
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manner. "A grudging and negative attitude by reviewing courts
toward warrants," it was cautioned, "will tend to discourage police
officers from submitting their evidence to a judicial officer before
acting."9 This presumption of validity which runs in favor of the
warrant allows an officer to operate with greater confidence, since
it provides at least minimal assurance prior to a search that the
issue of probable cause will be resolved in his favor. As a prac-
tical matter, therefore, a warrant should be secured whenever
circumstances and opportunity reasonably permit.
Aside from any immediate benefits which may be gained from
the use of a warrant, every enforcement officer should discharge
his duties with an appreciation of the vital role these limitations
have played in maintaining our constitutional heritage. Contrary
to what critics may assume, the requirement that police decisions
to search be submitted to a "disinterested magistrate" was not
adopted arbitrarily by the courts to serve as an impediment to
enforcement efforts.10 Rather, it had its origins in our colonial
experience with the infamous writs of assistance which empowered
revenue officers to conduct random and general searches for smug-
gled goods at their discretion. 1
The first serious challenge to the legality of this practice arose
in Massachusetts in 1761. James Otis, then advocate-general to
Massachusetts Bay, resigned his office to attack the writ and de-
nounced it as "the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most
destructive of English liberty and the fundamental principles of
law, that ever was found in an English lawbook. It is a power,"
he declared, "that places the liberty of every man in the hands
of every petty officer." Although his eloquent plea failed to
sway the court, it helped to provide a catalyst for the revolutionary
movement. Among those spectators in the courtroom who heard
Otis' stirring argument was a young attorney, John Adams. "Then
and there," he wrote in later years, "was the first scene of the first
act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then
and there the Child Independence was born."12
The first formal prohibition against unrestricted searches was
declared in the Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776, which stated that
9. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965).
10. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 157 (1947) (dissenting opin-
ion).
11. See Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HARV. L.
REV. 361 (1920).
12. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886); LASSON,
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OP THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION, 58-59 (1937).
"general warrants whereby an officer or messenger may be com-
manded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact
committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, or whose
offense is not particularly described and supported by evidence,
are grievous and oppressive and ought not to be granted. 13 A
similar provision respecting privacy was later embodied in every
state constitution and declaration of rights. That philosophy ul-
timately was reflected in the fourth amendment.
The underlying premise of the warrant procedure was perhaps
best summarized by Mr. Justice Jackson who observed:
[T] he point of the Fourth Amendment ... is not that it
denies law enforcement the support of usual inferences
which reasonable men draw from evidence. This protec-
tion consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn
by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive en-
terprise of ferreting out crime.
14
The ancient maxim of English common law that "every man's
home is his castle" cannot, of course, be applied literally to the
automobile, particularly where the vehicle has been used as the
principal means to commit a criminal violation.15 But there can
be no doubt that the rights secured by the fourth amendment ex-
tend beyond persons and premises to encompass all of one's per-
sonal effects, including his automobile. 16 Consistent with the gen-
eral rules of search and seizure, therefore, the courts demand,
with few exceptions, that law enforcement officers submit their
decision to search to the detached judgment of a judicial officer.
A. Requirements To Be Met in Obtaining the Search Warrant
Although prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seiz-
ures have long been in force in every state, until recently many
jurisdictions followed the common law rule that pertinent evidence
is admissible even if illegally secured. 17 But with the extension
of the exclusionary rule to the states in Mapp v. Ohio,
I s most
local practices relating to search and seizure were brought into
alignment with federal requirements. One of the more trouble-
some questions left unresolved by that decision concerned the
extent to which federal rules displaced state law. The Supreme
13. LAssoN, HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSrITUTION, 79 n.3 (1937).
14. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13, 14 (1948).
15. Arwine v. Bannon, 346 F.2d 458, 470 (6th Cir. 1965).
16. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); United States v. Callahan,
256 F. Supp. 739 (D. Minn. 1966).
17. See Appendix to Opinion of the Court, Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 224-232 (1960).
18. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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Court subsequently made it clear, however, that the standards
for obtaining a search warrant are "the same under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments."' 9 And while the states retain some
prerogative in the development of their own rules to meet local
problems, the same fundamental criteria must be satisfied by all
jurisdictions, federal and state alike.
Probable Cause
The first and most important requirement of constitutionality
is that the warrant be based upon probable cause. Although the
latter term defies precise definition, it generally is held to exist
where the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge
and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are suf-
ficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in
the belief that a crime has been committed. But establishing
the fact of a crime is not enough. Probable cause for a search
warrant also requires facts sufficient to support a belief that in-
strumentalities or fruits of the crime, or contraband, are located
in the place to be searched.
20
It is generally agreed that the quantum of evidence necessary
to meet this standard must be more than mere suspicion or con-
jecture, yet it need not be of an amount sufficient to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, which is the requirement for convic-
tion.21 For the Court has long stated that "there is a large differ-
ence between the two things to be proved [guilt and probable
cause] as well as between the tribunals which determine them,
and, therefore, a like difference in the quanta and modes of proof
required to establish them.
'22
Consider as an example the case of Porter v. United States.23
Police officers arrested the defendant, Porter, on a charge of driv-
ing without a license and impounded his automobile. The fol-
lowing day he was identified in a police lineup as a robber in a
bank holdup committed approximately 1 month earlier. An FBI
Agent then filed affidavits before a U.S. Commissioner, stating
he had reason to believe that a gun and other materials con-
sidered to be instrumentalities of the crime were located in the
defendant's automobile. The facts submitted in support of the
19. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
20. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960).
21. Marderosian v. United States, 337 F.2d 759 (1st Cir. 1964); Ward
v. United States, 281 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
22. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
23. 335 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1964).
affidavits were as follows
1. Above-described items were allegedly used and worn
by bank robber.
2. Victim teller. . . identified Porter as person who perpe-
trated the robbery.
3. Above-described items were not in possession of Porter
when arrested.
4. Above-described vehicle is allegedly property of Porter
and registered in name of William Edwards.
5. Porter advised a Special Agent of the FBI that the
above-described car is his property.
24
At the same time the Agent applied for a warrant to search a
second automobile which the defendant had stated was his property
and which was registered in the name of a woman said by the
defendant to be his wife. While neither vehicle contained any of
the objects named in the warrants, a 12-gauge sawed-off shotgun
was found in the trunk of the impounded automobile. As a result
of this discovery, the defendant was indicted and found guilty of
two violations of federal law relating to the possession of un-
registered firearms.
On appeal of his conviction, Porter claimed, among other
things, that the warrant failed to show probable cause for believing
the articles listed would be found in the designated automobile.
The appellate court rejected this argument, stating:
We have no inclination to study the affidavit of a police
officer, applying for a warrant, as if it were a pleading pre-
pared by counsel in a lawsuit. The policeman makes his
statement in his own professional language, and the magis-
trate determines whether the substance of it shows prob-
able cause for the search. The standard applied by the
magistrate is not that of certainty that the object sought
will be found as a result of the search.
25
The defendant also contended that the application by the Agent
for his second warrant indicated the search of each automobile
was exploratory and therefore invalid. But the court noted that
the mere fact that a suspect possesses two automobiles or two
residences would not preclude a search of both locations; the evi-
dence sought could have been concealed in either place, and
"particularly in the case of two automobiles . . . it might be
imprudent for the police to risk the possibility that the one which
contained the evidence would be driven beyond reach while the
other was being searched." 26 In short, probable cause turns upon
probabilities, not certainties and not necessarily eventual truth.27
It is based on the practical considerations of everyday life on
24. Id. at 604.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 605.
27. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Bell v. United
States, 254 F.2d 82 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act"
By the same reasoning, federal law does not require that the
finding of probable cause rest upon evidence which is legally com-
petent in a criminal trial.29 Direct personal knowledge of the
affiant, of course, is always acceptable and indeed is indispensable
to the validity of the warrant in some state jurisdictions. How-
ever, the federal courts allow probable cause to be based upon
hearsay, provided the information is verified by personal observa-
tion of the officer or independent investigation conducted either
prior or subsequent to receipt of the report.
Where identity of the informant remains undisclosed, the mag-
istrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances
supporting the informant's conclusion and the basis for the offi-
cer's belief that "the informant was 'credible' or his information
'reliable.'-"30 The trustworthiness or credibility of the source can
generally be established by a statement in the affidavit that the
informant has proved to be reliable in prior dealings, preferably
in cases of a similar nature.3 ' The real point in issue, however,
is less that the informant be shown to be reliable than that
there be a substantial basis for crediting the information given.
Thus it might be reasonable to rely on the report of an anonymous
informant where the facts stated are of such a specific and particu-
larized nature that it would be highly unlikely the information
was false. A greater degree of corroboration is necessary where
the source is anonymous or of unknown reliability.
But regardless of the nature of the source or the type of
information relied upon to establish probable cause, it is essential
that the facts be set out in sufficient detail to enable an issuing
magistrate to make an independent determination of whether there
are sufficient grounds to support a warrant. Probable cause can-
not be made out by conclusory allegations which state only the
affiant's belief without detailing any of the underlying circum-
stances upon which that belief is based. 2 Thus, a mere affirmance
by the officer that he "has grounds to believe and does believe"
that contraband or other items subject to seizure are located in a
specific vehicle is not adequate under current standards of law.1
3
28. United States v. LaValles, 251 F. Supp. 292 (N.D.N.Y. 1966); see,
e.g., United States v. Spears, 287 F.2d 7 (6th Cir. 1961).
29. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949).
30. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964).
31. United States v. Ramirez, 279 F.2d 712 (2d Cir. 1960).
32. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
33. See, e.g., Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933); Byars v.
United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927).
A recital of the facts and circumstances supporting a conclusion
of probable cause is necessary, the Court has said, to insure that
the magistrate performs his "neutral and detached" function and
does not serve merely as "a rubber stamp for the police.
'34
In one recent decision,3 5 the Court held the following affidavit
to be insufficient:
Affiants have received reliable information from a
credible person and do believe that heroin, marijuana, bar-
biturates and other narcotics and narcotics paraphernalia
are being kept at the above described premises for the pur-
pose of sale and use contrary to the provisions of the law.36
Probable cause was not satisfied in this instance because the affi-
davit merely contained suspicion and belief without any supporting
facts. Indeed, the "mere conclusion" in this case was not the
officer's but rather that of an unidentified informant. Further-
more, there was no affirmative allegation that the affiant's source
spoke with personal knowledge of the matters contained therein.37
Accordingly, when the source of information is a reliable and con-
fidential informant, the officer should set out the approximate
time the informant got his information, how he got it, and the
basis for the affiant's belief that the informant is reliable, such
as the fact that he had been used for a specified length of time,
the approximate number and the types of cases in which he had
previously given information, and a statement as to the accuracy
of the information given by him in past cases.3 8 It is not neces-
sary, of course, that the officer state all the facts known about
the case, but only enough information for the commissioner or
magistrate to determine from a reading of the affidavit, by itself,
that there is sufficient probable cause to justify the issuance of
a warrant.3 9
Particularity of Description
In addition to a statement of probable cause, the fourth amend-
ment requires that the place or premises to be searched and the
property to be seized be particularly described in the warrant.40
The description of the premises-the vehicle in this case-need
not be set out in a technical or formalistic legal style.41  The
34. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964).
35. Id. at 108.
36. Id. at 109.
37. Id. at 114-115.
38. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); United
States v. Freeman, 358 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1966).
39. United States v. Bell, 17 F.R.D. 13 (D.D.C. 1955), aff'd, 240 F.2d
37 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
40. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948); Go-Bart Importing
Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
41. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965); Rugendorf v.
United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964).
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law requires simply that the premises be designated with such
certainty that the officer charged with executing the warrant can
with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended.
42
Where circumstances permit, however, the affidavit should contain
such data as-the make, model, color, body type, and license number
of the automobile and the place where it is expected the vehicle
will be located. While the identity of the operator or occupant
is not essential to the validity of the warrant, the better practice
is to include such information whenever available. 48 In addition,
any other identifying characteristics, such as a dented fender or
decals on the window, should be mentioned when they would dis-
tinguish the car from others in the area.
Similar rules regarding particularity of description apply to
property which is to be seized under a warrant. The underlying
principle behind this requirement is that the person "whose prop-
erty is in peril has a right to know precisely what is wanted and
on what basis demand is made.' '44 Here again, the property must
be stated with such specificity that the selection of items to be
seized is not left to the discretion of the searching officer."
Where articles of contraband are to be seized, the same de-
scriptive particularity is not necessary as, for example, in the case
of stolen goods.46 In such case a generic description in terms
of the character of the property, that is, narcotics, liquor, gambling
paraphernalia, is sufficient. Thus, warrants which commanded the
seizure of "cases of whiskey" or "gaming tables, gambling devices,
race horse slips, and gambling paraphernalia" have been held ade-
quate to meet the constitutional requirements.
47
On the other hand, where fruits or instrumentalities of the
crime are sought, it is generally required that they be carefully
identified and described. Indeed, the Court has held that particu-
larity of "the most scrupulous exactitude" was required of officers
to seize books, papers, and other records in enforcing the pro-
42. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498 (1925); United States v.
Joseph, 174 F. Supp. 539 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
43. State v. Edwards, 311 P.2d 266 (Okla. Crim. 1957); Hines v. State,
275 P.2d 355 (Okla. Crim. 1954); see also Annot., 47 A.L.R.2d 1444 (1956).
44. United States v. Gannon, 201 F. Supp. 68 (D. Mass. 1961).
45. See, e.g., Alioto v. United States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (E.D. Wis.
1963).
46. United States v. Nuckols, 99 F.2d 353 (D. Cir. 1938).
47. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 504 (1924); United States v.
Nuckols, 99 F.2d 353 (D.C. Cir. 1938); United States v. Quantity of Ex-
tracts, Bottles, etc., 54 F.2d 643 (S.D. Fla. 1931); United States v. Russo,
250 F. Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa. 1966); United States v. Joseph, 174 F. Supp. 539
(E.D. Pa. 1959).
visions of a state antisubversive law.48 The purpose of the de-
scriptive requirement is to offer some assurance to the court that
the officer has a specific object in mind before embarking on
the search and, in addition, to limit the degree of invasion by
confining the scope of the search to those areas where the article
might reasonably be located. Thus, if the officer is searching for
a large cumbersome item, for example, a television set, he would
not be empowered to look into the glove compartment or any other
area of the vehicle where an object of this size could not readily
be concealed.
This is not to say, however, that property of an entirely dif-
ferent character than that described in the warrant must be ig-
nored. In this regard, it is important to distinguish between the
right to search for certain goods and the right to seize such items
should they be discovered by chance during the course of a
proper search. It is well established that given a lawful search
some things may be seized in connection therewith which are not
described in the warrant.49 While the scope of the search is limited
to those objects specified in the warrant, the prevailing opinion
in the federal law allows the immediate seizure of all articles
uncovered which reasonably appear at the time to constitute the
fruits, instrumentalities, contraband, or mere evidence of a crime
without consideration as to whether they are connected with the
offense charged.
In United States v. Eisner,50 an FBI Agent applied to the U.S.
Commissioner for a warrant, stating in the affidavit he had ob-
tained information from a reliable informant that the defendant's
automobile contained furs stolen from the Davidson Indiana Fur
Co., of Indianapolis, Indiana. Following execution of the warrant,
it was discovered the furs recovered from the trunk of the car
were not taken from the company named in the affidavit but
rather had been stolen from a company in South Dakota. The
appellate court agreed with the finding below that probable cause
to search the automobile existed regardless of what the search
developed and the failure to find the items specified did not affect
the validity of the warrant. Moreover, seizure of the furs was
sustained even though they were the subject matter of a different
crime.5'
The argument for retention of the property by the Government
in Eisner was especially persuasive since at the time of their
48. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965). See also A Quantity
of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367
U.S. 717 (1961).
49. Palmer v. United States, 203 F.2d 66, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
50. United States v. Eisner, 297 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 859 (1962).
51. See also Johnson v. United States, 293 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 888; Bryant v. United States, 252 F.2d 746 (5th Cir.
1958); Sanders v. United States, 238 F.2d 145 (10th Cir. 1956).
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discovery the Agent apparently believed the furs had been taken
from the company specified in the affidavit. Once possession had
lawfully been acquired and it was learned that the property came
from a company different from the one believed to be the source,
the Agent was under no obligation to return them to the de-
fendant. The holding would not have differed, however, if it had
been apparent at the time of their discovery that these articles
were the fruits of a separate crime. As the decision indicated,
the federal courts generally have held that where the search is
valid and made in good faith, the officers need not ignore material
related to an offense other than that which is the basis for the
search.5 2 Having come into the officer's possession through a
lawful search, "it would be entirely without reason to say he must
return the item because it was not one of the things it was his
business to look for."
63
Moreover, the observation of such items, particularly in the
case of contraband, provides sufficient justification for an imme-
diate arrest on the theory that the officer has discovered a crime
being committed in his presence. Thus, where the search of a
vehicle for illegal aliens at a checking station disclosed a large
quantity of nontax-paid whiskey, the officer was entitled to arrest
the driver, seize the whiskey, and testify as to the violation of
law he observed.54 Furthermore, he may properly search the
entire automobile for additional evidence of contraband incident
to the arrest and in this manner increase the scope of his search
authority beyond the bounds set by the warrant.
Finally, it is important to recognize that there may be statu-
tory and constitutional limitations regarding the classes of property
which may lawfully be sought by a warrant. Not every item
of physical evidence can be seized, regardless of its value in es-
tablishing the crime or proving the guilt of the offender. Rule
41(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a
warrant may be obtained under federal law for property: (1)
stolen or embezzled in violation of the laws of the United States;
or (2) designed, intended to be used, or which has been used
as the means of committing a federal offense; or (3) possessed,
controlled, or designed or intended for use or which is or has
52. See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); Zap v. United
States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946); Johnson v. United States, 293 F.2d 539 (D.C.
Cir. 1961); Bryant v. United States, 252 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1958); Palmer
v. United States, 203 F.2d 66 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
53. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 238 (1960).
54. Kelly v. United States, 197 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1952).
been used as a means of violating any penal statute or treaty
in aid of any foreign government. 5 The historical basis for this
limitation is that the Government may search for and seize only
that property which it has a paramount right to possess or to
which the holder has no legal claim.56 To illustrate, one can have
no private right in contraband, for the possession of such articles
is, in and of itself, a criminal offense; property used in the com-
mission of a criminal violation is deemed forfeited to the state;
and, of course, the fruits of the crime belong not to the thief but
to the rightful owner. Consequently, each of these items is seizable
under the law.57
Until recently, it was well established that property could
be taken where the sole interest of the state was in its value as
evidence against the suspect in a contemplated criminal prosecu-
tion. Accordingly, the Supreme Court had held that the seizure of
private papers and books which are "merely evidentiary" was pro-
hibited through an interplay of the fourth and fifth amendments
to the Constitution.
5 8
The prohibition against the search for and seizure of "mere
evidence" was recently abolished as a constitutional imperative in
Warden v. Hayden.59 There the Supreme Court held that officers
may search for and seize mere evidence of a crime if there is
''cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular
apprehension or conviction."
Congress thereafter amended Rule 41(b) in the Omnibus Crime
Control Act of 1968 by adding section 3103a to Title 18 of the
United States Code:
In addition to the ground for issuing a warrant in section
3103 of this title, a warrant may be issued to search for and
seize any property that constitutes evidence of a criminal
offense in violation of the laws of the United States.60
Although Congress was quick to act in adopting the Warden
rule into positive law, the mere evidence rule may still be re-
flected in statutory limitations in effect in most other jurisdic-
tions. Until these laws are modified to conform with the broadened
search powers expressed by the Court, items of merely evidentiary
55. FED. R. ClaM. P., 41(b). See also 18 U.S.C.A. 3031(a) (Supp.
1969).
56. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 589-91 (1946).
57. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623-24 (1886); United States
v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1926); see also People v. Chiagles,
237 N.Y. 193, 142 N.E. 583 (1923).
58. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). But see State v. Biscaccia, 45 N.J. 504, 213 A.2d
185 (1965), where the New Jersey Supreme Court questions the "right to
possession" rationale and contends, "[t]he truth is that government searches
and seizes to obtain evidence of guilt."
59. 387 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1967).
60. See United States v. Robinson, 287 F. Supp. 245 (N.D. Ind. 1968).
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nature cannot be secured through the warrant process.
Some state laws are explicit in their listing of the types of
property for which a search warrant may be issued, and unless
the article sought is expressly mentioned in the statute, it cannot
be seized in this manner. But only a comprehensive enumeration
or the inclusion of a sweeping clause permitting the seizure of
"evidence of the crime" will assure the obtaining of all relevant
items connected with the crime. For example, a Missouri statute
authorizes warrants for the seizure of narcotic drugs, forged and
counterfeited instruments and molds for production thereof, dairy
product receptacles used in violation of trademark laws, lost or
salvaged property, illegally possessed game and wildlife, and ap-
paratus and materials used in the unlawful manufacture of liq-
uor.6 1 Since no provision is made for weapons or instruments used
to commit a crime, such items can be seized only when discovered
during the course of a search conducted incident to arrest.
62
Other states permit the taking of "property constituting evi-
dence of crime or tending to show that a particular person com-
mitted a crime."61 These provisions now square with the federal
law on the subject. In any event, even before the Warden an-
nouncement abandoning the mere evidence rule, this perhaps was
an area of the law alluded to in Ker v. California,6 4 in which the
states were allowed some latitude to adopt measures suited to
their particular needs.65
B. Limitations on the Use of a Warrant.
Ideally, all searches for evidence of crime should be con-
ducted under the authority of a warrant, but, as the introductory
remarks indicate, it is often impractical to do so where a car is
in a mobile condition and can be quickly moved to an unknown
61. Mo. R. CRIM. P. 33.01, § 542.380, R.S. Mo. (1959). See Hunvald,
A Dialogue on the Application of Federal Standards to Missouri Criminal
Law, 30 Mo. L. REv. 350, 360 (1965).
62. Id.
63. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC., § 792(4); CALIF. PEN. CODE § 1524(4)
(1957); WIS. STAT. § 962.01-963.02; OREG. REV. STAT. § 141.010(2) (Supp.
1963); NEBR. REv. STAT. § 29-813 (Supp. 1963).
64. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
65. See People v. Thayer, 47 Cal. Rptr. 780, 408 P.2d 108 (1966),
where the Supreme Court of California, per Chief Justice Traynor, held
the "mere evidence rule is not a constitutional standard and has no appli-
cation in that state." State v. Bisaccia, 45 N.J. 504, 213 A.2d 185 (1965)
(limiting the rule to private papers and books); Boles v. Commonwealth,
304 Ky. 216, 200 S.W.2d 467 (1947); State v. Raymond, 142 N.W.2d 444
(Iowa 1966).
location. As a result, the courts have long permitted vehicle
searches to be made on probable cause alone.0 6 While this con-
stitutional exemption goes far to meet enforcement needs created
by the use of automobiles in criminal endeavors, additional prob-
lems remain concerning the seizure of physical evidence located
within the vehicle itself.
It is particularly difficult, for example, to obtain such evi-
dentiary items as blood samples, hair or clothing fibers, dust par-
ticles, or other trace specimens which may have been left in the
car by a criminal suspect or his victim. In the absence of consent
or abandonment, the problem of seizing tangible articles of this
type becomes acute in those situations where the police must obtain
a warrant before entering a vehicle. For aside from "mere evi-
dence" limitations which may still exist on the state level, it often
is not possible for the officer to meet the constitutional require-
ments that he describe the type of object sought with particu-
larity and establish sufficient probable cause to believe that such
items are located within the vehicle.
In many jurisdictions there are statutory limitations which
may prevent the issuance of a warrant in these circumstances.
As mentioned in the preceding section, the legislative authority
to search for and seize physical evidence by warrant is sometimes
set out in explicit terms, specifically designating the kinds of
items which may be seized. Few, if any, statutes of this nature
include in their listing such items as blood specimens or hair
fibers. Nor is the problem alleviated where the statute is worded
more broadly to encompass the fruits, instrumentalities, or con-
traband of crime, for it is unlikely that such articles would fall
within any of these categories. Some states allow the seizure
of all physical evidence related to the offense, and the Warden
case now supports their constitutionality. While this issue is not
unique to automobile searches, the problems are exacerbated
somewhat by the frequency and regularity with which motor ve-
hicles are stolen or employed as an instrumentality of crime.
Consider the facts of a particularly offensive crime that oc-
curred in Westport, Connecticut, several years ago. A gardener
returned to the home of his former employer in the early morning
hours and, upon gaining entry, repeatedly attacked a mother and
her young daughter. Toward the end of the morning, the de-
fendant attempted to strangle both women with a clothesline.
The mother died but the girl managed to survive. After dis-
covering that efforts to kill the daughter had been unsuccessful,
he tied the girl securely with rope and carried her to his auto-
mobile. The assailant drove for several hours during which time
66. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
67. See Note, Evidentiary Searches; The Rule and the Reason, 54
GEO. L.J. 593 (1966).
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he again attacked his victim. Eventually, the girl was able to untie
her bonds and escape to a nearby residence. A warrant was
issued, and several days later the suspect was arrested by FBI
Agents in Soperton, Georgia. Connecticut authorities inspected
the car in Georgia without a warrant two days after the arrest
and submitted certain materials taken from the vehicle to their
state laboratory for examination. The vehicle was later returned
to Connecticut, where it was again examined by members of the
Westport Police Department. At the trial for first-degree murder,
testimony was admitted over the defendant's objection concerning
the finding of significant quantities of human hair and blood
samples on the rear seat and door of the car. On appeal from
the conviction, the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut re-
versed and remanded for a new trial, ruling that in the absence
of consent the warrantless search of the automobile was illegal.68
The obligation of the police to examine this vehicle for blood-
stains, hair fibers, or other physical evidences which could estab-
lish either the guilt or innocence of the defendant in this case
is undisputed. Yet as the court indicated, the officers could enter
the automobile in this situation only with the consent of the de-
fendant or the authority of a lawful search warrant. But reliance
on consent is a poor alternative, for the federal courts have long
been hesitant to accept a waiver of rights by an arrestee, particu-
larly one who denies his guilt in the matter.6 9 Similarly, the
courts have found it equally difficult to infer consent in cases
where it must have been obvious to the defendant that the officers
would discover the incriminating evidence in the place to be
searched.
7 0
All things considered, the most appropriate procedure in this
type of situation would be to obtain a search warrant, but, as
stated, both statutory and constitutional limitations make it im-
probable that a court would issue a warrant for items which
do not fall within the prescriptions of the enabling statute or
which are not classifiable as fruits, instrumentalities, contraband
or mere evidence of the crime. Even though the proscription
against seizure of mere evidence has been abandoned by the fed-
eral courts, can it be said with any assurance that the officers
68. State v. Miller, 152 Conn. 343, 206 A.2d 835 (1965); see also Thur-
low v. State, 406 P.2d 918 (Nev. 1965).
69. Weed v. United States, 340 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1965); Judd v.
United States, 190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
70. Higgins v. United States, 209 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1954); United
States v. Wallace, 160 F. Supp. 859 (D.D.C. 1958).
would have sufficient information to convince a magistrate that
there is probable cause to believe that bloodstains or hair fibers
are located in the vehicle? And would it not be even more difficult
to specify with particularity or definiteness the precise articles
sought by the warrant? To be both candid and practical, one
must admit that any examination conducted under these circum-
stances would be of a general exploratory nature, a type of search
long prohibited by the courts as violative of the fourth amend-
ment.
A similar problem arises in cases involving the recovery of
stolen automobiles. At least one federal appellate court has
stated that in the absence of consent, any examination of the
motor vehicle number of an impounded automobile must be con-
ducted under the authority of a warrant.7 1 Avoiding for the mo-
ment the question of whether a warrant may properly issue where
no seizure of any kind is contemplated 2 it is again doubtful that
a vehicle number may properly be characterized as "seizable."
Further, how can such a vehicle lawfully be inspected for fin-
gerprints or other physical evidence relating to the crime short
of establishing the identity of the owner through independent in-
vestigation and obtaining his consent for the examination?
The problems encountered in securing items of an evidential
nature are perhaps minimized somewhat where a lawful entry
can be effected into the vehicle either under a warrant for specific
property listed in the enabling statute, during a proper search
under the Carroll rule,7 3 or as incident to the defendant's arrest.
Undoubtedly, the owner has fourth amendment rights over the
interior of his car and any articles therein that he legally pos-
sesses, but it is questionable whether he has any property right,
or privacy right, over the fibers from a victim's clothing or
in blood and hair samples that may have fallen from a victim's
body. Furthermore, it might well be argued that since these
items are not "personal effects" as that term is usually interpreted
under the fourth amendment, the defendant could have no lawful
objection to their seizure even if it should be established that
such items in fact came from his own person.
But this theory provides only a partial answer at best, for
the scope and intensity of a search made in connection with an
arrest or under authority of a warrant are limited by the nature
of the item sought. One looking for a gun, for example, cannot
take dust sweepings from the floor area. Thus, unless the object
sought is itself of similar size and character, it would be difficult
71. Simpson v. United States, 346 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1965).
72. See, e.g., dissent by Holtzoff, J., District of Columbia v. Little,
178 F.2d 13, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
73. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); See discussion in
text at p. 389.
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to support the type of close examination ordinarily needed to
detect fibers and other evidentiary materials within the vehicle.
In few cases would the police be justified in employing cleaning
apparatus or other scientific techniques required for the detection
of these materials.
As an alternative theory, it has been suggested that the vic-
tim's blood, clothing, and hair fibers may be considered "fruits"
of the crime, or stolen property, since they clearly were taken
from the victim by force and violence.74 In that event, it would
be possible to search for and seize these items under a warrant,
provided the standards of particularity and probable cause could
be satisfied. But in the absence of any federal decisions on point,
the propriety of using either of these procedures to obtain evi-
dentiary materials remains a matter of conjecture.
It would seem that the decisional law has not given appro-
priate weight to the consideration that when a vehicle falls within
the category of fruit, instrumentality, or contraband of crime, it
is subject to immediate seizure in precisely the same manner as
any other property which is so classified under the criminal law.
In the Miller case,75 the automobile had been used to convey
the defendant to and from the murder residence, to transport his
rape victim from her home, and to facilitate both the commission
of the crime and his subsequent escape to another state. Thus
the car was an integral part of the scheme of murder, rape, and
kidnaping, and was properly classifiable as a means by which
these offenses were committed. As such, the vehicle should have
been subject to seizure in its entirety as an instrumentality of
crime. It did not differ in this regard from shoes worn by a
bank robber during the commission of the crime or, indeed, from
a weapon used to carry out the offense.
76
Once an article is lawfully seized, moreover, no further tres-
pass is involved by its close examination at leisure either at the
station house or in the police laboratory. Surely, the weapon
taken from a bank robber incident to his arrest, or otherwise law-
fully discovered by the police, could be subjected to a ballistics
test for comparison with the slug or cartridge found at the scene
of the crime. Preliminary to the examination, the chamber of the
74. See Brief for United States at 4, n.12, Fuller v. United States,
390 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
75. State v. Miller, 152 Conn. 343, 206 A.2d 835 (1965).
76. United States v. Guido, 251 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1958). See Brief for
United States at 4, Harris v. United States, 370 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1966),
aff'd, 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
weapon would be opened and the serial number noted. If the
gun had been used to strike the victim, additional scientific tests
would be made for the presence of blood or skin samples or
traces of hair fibers. Each of these procedures, well established
in the law, ought to be equally applicable where the instrumen-
tality or object of the crime is a vehicle. Yet, with the exception
of those cases where an automobile has been confiscated for for-
feiture purposes, few decisions have adopted this general approach.
One recent case which applied the instrumentality theory in
support of a vehicle search is Johnson v. State.77 There the victim
informed local officers that as she alighted from her automobile
in a parking lot, she had been kidnaped by four men and taken
to a nearby farm area where she was beaten and raped. She
described the vehicle her assailants had used as a ligh-colored
Cadillac bearing Maryland license plates and an AAA decal on the
rear. Shortly thereafter, sheriff's deputies, who had been alerted
to watch for the vehicle, saw an automobile fitting that description
travel through a stop sign. The vehicle was halted and the three
occupants were immediately arrested and handcuffed. After they
were placed in the patrol car, one of the deputies examined their
vehicle. Although he found a revolver under the right front seat
and observed in the trunk a white coat and black purse, which
were later identified as the property of the victim, the officer
did not remove any of these articles at that time.
The appellants were taken to the station and their vehicle
was towed to a police parking lot. A fourth assailant was sub-
sequently apprehended. Approximately 2% hours after the arrest,
the deputies reexamined the automobile and found another pistol
under the driver's seat. Still later that morning the coat and
purse were removed from the trunk. It was not until several
days following the arrest that sweepings and dust samples were
taken from the car. The items obtained in each of these searches
were admitted in evidence at the trial, and the appellants were
convicted of rape and kidnaping.
On review, the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled the revolver
found under the right front seat of the car immediately following
the arrest was obtained through a lawful search conducted inci-
dent to arrest and therefore was properly received in evidence.
The appellants contended that the coat, purse, and second gun,
found several hours later, were inadmissible since the search and
seizure by which they were obtained were too far removed in
time from the arrest to be incident thereto. The court of appeals
rejected this argument and distinguished the instant case from
Preston v. United States,78 by commenting that here
77. 238 Md. 528, 209 A.2d 765 (1965).
78. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
Search of Motor Vehicles
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
[t] he automobile ... had been used as an instrument
in the perpetration of the alleged crime; [the victim] stated
that she had been raped in the back seat. The coat and
purse had been seen in the truck of the car at the time of
arrest and could legally have been seized at that time.
Where there has been a valid arrest, property found in con-
nection with the arrest which tends to establish the com-
mission of the crime charged may be held by the officers
for evidence. If the arrest is lawful, the seizure is lawful,
if the property is of evidentiary nature. . . . The automo-
bile itself could have been offered in evidence at the trial.
Having lawfully seized it, the police had the right to ex-
amine it after the seizure for evidence in connection with
the crime.
79
79. Id. at 770. Accord, Trotter v. Stephens, 241 F. Supp. 33 (E.D.
Ark. 1965), aff'd, Harris v. Stephens, 361 F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1966) (upholding
search of vehicle 2 hours after arrest where automobile had been used in
the commission of a rape); Kimbro v. Henderson, 277 F. Supp. 550 (W.D.
Tenn. 1967) (vehicle seized as material evidence of murder); United
States v. McKendrick, 266 F. Supp. 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (vehicle an in-
strumentality of hijacking); United States v. Doyle, 373 F.2d 875 (2d Cir.
1967) (vehicle an instrumentality of bank robbery); People v. Teal, - Cal.
Super. -, decided February 25, 1969, 4 CrL 2483 (auto seized incident to
arrest for murder "as evidence connecting [defendant] with crimes");
State v. Anderson, 148 N.W.2d 414 (Iowa 1967) (search of vehicle at police
garage reasonable because car was instrumentality used in the carrying of
concealed weapons and the possession of burglary tools); Abrams v. State,
223 Ga. 216, 154 S.E.2d 443 (1967) (vehicle seized at time of arrest "as an
implement used in the commission of the crime of rape"); State v. Hoy,
430 P.2d 275 (Kan. 1967) (auto seized as instrumentality of fatal shooting);
State v. McCoy, 437 P.2d 734 (Ore. 1968) (officers took custody of car as
instrumentality of rape offense); State v. McKnight, 52 N.J. 35, 243 A.2d
240 (1968). See also People v. Webb, 66 Cal. 2d 107, 424 P.2d 342, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 902, n.3 (1967); People v. Miller, 245 Cal. App. 2d 112, 53 Cal. Rptr.
720, 738-739 (1966); State v. Darwin, 230 A.2d 573 (Conn. 1967) (holding
that an automobile can be seized under a warrant as having been used
in a murder and authorizing a search of the car as to all integral parts or
components of that automobile, including dust, scratches, dents, stains, or
mud on the body or chassis of the vehicle).
In Weaver v. Lane, 382 F.2d 251 (7th Cir. 1967), the defendant was
arrested for the rape of a young girl. En route to the police station he
walked past the automobile in which the attack occurred, stopped at the
vehicle, and took his coat from it. The car was under police guard at that
time. "Although the defendant gave no consent to the removal of his car
to the city police garage and was shown no evidence of a warrant for
the seizure of the automobile, the vehicle was taken into police custody
and examined by technicians. A blood-stained seat cover, blood stains
from the dash panel from the front seat were removed and used in evi-
dence at the criminal trial." In a habeas corpus proceeding, the federal
district court held the search illegal since it was not made contemporane-
ously with the arrest. The court of appeals disagreed and remanded the
case for denial on the petition for habeas corpus. In support of the ruling,
the court said:
In the case before us, Detective Garner saw the bloodstained
interior of the automobile as he came by the petitioner who had
In Johnson the court upheld the seizure of the automobile as
having lawfully been made incident to the arrest of the occupants.
This rationale could well be extended to say that independent of
the arrests, the officers had reasonable cause to believe the car
had been used as a means of committing the offense of rape or
kidnaping and could therefore seize and search the vehicle. Thus,
had the automobile been located at a point beyond the scope of
the incidental search rule, it would seem that the seizure would
nevertheless have been appropriate.
This doctrine is but a slight extension of the statutory au-
thority which has been granted by federal and state laws with
regard to the seizure of conveyances used to transport contraband
materials.80 In point of fact, the rule permitting a search of mobile
vehicles as an exception to the constitutional warrant require-
ment, grounds on the realization that "[a]n automobile ... was
an almost indispensable instrumentality in large-scale violation of
the National Prohibition Act and the car itself therefore was
treated somewhat as an offender and became contraband."8 ' The
power of Congress to brand goods as contraband and declare them
or vehicles transporting them to be subject to forfeiture has con-
just been arrested and who was getting his coat out of the car.
As the petitioner said, the automobile was already in effect in
custody of the watching motorcycle policeman. They were not
isolated, later-discovered items which were seized, but the entire
automobile itself at the scene of the crime for which the petitioner
was being arrested.
There is no reason why the prosecutor could not have intro-
duced the entire automobile in evidence. The automobile was dis-
mantled purely as a matter of convenience. The petitioner had
been arrested and his automobile had been seized in the same gen-
eral transaction.
The court's reference to the fact that the automobile could have been
dismantled and introduced in evidence against the accused is reminiscent
of the language used by Justice Black in Cooper v. California, 368 U.S. 58
(1967). There, the Supreme Court sustained the search of a vehicle 8 days
after the arrest of the driver and the impounding of his automobile, plac-
ing particular emphasis on the fact that the car was held as evidence.
In Cooper the vehicle was seized under a state statute providing for the
forfeiture of vehicles used in the transportation of narcotics. In Weaver the
car was seized incident to the arrest of the defendant, presumably as an
instrumentality of the crime of rape. The common denominator in both
cases is that the automobile was seized and held as evidence for use in a
later proceeding. This is to be distinguished from situations where the
police take possession of a car solely for custodial purposes or, as Justice
Black put it, for the convenience of the driver. In the latter event, a
warrantless search of the vehicle, made without consent and conducted
at a place remote in time and place from the arrest, will be invalid.
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
80. See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Commonwealth, 380 U.S. 693
(1965); One 1961 Lincoln Continental Sedan v. United States, 360 F.2d 467
(8th Cir. 1966); United States v. Francolino, 367 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1966);
United States v. Ziak, 360 F.2d 850 (7th Cir. 1966); Drummond v. United
States, 350 F.2d 983 (8th Cir. 1965); Burge v. United States, 342 F.2d 408
(9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 829 (1965); Sirimarco v. United
States, 315 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 807 (1963).
81. United States v. Dire, 332 U.S. 581, 586 (1948) (emphasis added).
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sistently been sustained by the courts with respect to the carriage
of illicit liquor, narcotics, and counterfeit money. 2 The theory
underlying this legislation is that the owner has lost any rightful
claim to the property by employing it for unlawful purposes and
upon such use title forfeits to the Government.
It would seem, therefore, that a strong argument could also
be made for a similar forfeiture of the vehicle where it is used
in the perpetration of more aggravated offenses, such as murder
and robbery. Although there is little statutory precedent for leg-
islation of this type, at least one state has adopted such a law.
At the urging of the Chicago Crime Commission, the Illinois Legis-
lature passed a bill in 1965 which provides for the forfeiture of
"any vessel, vehicle, or aircraft" used in the commission of the
offenses of murder, aggravated kidnaping, armed robbery, bur-
glary, possession of burglary tools, arson, possession of explosives,
gambling, or certain narcotics violations. 3 Although no case law
by which to measure the judicial response to this law is available
at this writing, the constitutionality of the statute appears to be
on strong footing.
By the same reasoning, it follows that an automobile may
likewise be seized and searched when the officers have cause to
believe that it is stolen. In one of its earliest pronouncements
on fourth amendment matters, the Supreme Court stated that
"[t]he seizure of stolen goods is authorized by the common
law . . ." on the theory that "the owner from whom they were
stolen is entitled to their possession. ' '8 4 Again, the seizure could
be effected without any accompanying arrest so long as the officer
had the requisite cause to believe the automobile was stolen prop-
erty. Although there is no case law on this precise point as yet,
several states have adopted legislation specifically empowering the
police to seize an automobile when they have reasonable cause
to believe that the vehicle is not in the rightful possession of the
owner.8 5 And once having lawfully acquired the automobile,
whether as a fruit, instrumentality, or contraband of crime, "there
appears no good reason why officers may not inventory the con-
tents . . . without having to obtain a warrant to search what
82. United States v. Francolino, 367 F.2d 1013, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966).
83. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 36-1 (1965); see LaFave, Search and
Seizure: "The Course of True Law . . . Has Not ... Run Smooth," 1966
U. ILL. L.F. 255, 378.
84. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623, 624 (1886); Brief for
United States at 39, Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
85. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 13-2-17 (1954); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 41-1-115 (1960); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 31-322 (1967).
they already lawfully possess.'8 6
It has not been intended to suggest that the warrant require-
ment should be dispensed with merely to facilitate the collection
of physical evidence. Nor is it proposed that motor vehicles be
further exempted from the firmly settled rules of search and
seizure. On the contrary, to the extent that the police have long
had the authority to seize the fruits, instrumentalities, and con-
traband of crime, this theory introduces no new or novel idea
into the law. The point here is simply that it is inappropriate
to equate the sanctity of the automobile, which is but a form of
personality, to that traditionally accorded the private dwelling.
It is well established that these are separate and distinct areas of
fourth amendment interests which traditionally have been gov-
erned by different standards of reasonableness. As the Supreme
Court recently stated:
Common sense dictates, of course, that questions in-
volving searches of motorcars or other things readily
moved cannot be treated as identical to questions arising
out of searches of fixed structures like houses. For this
reason, what may be unreasonable search of a house
may be reasonable in the case of a motorcar.8 '
Moreover, this distinction is not based solely on the practica-
bility of securing a warrant. It pertains "also to the purpose and
extent of the interference with liberty represented by the arrest
or search."8 8  In this regard, it can fairly be said that a search
of the trunk of one's car is a far less onerous intrusion than a
police entry into the living quarters of his home. Perhaps because
of this difference, the courts have sometimes sustained auto
searches in fact situations which would not have supported a
warrant for the search of a dwelling.8 9 It would seem, therefore,
that while treatment of the vehicle as a seizable item of personal
property renders it more amenable to a warrantless search and
opens the way for a complete and uninhibited examination for
evidences of crime, this approach is generally consistent with es-
tablished principles of the fourth amendment.
In summary, it is clear that many items of physical evidence
having important probative value lie beyond the reach of the
formal warrant. While this situation is not peculiar to the search
of vehicles, the frequency with which the automobile is put to
use in criminal activities and the fact that it may be employed
for this purpose in a manner unlike that of fixed structures make
it most important that physical properties within the vehicle itself
be obtainable through the normal procedures of the law. Repudi-
86. United States v. Haith, 297 F.2d 65, 68 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 804 (1962); United States v. Ziak, 360 F.2d 850, 852 (7th Cir. 1966).
87. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 366, 367 (1964).
88. United States v. Baxter, 361 F.2d 116, 119 (6th Cir. 1966).
89. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
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ation of the mere evidence rule only partially alleviates this prob-
lem. 0 But as the earlier discussion indicated, additional diffi-
culties would remain with respect to describing the items sought
with sufficient particularity and to establishing cause to believe
that such items are located within the interior of the car.
There are, to be sure, dangers in any proposal that encourages
the seizure and search of private property by methods which
bypass the warrant procedures contemplated by the fourth amend-
ment. Perhaps other more desirable methods of accommodation
can be devised to meet this obvious enforcement need. It might
be practicable, for example, to allow an immediate seizure of the
vehicle in necessitous circumstances, to be followed at the earliest
opportunity by a warrant, not to search for further evidences of
crime, but rather, to provide judicial sanction for formal seizure
and perhaps forfeiture of the vehicle to the government. In this
manner, full and unlimited examination could then be made with-
out artificial distinctions as to whether the article sought is, to
paraphrase Justice Traynor, the bow, the arrow, or only the
quiver."'
There should be some constitutionally permissible way of ob-
taining any and all evidence which might identify the offender
or establish guilt sufficient to support a conviction. Society is
as much entitled to the blood-soaked garment, the dust samples,
fibers, prints, and other residual matter located within the car
as it is to the gun used to murder the victim. At a time when
the courts are deemphasizing the use of confessions and admon-
ishing the police to rely on scientific analysis in their pursuit of
the guilty, it becomes most imperative that such investigation not
be foreclosed by anachronistic or ill-developed rules of law.
2
III. SEARCH ON PROBABLE CAUSE
The capacity of the automobile to be moved quickly to an
unknown location or beyond the jurisdictional reach of the officer
often makes resort to the search warrant impossible. In response
to this problem, the federal courts have long permitted a search to
be made without a warrant or previous arrest when the officers
have reasonable cause to believe the conveyance contains contra-
90. Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE
L.J. 319, 331; LaFave, Search and Seizure: "The Course of True Law ...
Has Not ... Run Smooth," 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 255, 258.
91. Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE
L.J. 319, 331.
92. Golliher v. United States, 362 F.2d 594, 601 (8th Cir. 1966).
band or other items which offend against the law. 8 This doctrine,
popularly known as the "Carroll rule," has been adopted in nu-
merous states, either by statute or court decision, and, where prop-
erly employed, has proved to be an important tool of law en-
forcement.94 Unfortunately, many police administrators are either
unaware of the concept or fail to appreciate its full potential as
a method of search.
It is sometimes asserted that the principle has little practical
value for the police since if there is probable cause to believe the
automobile contains contraband, there are also sufficient grounds
to arrest the operator of the vehicle. This proposition lacks valid-
ity for two reasons. First, in many states the possession of con-
traband is a misdemeanor offense and, if the common law rule is
followed, an arrest can be made only if the violation is committed
"in the presence" of the officer.9 5 Consequently, even the policeman
is powerless to act unless one of his senses affords him direct
personal knowledge that an offense is being committed. Obvi-
ously this standard is difficult to satisfy where, as in most cases,
the contraband is carefully secreted within the interior of the car.
The Carroll rule has particular value here since in most jurisdic-
tions it is applicable to all criminal offenses, including misde-
meanor violations. Indeed, one basis for the decision was the
consideration that the authority of the officer to act in these situ-
ations should not be limited "to what . . . [h]e sees, hears, or
smells, as the automobile rolls by."98
Secondly, it is erroneous to assume that the facts and circum-
stances which underlie probable cause to arrest are identical with
those necessary to establish probable cause to search. The latter
standard is predicated upon two conclusions: that a crime has
been committed and that seizable evidence related to that crime
will be found in the place to be searched. An arrest, on the other
hand, can be made only when an offense is committed in the
presence of the officer, or the officer has reasonable cause to
believe that a felony has been committed by the person to be
arrested.0 7 "In the case of the arrest, the conclusion concerns
the guilt of the arrestee, whereas in the case of search warrants,
the conclusions go to the connection of the items sought with
crime and to their present location."0 8  Situations are certain to
93. Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938); Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931);
United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925).
94. See FLA. STAT. § 933.19 (1965); People v. Terry, 61 Cal. 2d 137
(1964); Pettit v. State, 207 Ind. 478, 188 N.E. 784 (1934).
95. United States v. Blalock, 255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
96. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156-57 (1925). See LaFave,
Arrest, the Decision to Take a Suspect Into Custody, 232 (1965).
97. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925).
98. See Comment, 28 U. Cm. L. REv. 664, 687 (1961). See also
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158-59 (1925).
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arise, therefore, in which grounds for arrest are lacking but which
call for a search of the vehicle for evidence of crime. Suppose,
for example, reliable information indicates that a suitcase con-
taining a large quantity of narcotics has been placed with a public
carrier,9 9 or with an unknowing cabdriver who is directed to trans-
port it to a certain address. Or perhaps the suitcase or other
seizable property is locked within the trunk of the suspect's ve-
hicle, and the car is now in the temporary possession of a friend
or relative. Surely arrest of the innocent transporter would be
inappropriate in these cases. Moreover, consent given by a third
party who is in temporary possession of the suspect's property
has been looked upon with disfavor by some courts. 00 The re-
maining alternative is to secure a warrant or, where impracticable
to do so, conduct an immediate search under the Carroll'0 ' doctrine.
Development and Application of the Rule.
The leading Supreme Court decision which held the search
of motor vehicles without a warrant to be reasonable if made
upon probable cause was, as the name of the rule indicates, Carroll
v. United States.'02 The question in that case concerned the ad-
missibility in evidence of contraband liquor which had been seized
by federal prohibition agents after the interception and search
of an automobile without a warrant on a public highway. Posing
as buyers of whiskey, the agents had arranged to meet the de-
fendants at a later date to make a purchase and had noted the
license number and description of their automobile. The defend-
ants failed to meet the officers as planned, but several months
later they were observed traveling a highway in what appeared
to be a heavily laden vehicle. The officers pursued the vehicle,
stopped it, and conducted an extensive search which disclosed a
large quantity of liquor secreted behind the upholstery of the
seats.
On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the
defendants and propounded what has since become the principal
rule governing the search of motor vehicles without warrant,
namely, that a search may lawfully be made where there is prob-
able cause to believe that an automobile or other conveyance con-
99. Hernandez v. United States, 353 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1965).
100. See Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1, 8 (9th Cir. 1966); but
see, Eldridge v. United States, 302 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1962); State v. Bernius,
177 Ohio 155, 203 N.E.2d 241 (1964).
101. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
102. 267 U.S. 131 (1925).
tains that which by law is subject to seizure. The Court empha-
sized that this authority to search is not conditioned on the right
to arrest. Rather, "it is dependent on the reasonable cause the
seizing officer has for belief that the contents of the automobile
offend against the law."'0 3  In support of this exception to the
general warrant requirement, Chief Justice Taft, speaking for the
majority, noted that the fourth amendment safeguards had long
been construed
as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of
a store, dwelling house, or other structure in respect of
which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained
and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon, or automobile
for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure
a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out
of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must
be sought.
10 4
The Court derived the search authority, in part, from the
provisions of the National Prohibition Act which had empowered
officers who discovered intoxicating liquors to seize both the liquor
and the vehicle transporting it. While the statute expressly pro-
hibited the search of a private dwelling without a warrant, it was
silent as to the necessity for obtaining warrants before searching
motor vehicles. The legislative history of the Act, the Court said,
showed that Congress intended to provide for searches without
warrant and that the statute was entitled to a strong presumption
of constitutionality.
Two decades later the Court suggested that Carroll left unre-
solved the question of whether the principle applied to searches
which were not based on similar statutory authorization. 10 5 Justice
Jackson, writing for the majority, favored a narrow interpretation
of the rule, claiming that Carroll "falls short of establishing a
doctrine that, without such legislation, automobiles nonetheless are
subject to search without warrant in enforcement of all federal
statutes."'106 But this argument seemingly ignored a clear state-
ment in the opinion that "[oin reason and authority the true rule
is that if the search and seizure without a warrant are made
upon probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out
of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile
or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure
and destruction, the search and seizure are valid."'
10 7
Jackson's argument was rejected by the Court the following
year in Brinegar v. United States, 00 which upheld a warrantless
103. Id. at 159.
104. Id. at 153.
105. United States v. DiRe, 322 U.S. 581 (1948).
106. Id. at 585; see Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme
Court, 92 (1966).
107. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 131, 149 (1925). See also dis-
cussion in United States v. Francolino, 367 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1966).
108. 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
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search of a vehicle made under the Liquor Enforcement Act of
1936. Federal agents were parked at a point near the Missouri-
Oklahoma border, in an area where there had been a great deal
of illegal liquor traffic. One of the officers knew the defendant
to have a reputation for hauling liquor, since he had arrested him
on that charge several months earlier; moreover, he had twice
seen him loading liquor into a car or truck during the preceding six
months. Consequently, when the agents saw the defendant's
heavily loaded automobile pass them on the highway, they gave
chase and forced it to the side of the road. A search of the car
revealed a quantity of untaxed liquor in the trunk, and on the
basis of this evidence Brinegar was convicted of importing liquor
into a "dry" State. On review, the Supreme Court sustained the
legality of the search as having been made on probable cause,
despite the fact that it had not been based on any specific statutory
powers. Justice Jackson dissented, protesting that the decision
dispenses with the warrant "as a matter of judicial policy" and
extends the Carroll rule to the enforcement of all federal of-
fenses. 10 9 Nevertheless, the principle has been referred to ap-
provingly by the Supreme Court in several subsequent opinions
and by numerous federal and state tribunals in a variety of search
situations, none of which could be said to ground on congressional
authorization. 110
Neither is there any reason to assume that the type of offense
is relevant. Although Carroll has been used almost exclusively
in matters involving the transportation of per se contraband, such
as narcotics, counterfeit money, and bootleg liquor, it would seem
that its rationale extends as well to fruits and instrumentalities
of crime. Each is a class of property which has long been held
to be seizable under the terms of the fourth amendment. The
only departure which that doctrine made from existing rules of
search and seizure law was to permit a search without warrant
where conditions made it impracticable to secure one. In Henry v.
United States,1 ' the Court made it clear that the rule was ap-
plicable to a search for liquor stolen from an interstate shipment.
And more recently, the Court suggested that an automobile can
be searched without a warrant when there is cause to believe
that it has been stolen. In Preston v. United States,"2 Justice
109. Id. at 183.
110. Ventresca v. United States, 380 U.S. 102, 107, n.2 (1965); Preston
v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98,
104 (1959); Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938). See also discus-
sion in United States v. Francolino, 367 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1966).
111. 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
112. 367 U.S. 364 (1964).
Black, speaking for a unanimous Court, declared, "Here, we may
assume, as the Government urges, that, either because the arrests
were valid or because the police had probable cause to think the
car stolen, the police had the right to search the car when they
first came on the scene." 1 3  But once the "men were under
arrest at the police station and the car was in police custody at
the garage," this authority terminated, since there was no longer
"any danger that the car would be moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction. 11 4  In short, Carroll has been consistently applied
by the federal courts without any indication that either statutory
authorization for the search or the character of the offense involved
is a relevant consideration.
While the Carroll doctrine allows the officer to dispense with
a warrant in cases of necessity, the Court has made it clear that
"[w]here the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it
must be used .... 115 As a general proposition, it may be said
that "practicability," in turn, depends on whether or not the auto-
mobile is in a mobile condition. If the vehicle is in running order
and there is a likelihood that a delay will result in removal of
the car to another, perhaps unknown, location, an immediate
search can be conducted. However, once the possibility of removal
no longer exists, the right to proceed without a warrant terminates.
The circumstances under which an automobile may lose its
character as a movable vehicle cannot be stated categorically, for
such a determination must necessarily depend on the characteristic
facts of each case. Certain generalizations can be drawn, however,
which appear to represent at least the broad outer boundaries of
the rule.
For one thing, it is now well settled that an automobile which
has been placed in a police storage lot after the occupants have
been jailed and the keys removed from their possession is no longer
in a mobile condition. It is the necessity for an immediate search
that gives the right; but since, in these circumstances, there is
no apparent danger that the car would be moved to another lo-
cality, a proper search can be made only upon a warrant or consent
of the party in possession. 116
On the other hand, it is also established that a vehicle does
not lose its character as a movable conveyance simply because it
113. Id. at 367-68, citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
114. Id. at 368. See also United States v. Callahan, 256 F. Supp. 739
(E.D. Minn. 1966), and United States v. Myers, 245 F. Supp. 746 (E.D. Pa.
1965), wherein the court applied the Carroll principle to the search of a
burglary suspect's vehicle but concluded that there was a lack of prob-
able cause.
115. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 131, 156 (1925).
116. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 368 (1964); United States v.
Nikrasch, 367 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1966); Smith v. United States, 335 F.2d
270 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Shurman v. United States, 219 F.2d 282 (5th Cir. 1955);
Rent v. United States, 209 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1954).
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has been brought to a temporary halt," 7 or has been momentarily
left unattended. 118 The relevant inquiry is not whether the auto-
mobile is actually moving but whether it is so readily movable
as to make impracticable the obtaining of a warrant." 9
Attempts to limit Carroll to vehicles in transit on a public
highway or thoroughfare have similarly been rejected on the ob-
vious logic that automobiles located on private property are
no less mobile than any other conveyance. In Armada v. United
States,120 for example, an unoccupied vehicle which was believed
to contain contraband drugs was observed parked on the circular
drive of a hotel. The defendant, Armada, who was in possession
of the keys to the vehicle, stood nearby. The appellate court
sustained a search of the vehicle which had yielded a large quantity
of cocaine, stating that" . . . Armada was free to drive away unless
he was arrested or the automobile was seized or searched." Quoting
from an earlier opinion, the court noted that the possibility of
removal of the automobile "is present whether the vehicle is in
transit on the open road or parked.'
12
A recurrent question dividing the courts is whether the auto-
mobile is still mobile, for purposes of Carroll, once it has been
parked and the driver is in custody, particularly when the keys
have been surrendered to the arresting officer. Some decisions
hold that the principle is inapplicable under these circumstances
on the reasoning that "with [the defendant] already under arrest
and the agents in possession of his keys to the locked car, there
was no danger of movement of the car or loss of the evidence."
1122
This position is sound only if it can be said that the Carroll
rationale was aimed solely at preventing the operator of the car
from removing it or destroying evidence in the vehicle, without
117. Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 132 (1931).
118. See United States v. Haith, 297 F.2d 65 (4th Cir. 1961); cf. Scher
v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938). See also Dodge v. Turner, 274 F.
Supp. 285 (D. Utah 1967). There an officer received an erroneous report
that license plates on an unoccupied auto belonged to another vehicle.
The court held that officer's search of the vehicle was improper without
a warrant. The search was not made reasonable on theory that misde-
meanor was being committed in his presence, even though if vehicle had
been attended arrest and search could follow.
119. Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938); United States v.
Walker, 307 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1962).
120. Armada v. United States, 319 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1963).
121. Id. at 797.
122. United States v. Stoffey, 279 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1960); Shurman v.
United States, 219 F.2d 282 (1955), rev'd on other grounds, 233 F.2d 272
(5th Cir. 1956); Conti v. Morgenthau, 232 F. Supp, 1004, 1008 (S.D.N.Y.
1964); United States v. Kidd, 153 F. Supp. 605 (W.D. La. 1957).
regard for the fact that others might be similarly inclined. But
it is doubtful that any such limitation was intended by the Court.
Obviously, the vehicle can be moved or its contents destroyed
by other persons with or without a duplicate set of keys, unless
of course the officers are able to safeguard such property until
a warrant can be secured and executed.
The better rule is that the right to search is not lost simply
because the operator of the car has been placed in police custody.
A case in point is United States v. Haith.123 In this instance,
federal agents followed the defendant, a known bootlegger, for
the purpose of serving an arrest warrant charging him with con-
spiracy to violate the revenue laws relating to untaxed liquor.
The agents observed the defendant, Haith, as he parked his car
and entered his residence. They saw that the vehicle was over-
loaded, although it was equipped with supplemental air-cushioned
springs, and detected a strong odor of corn liquor emanating from
the trunk. The defendant was arrested in his home and was
asked for the keys to his automobile. He accompanied the agents
out to the car and gave them a key to the ignition, but denied he
had a key to the trunk lock. One of the agents removed the
back seat, reached into the trunk section, and took out a half-
gallon jar of corn liquor. Haith then produced a key to the
trunk, and a search therein produced 90 gallons of illicit liquor.
On appeal, the defendant contended that the district court
erred in denying his motion to suppress the whiskey. Haith argued
that with his arrest and the surrender of the ignition key, it
became practical for the officers to procure a warrant and their
failure to do so invalidated the search and seizure. Since the car
was parked and could not be moved, he argued, there was no
danger that the corn liquor could have been removed or destroyed;
under these circumstances, some of the officers should have re-
mained with the car to protect its contents while others made
efforts to secure a warrant from a commissioner's office.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected these
contentions: "The case is within the well-established rule that
a warrant is not required for a search of a movable vehicle if the
officers have reasonable cause to believe that it contains contra-
band."124 Touching upon the question of mobility, the court said,
"The defendant, under arrest, could not have moved the vehicle
until and unless he was discharged on bail. Meanwhile, however,
others may have had other keys to the ignition switch or, with or
without such keys, could have moved the vehicle unless the officers
were prepared to protect their possession of the seized automo-
bile."125
123. 297 F.2d 65 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 804 (1962).
369 U.S. 804 (1962).
124. Id. at 67.
125. Id. n.1.
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The fact that this decision turns in part on the agents' author-
ity to seize the automobile pursuant to a forfeiture statute does
not alter the essential rationale of the case, namely, that custody
of the suspect does not destroy the automobile's character as a
movable vehicle. Indeed, the opinion strengthens the argument
for an immediate search in situations where no such seizure statute
is involved, for, in that event, removal of the vehicle by the police
for safeguarding until a warrant could be secured might well
be impermissible. The only recourse would be for one of the
arresting officers to remain with the automobile in order to insure
that it is neither tampered with nor removed from its location.
Even assuming that there is adequate manpower to permit the
procedure, it would be unreasonable to suggest that police "divide
up . . . and thereby to endanger themselves, the effectuation of
the arrests, and the search of the automobile."'12 The procedure
is even less feasible in the case of the one-man patrol, since it
would require the arresting officer to remain at the car with his
prisoner while efforts are made by others to secure a warrant or
until a fellow officer arrives on the scene to stand guard over
the vehicle. In these circumstances, the officer is not expected
to make a considered and correct on-the-spot determination as
to the practicability of securing a warrant before searching the
car.
127
Necessity for Obtaining a Warrant Despite Mobility of the Car
Although, as a general rule, a warrant need not be obtained to
search a vehicle which is moving or capable of being moved im-
mediately, there are some situations in which even a completely
mobile vehicle cannot be searched on probable cause alone. As-
sume that officers of a vice squad receive information from a
known and reliable informant that the pickup man in a numbers
operation regularly follows a specific route of travel in his daily
rounds to collect betting slips from his writers. The officers are
advised of the make, model, and license number of the vehicle and
of the approximate times the suspect arrives at various booking
locations throughout the city. Through repeated surveillance of
the suspect over a period of several days, this information is fully
corroborated. Ordinarily, such facts would provide sufficient
grounds for arrest, but what if this course of action is barred
126. Brief for Government at 26, Preston v. United States, 376 U.S.
364 (1964).
127. United States v. Francolino, 367 F.2d 1013, 1018 (2d Cir. 1966).
to the officers because of local restrictions of law, or, for practical
reasons, their preference to search the vehicle on probable cause
in order to obtain physical evidence before effecting the arrest?
Under these circumstances the police cannot proceed under a state
counterpart of the Carroll doctrine because they have been ap-
prised in advance of sufficient information upon which to secure
a warrant and, in addition, have had a reasonable opportunity
to do so. The fact that an automobile retains its character as a
mobile conveyance up to the initial point of the search does not,
in this situation, authorize the police to proceed on probable cause
alone.
To illustrate the point, consider the case of Clay v. United
States,128 where federal agents, acting on information concerning
the reputation and prior conviction of the defendant on a gambling
charge, forced a vehicle he was operating to the side of the road
and searched both his person and the automobile. The precise
holding of the case is obscured somewhat by the fact that it was
the arrest and search of the person based on insufficient probable
cause rather than a search of the vehicle which yielded incrim-
inating evidence. Nonetheless, it is important to note the fol-
lowing comments by the court regarding the failure of the agents
to secure a warrant:
Paradoxically, all of the information now claimed to
have justified the conclusion that a crime had been com-
mitted demonstrated that Clay's actions followed an al-
most fixed, habitual pattern of time, place and move-
ment. In that, the use of the automobile was purely in-
cidental. And, viewed from the vantage of knowledge
held either January 27 or the forenoon of January 28,
there was nothing to indicate that procuring warrants of
arrests or search would thwart, or impede the efficient en-
forcement of law, or intrude upon the judgment of the of-
ficers as to when to close the trap... "I
Thus the key issue in each instance is whether it is practicable
to obtain a search warrant. That is to say, do the circumstances
allow sufficient opportunity to secure and execute a warrant with-
out unduly risking the loss of contraband believed to be contained
in the car? If this question can be answered affirmatively, the
Carroll doctrine cannot be utilized as a method of search.
Entry Upon Private Premises
Case law generally supports the view that where officers,
acting on adequate probable cause and following closely behind
a vehicle, would have been authorized to search the automobile
on a public street, they may properly enter upon private property
in order to conduct the search. Moreover, the right of entry,
128. 239 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1956).
129. Id. at 204.
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under these circumstances, probably extends as well to the cur-
tilage area of the dwelling. In Scher v. United States,180 law
officers followed a heavily loaded vehicle to the defendant's home,
where it was parked in an open garage. They entered the garage
immediately behind the defendant, searched the automobile, and
seized contraband liquor stored in the trunk. In affirming the
conviction, the Supreme Court rejected the defendant's contention
that the passage of the vehicle into the garage destroyed the right
to search, noting that "it seems plain enough that just before he
[Scher] entered the garage, the following officers properly could
have stopped petitioner's car, made search, and put him under
arrest," and the mere fact that he had now parked the automobile
and alighted therefrom did not destroy this right. 
1
3
The holding in Scher is fully consistent with the general rule
that a privileged trespass upon property can be made when the
officer enters with lawful authority to search the premises or
effect the arrest of an occupant. 132 Accordingly, where the police
possess authority to search a vehicle on probable cause and are in
fresh pursuit, their trespass upon the land, necessary to carry
out that purpose, would not render inadmissible any evidence so
derived.
Furthermore, since the special protections of the fourth amend-
ment do not extend to open fields, an officer may also enter
the property outside the curtilage area for the specific purpose of
acquiring the necessary probable cause to make a search. While
a civil trespass would result, it would not be such an intrusion
upon a constitutionally protected area as to prevent the legal use
of evidence subsequently acquired. 18 3 Whether a given area is
within the protected area of a dwelling has been said to depend
upon a number of factors, including whether it is within the en-
closure surrounding the home as well as its use as an adjunct to
the domestic economy of the family." 4 Of course the limitations
regarding mobility would also apply in these circumstances and,
in some instances, might serve to preclude application of the Carroll
rule.
It does not appear, however, that the officers are privileged to
130. 305 U.S. 251 (1938).
131. Id. at 255.
132. United States v. Turner, 126 F. Supp. 349 (D. Md. 1954); 52 AM.
Jua. Trespass § 41 (1944).
133. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924); see Janney United
States, 206 F.2d 601 (4th Cir. 1953); United States v. Hayden, 140 F. Supp.
429, 435 (D. Md. 1956).
134. United States v. Minker, 312 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1962).
enter upon the curtilage where probable cause to search a vehicle
has not been lawfully and independently acquired before entry.
The decisions indicate that information so derived cannot validly




IV. EXAMINATION OF AN IMPOUNDED VEHICLE
It is a common practice among police departments for the
arresting officer to take possession of a vehicle whenever the driver
or person in control is taken into custody and to remove it to the
nearest garage or police lot. In some jurisdictions it appears that
the officer not only has the authority but the duty to impound
the automobile in order to insure its adequate safekeeping during
the period of the arrestee's confinement." 6 Where the owner later
claims loss or damage to his property, the failure on the part of
the officer to exercise this responsibility may result in civil lia-
bility. But the right to impound does not automatically follow
as an incident of the arrest. Absent other circumstances justifying
the seizure of the automobile, there is some question about the
legality of impoundment where the arrestee desires to leave the
automobile in the charge of another party who can remove it from
the scene. On the other hand, removal of an unoccupied, parked
vehicle is clearly justified where it constitutes a traffic hazard
or otherwise violates local parking ordinances.
Assuming, therefore, that the vehicle has been lawfully im-
pounded, the question then arises as to whether a valid search
for incriminating materials can be made without a warrant. Since
the possibility of removal or of the destruction of evidence termi-
nates when the vehicle is placed in storage, a search cannot be
made under the rationale of the Carroll case. Nor would an
incidental search be valid, for as the Supreme Court indicated,
"Once an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search
made at another place, without a warrant, is simply not incident
to the arrest.' 3 7 Thus the federal rule on this matter is clear,
namely, that even where probable cause exists, a warrantless
search of an automobile in police custody at a time after the
135. See the following cases where entry upon the curtilage prior to
acquiring probable cause invalidated searches of vehicles conducted inci-
dent to arrest: Weaver v. United States, 295 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1961);
Baxter v. United States, 188 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1951); United States v.
Castner, 217 F. Supp. 644 (E.D. Tenn. 1963). But compare Marullo v.
United States, 328 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1964).
136. State v. Giles, 254 N.C. 499, 119 S.E.2d 394 (1961). See also
Cotton v. United States, 371 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1967).
137. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964). In the recent case
of DiMarco v. Greene, 385 F.2d 556 (6th Cir. 1967), the court upheld the
discovery of incriminating evidence found in an impounded automobile by
a private person. Officers had arrested the defendant for parole violation
while he was in his automobile. The automobile was placed in a garage
by the police and on the following day when the garageman went to move
the car he discovered a pistol. The court held there was no "search."
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occupant's arrest and under circumstances where there is no danger
of removal is illegal. For example, in Smith v. United States,3 s
the appellant was arrested by local police on a charge of unau-
thorized use of an automobile. His vehicle was impounded and
removed to a nearby service station. On the following day a fed-
eral agent, accompanied by a county police officer, examined the
car without a warrant and discovered a stolen transmission in
the trunk of the automobile. On review, the appellate court held
that the search was invalid and ruled that the testimony of the
purchaser of the transmission, who only learned of its theft when
so informed by the police, was to be excluded since it was "come
at by exploitation of illegality."'3 9
Some state courts, however, have taken the position that once
the vehicle is lawfully in the custody of a police officer, any
contraband contained therein also is legally in his possession and
its discovery is not a result of an illegal search. 140 But the
validity of this argument is doubtful and has been viewed with
some reservation even by courts within the same jurisdiction.
141
This situation is clearly distinguishable from the case where a
vehicle used to transport contraband is seized under statutory
authority and is held as evidence until a forfeiture is declared,
142
or where the car is seized as the fruit or instrumentality of a
crime. 43 Under these procedures the automobile is seized in its
138. 335 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1964), rev'd on rehearing, 344 F.2d 545
(D.C. Cir. 1965). Accord, Williams v. United States, 382 F.2d 48 (5th Cir.
1967). In this case, the defendant fled upon approach of inspectors who
had him under surveillance because they suspected him of stealing treas-
ury checks from the mail. His abandoned auto was legally impounded
and a warrantless search uncovered a stolen checkbook. This evidence was
inadmissible since the search was not incident to any arrest and did not
relate to nature and purpose of custody of impounded vehicle.
139. See also Westover v. United States, 342 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1965)
(wherein appellant's automobile was impounded and towed into police
storage lot after his arrest on a bank robbery charge. On the following
day a federal agent and a local officer searched the automobile without a
warrant and found a topcoat in the trunk, which subsequently was intro-
duced in evidence. The appellate court held the search to be illegal but
sustained the conviction on the ground that the objection was not timely);
United States v. Coin, 332 F.2d 999 (6th Cir. 1964); Shurman v. United
States, 219 F.2d 282 (5th Cir. 1955); Rent v. United States, 209 F.2d 893
(5th Cir. 1954).
140. People v. Ortiz, 147 Cal. App. 2d 248, 305 P.2d 145 (1956); People
v. Baker, 135 Cal. App. 2d 1, 286 P.2d 510 (1955).
141. People v. Gramson, 189 Cal. App. 2d 549, 11 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1962).
142. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
143. People v. Webb, 56 Cal. Rptr. 902, 424 P.2d 342, 353 n.3 (1967);
Abrams v. State, 223 Ga. 216, 154 S.E.2d 443 (1967); Trotter v. Stephens,
241 F. Supp. 33 (1965); Johnson v. State, 238 Md. 528, 209 A.2d 765 (1965).
entirety, and once custody is so acquired, no further trespass is
involved by its later examination. Here, however, the police au-
thority to impound is much more limited: it does not carry with
it the right to assume complete control and dominion over the
property and everything contained therein but, rather, is restricted
solely to those measures which are reasonably necessary to insure
the safe custody of the owner's or possessor's property.
As was noted earlier, the primary purpose of impoundment
is to protect the arrestee's property from loss or damage during
the period of his confinement. In this connection it is not only
reasonable but appropriate that the officer examine the vehicle
and take an inventory of the property which is contained therein
so that it may be returned to the possessor or owner in its due
course. Indeed, some courts look upon the practice as "necessary
to defeat dishonest claims by the owner of theft of the car's
contents and to protect the temporary storage bailee against false
charges."'144 Since entry is not effected for the purpose of un-
covering evidence of crime, the examination of the vehicle is not
considered a search within the terms of the fourth amendment
and the usual limitations of reasonableness developed in that con-
text are inapplicable. 14  Thus the impoundment inventory is
viewed simply as an administrative custodial procedure not unlike
the usual search of the person which accompanies the booking
of an arrestee prior to his confinement. It is important to under-
stand, however, that the procedure cannot be used to seek out
or "rummage around" for incriminating materials and thereby cir-
cumvent the warrant requirement. 146 One can safely predict that
the courts will carefully scrutinize any inventory conducted sub-
sequent to an impoundment to insure that it is consistent with
its avowed purpose.
147
Accordingly, the scope of the examination must be restricted
solely to those areas where a person would ordinarily be expected
to store, or perhaps inadvertently leave, his belongings. The exam-
ination, therefore, would usually include the glove compartment,
the trunk, the sun visors, the front and rear seat areas, and even
144. People v. Ortiz, 147 Cal. App. 2d 248, 305 P.2d 145 (1956); see also
United States v. Fuller, 277 F. Supp. 97 (D.D.C. 1967), wherein court found
duty upon officers to protect impounded auto by rolling up windows and to
protect whatever valuables may be found in auto by keeping them in pre-
cinct station. People v. Simpson, 170 Cal. App. 2d 524, 339 P.2d 156 (1959).
145. Harris v. United States, 370 F.2d 477, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1966). A
similar distinction has been made by the Supreme Court in upholding a
warrantless entry into private premises by health inspectors. Ohio ex rel.
Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246 (1959); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
146. See People v. Burke, 61 C. 2d 575, 39 Cal. Rptr. 531, 394 P.2d 67
(1964).
147. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), where the
trial court reviewed the transcript of testimony and recalled the offi-
cer to determine whether the entry into the vehicle had in fact been a
search for evidence of crime.
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a view under the hood since there may be later claims that parts
have been removed from the engine. Moreover, a notation should
be made of the vehicle identification number, the motor number,
and the make, model, and license plate of the car so that it may
be readily identified at a later date.
48
Similarly, the intensity of the examination must also be limited
according to its purpose. Thus, if the officer dismantles the ve-
hicle, looks behind the upholstery, or in any other manner indi-
cates that his purpose is other than to protect the arrestee's prop-
erty, the courts will consider the examination to be a subterfuge
designed to uncover evidentiary materials. In that event the
fruits of the search will be inadmissible. In addition, the normal
practice will also be pertinent in determining the good faith of
the officer. If it is not the usual procedure of the department
to store and examine vehicles found to be in the possession of
the arrested person, any deviation from this routine will be viewed
with skepticism. Moreover, where the officers delay making their
examination for several days after the arrest and impoundment
of the automobile, naturally some doubt is cast on the validity
of the examination.
But while it cannot be the officer's purpose to look for evidence
of crime, yet if he unexpectedly discovers contraband or other
incriminating materials during the course of a bona fide inventory,
these items may properly be seized and are admissible in evidence.
Since he is lawfully present in the vehicle and there has been
no search in the legal sense, the situation falls within the "plain
view" doctrine which permits the nontrespassing officer to seize
contraband discovered in open and patent view. 149 It is con-
sidered in this situation that a crime is being committed in his
presence and the law does not require "that under such circum-
stances the law enforcement officials must impotently stand aside
and refrain from seizing such contraband material. 150 In People
v. Nebbitt,151 for example, local officers stopped a vehicle which
was being operated without license plates. Neither of the occu-
pants claimed to be the owner of the automobile nor did they
known to whom it belonged. Furthermore, the driver's statement
that he had borrowed the vehicle from a used car dealer was
not consistent with information disclosed on the registration
sticker. On the basis of this information, the officers arrested
148. Cotton v. United States, 371 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1967).
149. People v. Nebbitt, 183 Cal. App. 2d 452, 7 Cal. Rptr. 8 (1960).
150. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154-5 (1947).
151. 183 Cal. 2d 452, 7 Cal. Rptr. 8 (1960).
the two men on a charge of auto theft. "Thereafter, as a normal
procedure before impounding the vehicle, the officers began an
inventory of all personal property found therein.''1 2 One of the
officers picked up a jacket on the front seat where defendant
had been sitting and noticed in plain sight a burned cigarette. In-
asmuch as it appeared to be marijuana, the officer then searched
the jacket and found another such cigarette in the left-hand
pocket. The defendant then admitted that he had purchased the
cigarettes approximately one week earlier.
On appeal of the conviction for having illegal possession of
marijuana, the court held that the possession of the narcotic was
legally obtained by the officer stating:
In the course of making the inventory of the contents
of the car, the officer merely removed the jacket from
the front seat revealing in plain sight the narcotic. How
it got there could not be determined but it is clear that
when the officer picked up the jacket the cigarette was
there for all to see. Actually the officer's observation of
the cigarette was not the result of a search, for it appeared
in plain sight in the normal course of the reasonable and
valid activity of the officer in making the inventory inci-
dental to impounding the car.153
Thus, in Nebbitt not only was the taking of the contraband
proper, but, in addition, its discovery furnished the officer with
sufficient probable cause to arrest for that offense and to conduct
a valid incidental search both of the coat and the vehicle.
5 4
A more recent illustration of this procedure can be found in
Harris v. United States,15 5 where a police officer investigating a
robbery arrested the defendant as he sat behind the wheel of his
car and immediately made a quick but fruitless search of the
automobile for weapons. He then ordered a police towing crane
to impound the car as possible evidence itself of the commission
of the crime. Approximately an hour and a half later, the crane
operator advised the arresting officer of the car's location on the
impounding lot and stated that, although it was raining, he had
not closed the windows because he was afraid of disturbing finger-
prints. According to later testimony, the officer went out to the
lot for the purpose of placing a property tag on the vehicle, in-
ventorying its contents, and removing any valuables for safekeep-
ing, as required by departmental regulation. Having completed
the inventory, he opened the right front door of the car in order
to roll up the window to protect the vehicle from the rain. He
observed, lying in the well of the weather-stripping, an automobile
152. Id. at 455.
153. Id. at 452.
154. See also People v. Myles, 189 Cal. App. 2d 42, 10 Cal. Rptr. 733
(1961).
155. 370 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1966), aff'd, 88 S. Ct. 992 (1968).
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registration card that had been taken from the robbery victim.
The card was admitted in evidence over the defendant's objection
that it was unlawfully seized. The court said the card was ad-
missible because the officer, at the time the card was discovered,
was acting only to secure the automobile and its contents. "There
was, in his view, no search at all in relation to this particular
evidence, and therefore, no fourth amendment issue inescapably
requiring resolution.
'156
It is important to note, however, that the immediate seizure
of contraband, fruits, or instrumentalities of crime without a war-
rant in these circumstances is not permitted in all jurisdictions.
The Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
for example, has indicated that incriminating materials which are
discovered during the course of an inventory cannot be obtained
by the officer until he has secured a search warrant directed to
the custodian of property in his department. 1 7 It is necessary
that the officers list these items on the inventory sheet and turn
them over to the police property clerk in the same manner as
any other article found in the car. This in fact was the procedure
employed by the officer in the Harris case. After taking the
arrestee out to look at the victim's registration card where it lay,
the officer placed it in an envelope for delivery to the property
clerk's office. He then filed an affidavit for a search warrant
which, on the following day, was executed against the property
clerk and the vehicle.15 As indicated above, this procedure is
not consistent with the general law on the subject, nor does it
appear to serve any legitimate interest of the defendant. Hence,
its widespread adoption in other jurisdictions is unlikely.
V. SEIZURE OF A VEHICLE FOR FORFEITURE PURPOSES
Another effective and well-established method of acquiring
possession of a suspect's vehicle is through the use of legislative
or statutory forfeiture provisions. Most jurisdictions authorize the
immediate seizure and forfeiture of conveyances which have been
used in connection with specified unlawful activities, such as nar-
cotics, gambling, and illicit liquor operations. In some jurisdictions
the vehicle can be seized and sold for such diverse offenses, as
156. Id. at 479.
157. Williams v. United States, 170 A.2d 233 (D.C. Mun. App. 1961);
Travers v. United States, 144 A.2d 889 (D.C. Mun. App. 1958).
158. Harris v. United States, 370 F.2d 477, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1966), aff'd,
88 S. Ct. 992 (1968).
those pertaining to local "shellfish" regulations, 1 9 or the continued
use of the vehicle by anyone driving under a revoked or suspended
license. Under the Federal Code, forfeiture laws are applicable
where the conveyance has been used in violation of general In-
ternal Revenue laws,160 including violations of liquor provisions," 1
narcotics statutes,162 counterfeiting matters, 68 the concealment of
property subject to federal tax,164 firearms laws, 6 5 customs stat-
utes,166 or where used to introduce intoxicants into Indian
country.
167
It is generally said that the law vests title in the Government
from the time of the vehicle's commission of the crime. 168 Ac-
cordingly, the conveyance may be seized :without a warrant in
order to bring it within the legal process of the court for a final
adjudication. Once the automobile is in lawful custody of the
Government, a warrantless search can be made for incriminating
materials, without regard to the usual limitations on the scope
and intensity of the search or its relationship in time or place
to the initial arrest or seizure.
In one case, for example, the police furnished an informant
$400 in marked currency, which was to be used to purchase a
quantity of heroin from the defendant, Burge. Shortly after their
scheduled meet, the defendant was arrested; however, a search of
his person and of his vehicle disclosed neither narcotics nor marked
currency. Immediately upon his arrest, the defendant's automobile
was seized and he was notified that his car was being impounded
"because it had been used in the sale and possession of narcotics."
Approximately one week later the police received information from
an undisclosed source that the marked money was secreted in
Burge's automobile. A thorough search was made of the vehicle,
without either a warrant or Burge's permission, and the officers
found the currency hidden in the headlight section of the car.
The money was admitted in evidence against the defendant, and
he was convicted in district court of violating the federal nar-
cotics laws.
Although the case was reversed and remanded for a new trial
on other grounds, the appellate court ruled that the trial court's
refusal to suppress the currency was proper. It was noted that
there was adequate cause to believe that the vehicle had been
159. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 50:5-17 (1955).
160. 26 U.S.C.A. § 7302.
161. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3615, 26 U.S.C.A. § 5614.
162. 49 U.S.C.A. § 782.
163. 49 U.S.C.A. § 782.
164. 26 U.S.C.A. § 7301.
165. 49 U.S.C.A. § 782.
166. 169 U.S.C.A. § 1584.
167. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3618.
168. Florida Dealers and Growers Bank v. United States, 279 F.2d 673
(5th Cir. 1960).
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used in violation of the Contraband Seizure Act and, further, that
from the time of its seizure until the search was conducted, the
vehicle had remained in the lawful custody of the Government.
"In these circumstances, the search without a warrant of [Burge's]
car could not be said to be 'unreasonable'." 169
In a more recent decision the defendant, Long, was arrested
by federal agents in a public restaurant and was charged with
violating the counterfeiting laws. A search of Long's vehicle,
which was located in the restaurant parking lot at the time of
arrest, disclosed a large quantity of untrimmed counterfeit money
in the trunk. Although there was a conflict in the testimony
as to when the search was conducted, the court apparently ac-
cepted the Government's claim that it was not made until after
the vehicle had been removed from the lot to the federal building.
It was held that there was adequate basis for the agents to exercise
their seizure authority under the statutes170 and that the subse-
quent search of the vehicle "when it remained in continuous and
proper Government custody, was not an unreasonable one within
the prohibitions of the fourth amendment."'
7'
It should be readily apparent from the above cases that the
availability of an appropriate forfeiture statute can often provide
the officer with an effective alternative method of search. In
Burge, the search conducted at a police lot one week after the
arrest obviously could not have been sustained as incident to the
arrest, nor could it have been made without a warrant under
the Carroll rule since the vehicle no longer retained its mobility.
Although the court in Drummond indicated in a dictum statement
that the search of the vehicle in the parking lot could have been
169. Burge v. United States, 333 F.2d 210, 219 (9th Cir. 1964), aJ'fd, 342
F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1965). See also Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967);
Lockett v. United States, 390 F.2d 168 (9th Cir. 1968). There the court held
that vehicle was "seized" within meaning of Contraband Seizure Act when
officers had physical possession of it and searched it. The search was rea-
sonable where officers had evidence identifying defendant as robbery
participant and defendant's companion informed the officers as to location
of stolen goods in automobile. Also United States v. Francolino, 367 F.2d
1013 (3d Cir. 1966); One 1961 Lincoln Continental Sedan v. United States,
360 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1967).
170. 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 781-783.
171. Drummond v. United States, 350 F.2d 98 (8th Cir. 1965). See also
Armada v. United States, 319 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 906 (1963); Sirimarco v. United States, 315 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1963);
United States v. Haith, 297 F.2d 65 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 890
(1961); Vaccaro v. United States, 296 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 890 (1961); United States v. Carey, 272 P.2d 492 (5th Cir.
1959); United States v. Interbartolo, 192 F. Supp. 587 (D. Mass. 1969).
made incidental to the arrest in the restaurant, there is some
question about the validity of this proposition.1 72 In any event,
the incidental search could not have been made once the vehicle
was removed to the federal building. Thus, absent consent or an
appropriate forfeiture statute, the only recourse would have been
to secure a warrant. Arguably, there was ample evidence in both
cases to support an affidavit. But where the officer does not
have sufficient information upon which to base a warrant, it may
be helpful to invoke an appropriate statutory forfeiture provision.
One of the more difficult questions with regard to the ap-
plication for forfeiture laws concerns the degree of involvement
which is necessary to bring the vehicle within the scope of the
applicable statute. For example, in United States v. Lane Motor
Co.,175 the operator of an illegal distillery used a truck and an
automobile regularly to drive from his home to a point approxi-
mately one-half mile from the still, walking the remainder of the
distance. The trial court disallowed the forfeiture of the vehicles,
stating that the Government had not shown that they had been
used for transporting materials for use at the still. In a per
curiam decision the Supreme Court affirmed, holding, "We think
it clear that a vehicle used solely for commuting to an illegal
distillery is not used in violating the revenue laws.
1 74
On the other hand, where the vehicle has played an integral
role in violating the applicable statute, clearly it is subject to for-
feiture as an in rem violator. To illustrate this point, consider
the case of United States v. One 1959 Pontiac Tudor Sedan.
75
There, the vehicle had been used to transport a buyer of nontax-
paid whiskey to a pickup point, where he was transferred to an
older vehicle which in turn transported both the whiskey and
the customer to the customer's premises. The vehicle was then
used by the dealer to go to the customer's home in order to collect
his money. The next day the dealer used the vehicle for another
trip to the premises of the same customer, where he received
another order which in turn was delivered to the customer in
the older vehicle. The dealer then returned to the premises and
collected for the second order. In these circumstances the appel-
late court reversed the finding of the court below and held that
the vehicle was properly subject to forfeiture.
176
172. But see United States v. Francolino, 367 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1966).
173. 344 U.S. 630 (1953).
174. Id. at 631. See also Burt v. United States, 283 F.2d 473 (5th Cir.
1960), and Simpson v. United States, 272 F.2d 229 (9th Cir. 1959) (vehicle
used by operator of bookmaking establishments to transport officer in
bribe attempt not sufficiently involved in the gambling enterprise to
warrant forfeiture).
175. 301 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1962).
176. See also United States v. Lawson, 266 F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1959)
(automobile used by dealer to transport a prospective customer to a
Search of Motor Vehicles
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Until recently the courts were divided on the question of
whether the unlawfulness of the search which established that
the vehicle had been used in violation of the law was a bar to
forfeiture. However, that issue was resolved by the Supreme
Court in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Commonwealth.117 In the
latter case officers of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board
stopped an automobile after it had crossed from New Jersey into
Pennsylvania because they noticed that it "was low in the rear."
They searched the vehicle without a warrant and found thirty-one
cases of liquor that did not have Pennsylvania tax seals. The
car and the liquor were seized and the driver was arrested. The
Commonwealth then filed a petition for forfeiture pursuant to
an applicable Pennsylvania statute. The trial court dismissed the
petition on the grounds that the forfeiture was based upon il-
legally seized evidence. The superior court reversed and ordered
that the vehicle be forfeited. The state supreme court affirmed,
holding that the exclusionary rule applies only to criminal pro-
ceedings and is not applicable in this case since the forfeiture
action is essentially civil in nature. The United States Supreme
Court reversed. Mr. Justice Goldberg, speaking for the majority,
pointed out that the forfeiture proceeding is quasi-criminal in
nature and that "its object, like a criminal proceeding, is to pe-
nalize for the commission of an offense against the law." The
Court said that it would be anomalous therefore to hold that
the evidence so derived would be excluded in a criminal pro-
ceeding but admitted in a libel action for forfeiture of property.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
source of whiskey and to keep the customer out of sight while the whiskey
was procured and to take the customer to town was properly forfeited);
Wingo v. United States, 266 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1959) (automobile used for
transfer of large quantities of cash required in illegal lottery business sub-
ject to forfeiture); United States v. General Motors Acceptance Corpora-
tion, 239 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1956) (truck used to transport lottery tickets);
D'Agostino v. United States, 261 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1958) (car used to
transport betting markers and to make the rounds of bettors on a weekly
basis); Nocita v. United States, 258 F.2d 199 (9th Cir. 1958) (car used to
accept winnings of previous wagers was an integral part of bookmaking
business); United States v. One 1952 Lincoln Sedan, 213 F.2d 786 (5th Cir.
1954) (automobile used as a decoy for a truck transporting nontax-paid
whiskey and to block federal officers in pursuit of the truck); United States
v. One 1962 Ford Galaxie Sedan, 236 F. Supp. 529 (S.D. Cal. 1964) (use of
automobile for transportation of checks given in connection with driver's
bookmaking activities was sufficient to justify forfeiture under the Internal
Revenue laws); United States v. One 1963 Cadillac Hardtop, 231 F. Supp.
27 (E.D. Wis. 1964) (vehicle used to transport marihuana). Compare
First National Bank of Atlanta v. United States, 249 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1957).
177. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Commonwealth, 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
was reversed and the matter was remanded for a review of the
trial court's finding that the officers did not have a probable cause
for the search involved. It is well settled, therefore, that unless
the search which provides proof of the unlawful use of the auto-
mobile is reasonable, the evidence derived thereby will be barred
from admission both in a criminal prosecution against the owner
or operator and in a forfeiture proceeding against the vehicle
itself.
VI. CONSENT SEARCHES
The constitutional protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures provided by the fourth amendment can be waived by
the express consent of the person whose property is to be
searched. 178 Because of the obvious advantages it offers over the'
search by warrant or incidental to arrest, the consent search has
become a popular method of securing evidence from suspected
offenders. Where properly obtained from the party in interest,
it avoids the requirements of probable cause and particularity of
description necessary to a valid warrant. And since it need not
be tied to an arrest, the contemporaneous factors of time and
place associated with the incidental search are also inapplicable.
But it is precisely because this technique circumvents these tra-
ditional safeguards of privacy that consent searches are looked
upon with disfavor by the courts.
When one consents to a search of his automobile, it is said
that he waives any constitutional right of privacy he might other-
wise enjoy over the vehicle or any property contained therein.
As in all situations involving a waiver of fundamental consti-
tutional rights, it can be expected that the prosecution will have
to meet a high standard of proof.179 In general, the limitations
set on consent searches are the same considerations that have
been employed in the past in determining the voluntariness of
confessions. Thus the courts have held that consent must be
given in circumstances free of "duress or coercion," that it be
"knowingly and intelligently" given, and that it be stated in a
"clear and unequivocal" manner. Because these determinations
generally involve inquiries into the subjective state of mind of
the suspect, the officer, or both, they present practical difficulties
in judicial supervision which more often than not are resolved
in favor of the criminally accused.
A. Duress or Coercion
Applicability of the fourth amendment guaranty of immunity
from unreasonable searches or seizures is not dependent upon
178. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
179. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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any affirmative assertion by the private citizen. 180 To hold other-
wise would require the individual to make the difficult choice
either of challenging the officer's authority, perhaps by force, or
waiving his constitutional rights through inaction.' Thus, in
many cases where a consensual situation is in issue, there is no
overt indication that the person voiced objection or otherwise
Contested the search. The courts must therefore look to the sur-
rounding circumstances to determine whether or not the pur-
ported consent was induced by pressure or coercion. Peaceful
submission under such circumstances is not consent but simply
acquiescence to higher authority and cannot lawfully support a
search without a warrant."8 2
There is, of course, no easy yardstick by which to measure
the degree of coercion or duress necessary to vitiate an expressed
consent, for this must depend upon the characteristic facts of
each case. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify several factors
which generally influence the courts in making this determina-
tion. It has been held, for example, that the attitude and conduct
of the advising officer are an important consideration, particularly
where they might indicate that he had intended to search in
any event. If he states peremptorily, "Open the glove compart-
ment," or "I want to look in the trunk of your car," it is likely
that this will be viewed as coercive. The courts have also pointed
to such factors as undue emphasis on authority and even an
aggressive manner as being sufficient to invalidate consent.' 8'
Similarly, the time of night,8 4 number of officers seeking con-
sent,18 display of weapons or other symbols of authority, 88 or
presence of the suspect's family during questioning,8 7 all tend
to create a strong implication of coercion.
It is important therefore that the police avoid use of de-
manding words or gestures or any comment which might be con-
strued to mean that the subject has no choice but to allow a
search. This issue often arises when an officer threatens to pro-
180. United States v. Rembert, 284 F. 996, 998 (S.D. Tex. 1922); Dade
v. State, 188 Okla. 677, 112 P.2d 1102 (1941).
181. Id.
182. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Amos v. United
States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); United States v. Rembert, 284 F. 996 (S.D.
Tex. 1922).
183. United States v. Kelih, 272 F. 484 (S.D. Ill. 1922).
184. United States v. Roberts, 279 F. Supp. 478 (D.D.C. 1959).
185. United States v. Alberti, 120 F. Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
186. United States v. Marquette, 271 F. 120 (N.D. Cal. 1920).
187. Catalanotti v. United States, 208 F.2d 264 (6th Cir. 1953).
cure a search warrant if consent is not given. It has been held
by some courts that permission given under these circumstances
is a mere submission to authority and that the individual yields
his rights only because he feels there is no reasonable alternative
but to consent.18
On the other hand, it is arguable that knowledge that one
cannot lawfully prevent a search indefinitely may enable him to
make a more intelligent decision as to whether and how much he
will cooperate. It is not required, of course, that the individual
desire a search be made of his property, but only that he make a
free and voluntary choice on the matter. Accordingly, some cases
hold that where the officer in good faith informs a party of the
likelihood that a warrant will be issued, he does no more than
advise the suspect of the legal alternatives confronting him, and,
in the absence of any aggravating circumstances, this factor alone
will not invalidate the consent.8 9
This line of reasoning is implicit in Hamilton v. State' 90 where
police, alerted to a recent safe robbery, arrested the defendant
near his automobile. The arresting officer asked for permission
to search the car, stating that he did not have a warrant with
him but could get one if necessary. The defendant replied, "There
is no need of that. You can search the car." He then handed
the keys to the officer who searched the vehicle and found a
pistol. In denying a petition for habeas corpus, the federal district
court ruled, "The fact that the officer told [the defendant] that
he did not have a search warrant but that he could get one
is immaterial." Citing an earlier appellate decision, the court
stated, "a defendant cannot assert the illegality of a search made
with his consent, though given in response to a threat to procure
a search warrant."'191 There is a common agreement, however,
that if the consent is obtained through fraud, deception, or mis-
representation regarding either the officer's authority or intention
to secure a formal search warrant, the search will be invalid.
192
One of the more troublesome issues of consent arises when
permission to conduct a warrantless search is obtained from one
who is under arrest or otherwise subjected to official restraint.
Since intimidation and duress are necessarily implicit in such
188. United States v. Baldocci, 42 F.2d 567 (S.D. Cal. 1930); United
States v. Dixon, 117 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Cal. 1949); see also Weed v.
United States, 340 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1965).
189. Simmons v. Bomar, 230 F. Supp. 226 (M.D. Tenn. 1964).
190. Hamilton v. State, 260 F. Supp. 632 (E.D.N.C. 1966).
191. Id. at 635. See, Gatterman v. United States, 5 F.2d 673 (6th Cir.
1925); Kershner v. Boles, 212 F. Supp. 9 (N.D. W. Va. 1963), modified and
aff'd, Boles v. Kirshner, 320 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1963).
192. Bolger v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd,
293 F.2d 368 (2d Cir. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 371 U.S. 392 (1963);
Pekar v. United States, 315 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1965); United States v. Wal-
lace, 160 F. Supp. 859 (D.D.C. 1958).
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situations, it is especially difficult for the prosecution to convince
the court that the waiver was given free from negating pressure
or coercion.1 93 But while some courts consistently view consent
given by one in police custody as invalid,9 4 most federal courts
will inquire into the total circumstances of the case. 95
On the other hand, where conditions of the restraint indicate
a high probability of intimidation, consent by the person in cus-
tody will usually be invalid. This is often the result when a dis-
play of firearms or other open show of force is made during the
course of the arrest. Thus, in one case police officers, exhibiting
drawn pistols and riot gun, stopped the defendant's vehicle and
placed the occupants under arrest for vagrancy and auto theft.
One of the officers asked the defendant, Weed, about a vehicle
parked approximately one and one-half blocks away from the
scene of the arrest and he answered that the vehicle was his.
Weed surrendered the keys to the car after being told by the
officers that they could get a search warrant if necessary. The
latter circumstance, coupled with the fact that the defendant re-
linquished the keys while in custody and "during a period of
dramatic excitement of drawn guns," led the court to conclude
that the alleged consent was not "freely and intelligently
given."19
As a general rule, the courts tend to question the competence
and voluntariness of consent given by a subject who denies guilt,
particularly where it is apparent that incriminating evidence will
be discovered. One appellate court rejected a waiver in this situ-
ation, stating that "no sane man who denies his guilt would ac-
tually be willing that a policeman search his room for contraband
which is certain to be discovered.' 1 7 On the other hand, a con-
fession of guilt which precedes a search tends to support the
193. United States v. Wallace, 160 F. Supp. 859 (D.D.C. 1958).
194. Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
195. Burke v. United States, 328 F.2d 399 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 849 (1964); Kershner v. Boles, 320 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1963);
United States v. Paradise, 253 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1958); United States v.
Perez, 242 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 941 (1957);
Hamilton v. State, 260 F. Supp. 632 (E.D.N.C. 1966); Gendron v. United
States, 227 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. Mo. 1964).
196. Compare United States v. Kuntz, 265 F. Supp. 543 (N.D.N.Y. 1967)
(upholding consent search at a roadblock manned by an officer armed
with a shotgun).
197. Higgins v. United States, 209 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1954). See also
United States v. Gregory, 204 F. Supp. 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 309 F.2d
536 (2d Cir. 1962) (holding that consent given under these circumstances
is simply "not in accord with human experience").
authenticity of the consent. 198
Also, where it appears that the person in custody consented
primarily in an effort "to shift culpability" to another, 199 or to
bluff his way through a search on the mistaken belief that the
incriminating articles are too well concealed to be discovered, the
courts have generally allowed the admission of such items into
evidence. 20 0 A similar result was reached recently in a case where
the subject delivered the keys to his vehicle in an attempt to "cor-
rupt" a federal agent into preventing the government from
obtaining pertinent evidence. In United States v. Hilbrich,201 the
defendant was arrested by police officers shortly after he had
robbed a savings and loan association. While being interviewed
by an agent with whom he was acquainted, he gave his car
keys to the agent and asked him as a "favor" to go to the automo-
bile, which was parked a short distance from the scene of the
robbery, and to "get rid of" two boxes of ammunition located
in the trunk. A second agent used the keys and seized the am-
munition. The defendant later advanced the rather novel argu-
ment that he had not in fact consented to the search since his
only reason in surrendering the keys was to prevent the govern-
ment from getting the evidence. The appellate court, however,
rejected this contention, stating that in the absence of any showing
of coercion, the motion to suppress the evidence was properly
denied.
The defendant's argument here was not without merit; that
is, permission to enter the vehicle was extended for the sole and
limited purpose of disposing of the evidence and, once this author-
ity was exceeded, the consent, which has sometimes been viewed
as an agency relationship, was terminated. But since it is also
clear that Hilbrich made no effort to withdraw his consent even
after the agent unequivocally informed him that he could not
comply with the request, the result in this case seems a proper
one. It is worth repeating at this point, however, that whenever
the conditions permit, as would appear to have been the case
here, an officer should endeavor to obtain a warrant. Although
the practicability of doing so does not have a bearing on the
legality of the consent search, evidence which has been obtained
in the execution of a proper search warrant is always received
more favorably by the courts than that which has been secured
198. United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944); United States v.
Smith, 308 F.2d 657, 663-64 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 906 (1963);
United States v. Wallace, 160 F. Supp. 859 (D.D.C. 1958). See also State
v. Bindhammer, 44 N.J. 372, 209 A.2d 124 (1965).
199. United States v. De Vivo, 190 F. Supp. 483 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).
200. Grice v. United States, 146 F.2d 849 (4th Cir. 1945), contra, Smith
v. United States, 308 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1962) (dictum), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 906 (1963).
201. United States v. Hilbrick, 232 F. Supp. 111 (N.D. Ill. 1964), all'd,
341 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1965).
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through a claimed waiver of rights.
B. Clear Expression of Consent
Aside from consideration of duress or coercion, consent cannot
validly be obtained unless it is expressed in an explicit and un-
equivocal manner by the person whose property is to be
searched. 202 Where the consenting words are such that they do
not show a clear and unmistakable intent to waive one's consti-
tutional right to refuse a warrantless search, the evidence so ob-
tained will be inadmissible.
20 3
As a general rule, the express language used by a suspect
is merely a factor to be considered, among others, in determining
the voluntariness of the consent. In the words of one appellate
court, ". . . a waiver cannot be conclusively presumed from verbal
expression of assent. The court must determine from all the cir-
cumstances whether the verbal assent reflected an understanding,
uncoerced, and unequivocal election to grant the officers a license
which the person knows may be freely and effectively with-
held."'204 Thus, while the party may respond with words indi-
cating consent, they do not constitute a valid waiver when the
surrounding circumstances fail to support the voluntary use of
such words. Accordingly, consent searches have been invalidated
in some cases notwithstanding such remarks as, "I have no stuff
in my apartment and you are welcome to go search the whole
place," 203 or, "I have nothing to hide, you can go there and see
for yourself.
'200
In Application of Tomish,2 7 the defendant was arrested for
a traffic violation. When asked by the officers for permission
to search his car, Tomich replied that "he didn't mind," but stated
that he did not have a key to unlock the trunk; in fact, he had
the key hidden in his shoe. Eventually, the police were able
to gain entrance into the trunk by having a key made at a local
garage. Tools and a pair of shoes linking Tomich to a burglary
were found in the trunk of the vehicle and were later used in
evidence against him. In a subsequent habeas corpus proceeding,
202. Karwicki v. United States, 55 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1932); United
States v. Fowler, 17 F.R.D. 499 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
203. Ray v. United States, 84 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1936).
204. Cipres v. United States, 343 F.2d 95, 97 (9th Cir. 1965).
205. Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1960).
206. Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1951). See, 79
C.J.S., Searches and Seizures, § 62 n.89, for further examples.
207. 221 F. Supp. 500 (D. Mont. 1963), aff'd, 332 F.2d 987 (9th Cir. 1964).
a federal district court rejected the state's contention that valid
consent had been obtained, stating: "At all times when he was
allegedly consenting to the search, he had in his possession, hidden
in his shoe, the key to the trunk. If he truly consented to the
search, he would have delivered up the key to the officers and
saved them all the trouble they went to to get into the trunk
of the car.
208
The difficulty with this reasoning is that the officers in this
case had no way of knowing that the subject was in possession
of the key. Had his overt conduct reasonably indicated that he
did not in fact wish to cooperate, the police would not have been
justified in relying on his expressed consent. But to all outward
appearances the defendant in this case knowingly and voluntarily
relinquished his right to insist upon a warrant. Carried to the
extreme, Tomich could open the way for a criminal suspect to
insure the inadmissibility of physical evidence, by professing co-
operation at the scene and later refuting his alleged consent,
claiming that he had in fact withheld the keys to the vehicle or
in some other manner had not fully assisted the police.
20 9
In some cases, permission to search has been found by the
courts in the absence of consenting words by the suspect, where
it appeared that the party had indicated a willingness to cooperate
or had rendered some affirmative assistance to the officers. Where
the defendant readily tendered the keys to his vehicle upon re-
quest,21 0 or, without objection, opened the trunk and surrendered
pornographic materials to investigating officers,211 such conduct
has been viewed as convincing evidence of consent.
212
C. Knowing and Intelligent Waiver of Rights
The courts have long required that consent to search be a
"deliberate relinquishment of a known right, ' 213 and that such
consent be "intelligently" given.214  As a general rule, however,
there need not be an affirmative showing that the consenting
208. Id. at 503.
209. See, e.g., Burge v. United States, 332 F.2d 171 (8th Cir. 1964), in
which the defendant apparently feigned consent as "a determined strategy"
to a later claim of illegality on the part of the officers.
210. Robinson v. United States, 325 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1963).
211. Burge v. United States, 332 F.2d 171 (8th Cir. 1964).
212. See also Smith v. United States, 308 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1962)
(dictum), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 906 (1963) (consent found where the de-
fendant, while under arrest for possession of narcotics, led officers to a
nearby apartment and produced a suitcase containing heroin); United
States v. MacLeod, 207 F.2d 853 (7th Cir. 1953) (dictum) (following his
arrest, the defendant cut the lock off a chest containing incriminatory
evidence and, without suggestion from the agents, went into the bedroom
and carried out a hand printing press).
213. United States v. Alberti, 120 F. Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
214. United States v. Smith, 308 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 906 (1963).
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party was advised of his fourth amendment right to prevent a
search without a warrant. Although a failure to warn has some-
times been persuasive on the issue of coercion, that factor alone
has not been sufficient to invalidate the search. 215 Rather, the
practice has been to establish whether, in view of the circum-
stances as a whole, the waiver of fourth amendment rights was
voluntary and intelligent. 216 In making this determination, the
courts have been influenced by the suspect's "marked intelligence
and mental alertness, 211 or the fact that the consenting parties
were "sophisticated businessmen of many years experience.' 218 A
history of previous arrests or "indicated knowledge from previous
search and seizure experience" may also show that the party
was probably alert to his rights and to the consequences of a
waiver at the time he allegedly gave permission to search.219
Thus, while upholding a consent search, one federal court de
clared: "The amount of intimidation or fear of the badge in a
person with little knowledge of police officers or of legal pro-
ceedings would be much more acute and motivating than that of
a man with thirteen years of experience as an officer and in-
vestigator. It may be reasonably assumed that he was aware of
all the consequences. 2 0 By the same token, the government's
burden of proving a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights
is understandably difficult to sustain when the consenting party is
illiterate or does not have a good understanding of the English
language.
221
In a noticeable departure from the traditional approach, how-
ever, some courts have interpreted the requirement of a knowl-
edgeable waiver to mean that, in the absence of other evidence
that the suspect was aware of his fourth amendment rights, a
formal warning by the police officer is a necessary prerequisite
to consent. For example, in United States v. Blalock,222 the de-
fendant was questioned in a motel room concerning his possible
215. United States v. Paradise, 253 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1958).
216. Tatum v. United States, 321 F.2d 219 (9th Cir. 1963); Channel v.
United States, 285 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1960).
217. United States v. Haas, 106 F. Supp. 295 (W.D. Pa. 1952).
218. United States v. Martin, 176 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); In re
White, 98 F. Supp. 895 (S.D. Miss. 1951).
219. Burge v. United States, 332 F.2d 171 (8th Cir. 1964).
220. Tatum v. United States, 321 F.2d 219, 220 (9th Cir. 1963).
221. Kovach v. United States, 53 F.2d 639 (6th Cir. 1931); United States
v. Wai Lau, 215 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd, 329 F.2d 310 (2d Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 856 (1964); United States v. Ong Goon Sing,
149 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
222. 255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
implication in a recent bank robbery. When asked whether he
would mind if the agents searched the room, the defendant replied
that he had no objection. The search disclosed a quantity of
bait money taken during the robbery. On a motion to suppress
the evidence, the federal district court stressed the need for an
"intelligent" consent and rested the long-standing rule that one
cannot be said to waive a fundamental right unless he knows the
right exists. Pointing out that the "voluntariness" of the consent
was not in issue, the court stated: "[T]he fourth amendment
requires no less knowing a waiver than do the fifth and sixth.
The requirement of knowledge in each serves the same purpose,
i.e., to prevent the possibility that the ignorant may surrender
their rights more readily than the shrewd.)
22
Blalock expresses the growing tendency among the federal
courts to avoid resolving each case on its own set of facts where
a waiver of constitutional rights is involved. By requiring an
explicit warning of fourth amendment rights for all suspects, re-
gardless of age, experience, or coercive influences, the court frees
itself from the burden of deciding whether this particular de-
fendant knew of his rights in the matter. This trend away from
"particularism" in the law has been most evident in the fifth
amendment area where, as indicated earlier, the court previously
weighed similar factors in establishing the voluntariness of con-
fessions. In Miranda v. Arizona,224 however; the court rejected
this approach, requiring that all persons in custody be warned
of their right to remain silent prior to interrogation. Since there
are elements of self-incrimination in illegal searches, 225 it has been
speculated that Miranda bears constitutional implications for con-
sent searches as well. 228 Whether advice of fourth amendment
rights need be as comprehensive as Miranda requires, or whether
the states would be bound by such a rule, is largely a matter
of conjecture at this point.
But even assuming that Miranda is relevant to fourth amend-
ment matters, at best it would apply only where the consenting
party is "in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way."2 27  As noted earlier, it is in this type
of situation that consent searches are most difficult to sustain,
the theory being that custody itself creates a coercive atmosphere
which makes it difficult for one to exercise free choice. Thus,
while a technical reading of the law at this point may not require
a warning in every instance, the better practice in situations of
223. See also United States v. Nikrusch, 367 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1966).
224. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
225. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
226. See Note, Consent Searches: A Reappraisal After Miranda v.
Arizona, 67 COLUM. L. Rv. 130 (1967).
227. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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restraint or intimidation is to inform the consenting party that
he has the right to insist upon a warrant.
D. Consent by Third Parties
As a general rule, the constitutional right to privacy is per-
sonal to the individual and cannot be waived by third parties.
228
Consequently, in the absence either of expressed or implied au-
thorization to consent or a joint occupancy or ownership of the
property to be searched, a valid waiver of the privilege against
unreasonable searches and seizures can be given up only by the
person himself. This limitation holds true, moreover, regardless
of the personal or familiar relationship which may exist between
the consenting party and the person against whom the evidence
is to be used.
The specific question or whether the wife's consent can val-
idate a search against her husband remains unsettled in both
the state and federal law.229 But judging from the existing law
applicable to the search of fixed premises, one ordinarily can as-
sume that a spouse can give consent to the search of a motor
vehicle which is valid as against the other, where they jointly'
own and utilize the automobile in question. 21 In this type of
situation, the wife's authority to permit a search comes from her
right to joint possession of the property to be searched and not
from the marital relation per se. For example, in Dalton v.
State,23 1 officers investigating a hit-and-run offense asked the
wife for consent to search the suspect automobile, which was
registered in her name. The car, however, was paid for by the
228. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1966). In Pasterchik v.
United States, 400 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1968), the court held a search by fed-
eral agents to be improper where person who opened trunk of vehicle for
agents did not have equal or independent right of access to vehicle. But see
the recent case of Anderson v. United States, 399 F.2d 753 (10th Cir.
1968). There an automobile owner consented to a police search of her
auto which was being operated by the defendant who borrowed the car.
The court found that the property right of the owner was superior to that
of the defendant. Waiver of the owner's personal fourth amendment
rights effected a legally binding waiver of the defendant's fourth amend-
ment rights.
229. See Note, The Effect of a Wife's Consent to Search and Seizure
of the Husband's Property, 69 DICK. L. REv. 69 (1964).
230. See State v. Cooper, 106 N.H. 186, 208 A.2d 322 (1965) (wife's
consent to search family cars parked in yard upheld). See also Roberts v.
United States, 332 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 980
(1965); Stein v. United States, 166 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1948); United States
v. Heine, 149 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 885 (1945).
231. 230 Ind. 626, 105 N.E.2d 509 (1952).
husband, who had sole control and possession of it. The wife had
never driven the car. In view of her lack of possession, the
court held that the wife could not consent to a search of the car
which was her husband's personal "effect," protected by the fourth
amendment. Moreover, if a specific area of the vehicle or a con-
tainer in the automobile, such as luggage or a footlocker, is the
exclusive property of the defendant, it is doubtful that a proper
waiver can be obtained from a consenting spouse.
23 2
The issue of interspousal consent was present in a case which
came before the Supreme Court recently, but the Court disposed
of the matter on other grounds. In Henry v. Mississippi,23 the
petitioner was convicted of disturbing the peace by making inde-
cent proposals to and offensive contact with a hitchhiker to whom
he allegedly gave a ride. The only evidence available to cor-
roborate the complainant's charges was obtained by an allegedly
unlawful search of the vehicle. The evidence tended to substan-
tiate the complainant's story by showing its accuracy in details
which could only have been seen by one inside the car. Sub-
sequent to the petitioner's arrest, an officer went to his home
and obtained permission from the petitioner's wife to search the
vehicle without a warrant. Despite the fact that under Missis-
sippi law a wife could not give consent which waived the con-
stitutional rights of her husband, the state supreme court af-
firmed the conviction on the ground that the petitioner's counsel
had failed to make a timely objection to the introduction of the
illegal evidence. In vacating the judgment and remanding it for
a rehearing on the question of whether the noncompliance with
the procedural rules constituted a waiver, the Supreme Court
noted: "Thus, consistently with the policy of avoiding premature
decision on the merits of constitutional questions, we intimate
no view whether the pertinent controlling federal standard gov-
erning the legality of a search and seizure, see Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23, is the same as the Mississippi standard applied here,
which holds that the wife's consent cannot validate a search as
against her husband. 23 4
Where a gratuitous bailment of a vehicle is concerned, one
appellate court has taken the view that delivery of the automobile
into the temporary custody of another represents an affirmative
relinquishment of one's fourth amendment protection over such
property. In Eldridge v. United States,23 5 the suspect lent his
automobile to a friend, Nethercott, who had requested permission
to use the car to visit his daughter. The keys to the ignition
232. See, e.g., State v. Evans, 45 Hawaii 622, 372 P.2d 365 (1962)
(wife cannot consent to search of husband's cuff link case in dresser
drawer).
233. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
234. Id. at 449 n.6.
235. 302 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1962).
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and to the trunk were given to him. Acting on information
that there was a stolen rifle in the car, and after observing a
rifle on the back seat, the police asked the friend for permission
to examine the automobile. The trunk of the car was voluntarily
opened by the friend, disclosing two stolen Government radios
which were immediately seized and turned over to federal au-
thorities. At his trial the defendant contended unsuccessfully that
the radios had been illegally seized, claiming that the protections
of the fourth amendment are personal to him and cannot be
waived for him by the gratuitous bailee of the car. On review
of the conviction, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that
the articles seized from the automobile were properly admitted
in evidence. The court reasoned that the friend
was clothed with rightful possession and control and
could do in respect to the automobile whatever was reason-
able and not inconsistent with its entrustment to him. No
restriction was imposed upon him except to return with
the car by a certain hour. Although the defendant knew
of the presence of the stolen radios in the trunk, he appar-
ently did not think it worthwhile to take the precaution
of forbidding his bailee to open the trunk or permit anyone
to look into it. He reserved no exclusive right of privacy
in respect to the trunk when he delivered the key. In re-
sponding as he did to the police, Nethercott did not ex-
ceed the authority Eldridge had seemingly given him.
Using the key to open the trunk was not an unwarranted
exercise of dominion during the period of his permissive
posession and use. Access to the trunk is a normal inci-
dent to the use of an automobile. And if, when he volun-
tarily opened the trunk, Nethercott did not exceed pro-
per bounds because he had to that extent at least concur-
rent rights therein with Eldridge, was the ensuing search
by the police unreasonable? We think not.
236
A similar result was reached in Hamilton v. State,237 where
a federal district court ruled that petitioner's co-defendant, who
was in temporary possession of the vehicle, had the capacity to
consent.
It has been argued in support of Eldridge that one who has
lent his vehicle to another "seems affirmatively to be taking the
risk that the third party will show his belongings to others. There-
fore, it is not unreasonable to conclude that in these cases the
suspect has impliedly given the third party authority to waive
236. Id. at 466.
237. 260 F. Supp. 632 (E.D.N.C. 1966).
his own personal right to privacy. '238 But not all decisions are
in agreement with this view, as evidenced by the holding in State
v. Bernius. 39 There the defendant lent his automobile to a friend
who was later arrested on a traffic violation. When she was
unable to give a satisfactory account of her possession of the
automobile, she was taken into custody and the car was removed
to a local police lot. While being detained at the station, the
friend gave the keys to the car to the police who searched the
trunk and found incriminating evidence which subsequently was
used to convict the defendant. In reversing the conviction, the
New Jersey State Supreme Court refused to accept the implied
authorization theory which had influenced the holding in Eld-
ridge. Instead, the court ruled that "where the owner of an
automobile entrusts the possession and control thereof to another,
a search thereof with the consent of the one so entrusted but
without a warrant and without the express consent authorization
of such owner is, as against such owner, prohibited . . . as an
unreasonable search.
'240
A somewhat different situation is involved if the bailment is
for hire as, for example, where the defendant places his automo-
bile in the custody of a parking lot attendant. In this case it is
doubtful that the bailee can waive the defendant's rights.241 As a
general rule, when control over the property is limited to tempo-
rary custody for storage purposes with rights of access expressly
or impliedly denied, the courts hold that the custodian lacks suffi-
cient capacity to consent.24 2 The issue here is analogous to that
presented in Chapman v. United States,243 where the Supreme
Court held that a search by police officers of a house occupied
by a tenant violated the tenant's constitutional right, even
though the search was made with the authorization of the owner.
There the owner had not only apparent but actual authority to
enter the home for various purposes, such as to "view waste."
Since the purpose of the entry was not to view waste but to
look for evidence of a crime, the court held the search unlawful.
2 44
On this reasoning, it would seem that the authority conveyed to
the garage attendant would relate solely to the proper and safe
storage of the vehicle, and entry for any other reason would be
improper.
238. Note, Effective Consent to Search and Seizure, 113 U. PA. L. REv.
260, 263 (1964).
239. 177 Ohio 155, 203 N.E.2d 241 (1964).
240. Id. at 243.
241. But see Casey v. United States, 191 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1951) (holding
the defendant, who failed to claim ownership or interest in article
seized from vehicle, lost immunity from search and seizure when he placed
garage in possession of his automobile.
242. Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966); Holzhey v.
United States, 223 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1955).
243. 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
244. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 485, 489 (1964).
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VII. SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST
The right to search incident to arrest is deeply rooted in
the common law.2 45 The rule reflects, as Justice Cardozo once
observed, a "shrewd appreciation for the necessities of govern-
ment. '246 As a practical matter, the courts recognized that a
police officer must have some power to conduct an immediate
search following arrest in order to remove any weapons from
the reach of a suspect and to prevent him from destroying evi-
dence of the crime.24" While early decisions limited the search
to the person of the accused, the doctrine was extended in later
years to things within the "immediate possession" or "control" of
the suspect and "depending on the circumstances of the case to the
place where he is arrested."2 48
Although it is sometimes stated that the authority to search
incident to arrest is no greater than that under a warrant,249 this
assertion is not entirely correct. In many jurisdictions, for ex-
ample, including the federal, authority to search by warrant is
carefully circumscribed by statute; unless the item sought is spe-
cified in the enabling legislation, it cannot be obtained in this
manner. On the other hand, the search incident to arrest derives
mainly from decisional law which, as a general rule, is broader
and more permissive. And while the courts have gradually ex-
panded search and seizure powers on a case-by-case basis, legis-
lative action in this field has failed to keep pace with these de-
velopments. As a result, the search incident to arrest frequently
permits the seizure of physical evidence which could not properly
be the subject of a search warrant.5 0
In addition to its broader scope, the search incident to arrest
offers greater flexibility and ease of administration to the exe-
cuting officer. Unlike the warrant procedure, the rule does not re-
quire that he describe in advance either the place to be searched
or the articles to be seized. Neither is it necessary that he show
245. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
246. People v. Chiagles, 237 N.Y. 193, 197, 142 N.E. 583, 584 (1923).
247. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 72 (1950); Harris v.
United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20,
30 (1925).
. 248. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Davis v. United
States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946) (dissent by J. Frankfurter); Agnello v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).
249. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
250. See earlier discussion II. Search Under the Authority of a War-
rant. See also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (permitting the
seizure of mere evidence in the course of a search incident to arrest).
some basis for believing the evidence sought will be found at the
place of arrest, beyond the fact that the premises were in the
"immediate control" or "possession" of the defendant. Also, by
proceeding in this manner, the officer avoids both the formalism
and rigidity which attend the drafting of an affidavit and the
execution of a warrant.251 And finally, but perhaps most im-
portant from the police viewpoint, avoidance of time-consuming
warrant procedures enables the officer to take immediate action
to insure against the loss or destruction of critical evidence in the
case.
Yet the incidental search rule is not without its disadvantages.
Whenever the officer operates outside the warrant process, his
conduct will be closely examined by the judiciary. And the Su-
preme Court has cautioned in this regard that "[i]n a doubtful
or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable
where without one it would fall."252  But perhaps the principal
shortcoming of the rule lies in the uncertainty of its application.
The judicial tendency toward resolving the reasonableness of such
searches on the facts of each case has sometimes left the police
without effective guidelines for future conduct. What factors,
for example, are relevant in determining the physical perimeter
of the search and the intensity with which it may be conducted?
Assuming the rule is based upon the need to seize weapons of
escape and to prevent destruction of evidence of the crime, may
a search be made notwithstanding the fact that the vehicle is be-
yond the reach of the arrestee? Under what circumstances may
the search or seizure be delayed following arrest, and what are
the limits of the delay? Despite the fact that the incidental
search rule has been the "subject of almost constant scrutiny" by
the courts, these and other questions remain open to debate. "In
no other field," observed Mr. Justice Black, "has the law's un-
certainty been more clearly manifested."25 3  Nevertheless, the
search incident to arrest is perhaps the dominant method of se-
curing physical evidence of crime. Employed reasonably and
within the broad standards set out by the case law, the rule can be
a most important technique for effective law enforcement.
A. Vehicle Must Be in the Immediate Vicinity of the Arrest
The case law dealing with the permissible bounds of a search
incident to arrest, in the words of Justice Frankfurter, "cannot be
satisfactorily reconciled."2 54 In expanding the rule beyond the
person of the accused, the Court has held that the search may
251. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 254 F.2d 751, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1958)
(officer need not file an inventory nor provide a receipt for property
seized during incidental search).
252. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
253. United Staes v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 67 (1950).
254. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 235 (1960).
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include "the place where the arrest is made," provided it is con-
fined to the area under his immediate control at the time of
arrest.2  The extent of the search has also been defined in
terms of whether it is limited to the "immediate vicinity of the
arrest. '2 56 Unfortunately, the courts have had considerable diffi-
culty translating these concepts into meaningful guidelines for
the police. There is "no ready litmus paper test," observed the
Court, by which to measure the reasonableness of a search.
257
Here, as elsewhere in the search and seizure laws, "reasonableness
... must find resolution in the facts and circumstances of each
case."
258
As a general rule, it can be said that a suspect's automobile
may lawfully be searched incident to his arrest if the arrest takes
place in or near the vehicle. Where the suspect is seated in the
car or is standing beside it at the moment of arrest, there is
no doubt that it can be searched either as the "place of arrest"
or as an object under his "immediate control."2 59 When employed
in this context, the term "control" is rather loosely defined; it
is not intended to mean that the vehicle must be under the
actual physical control of the arrestee. It is sufficient for appli-
cation of this doctrine that the suspect has enjoyed free access
to the place of arrest, thereby raising the probability that physical
evidence may be found there.260 Accordingly, an automobile may
be searched incident to the arrest of a passenger in or beside the
255. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); United States v.
DiRe, 332 U.S. 581 (1948); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
256. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486 (1964).
257. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63 (1950).
258. Id.
259. United States v. Doyle, 373 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1967) (search de-
clared reasonable where "[t]he car was in Doyle's immediate presence
and but a few feet from him when he was handcuffed and taken into
custody"); United States v. Simpson, 353 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1965); Ford v.
United States, 352 F.2d 927 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Adams v. United States,
336 F.2d 752 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 977 (1965); Goforth v.
United States, 218 F.2d 820 (4th Cir. 1955); United States v. Law, 257 F.
Supp. 606 (W.D. Pa. 1966); United States v. Kapatos, 255 F. Supp. 332
(S.D.N.Y. 1966). But see Amador-Gonzales v. United States, 391 F.2d 308
(5th Cir. 1968), wherein the court ruled inadmissible heroin seized from
defendant's auto after his arrest for minor traffic violation. Here the fact
that the officer was in no danger and that the defendant was outside his
car and surrounded by three policemen were considerations in this deci-
sion. However, the court did state that a search incident to an arrest is
unreasonable if there is no relationship between the search and the
offense for which arrest was made.
260. See, e.g., Haas v. United States, 344 F.2d 56, 60 (8th Cir. 1965)
(upholding the incidental search of a dining room which the arrestee, who
was a tenant on the premises, had a right to use).
car despite the fact that the owner or some other person may
be in charge of the vehicle when the arrest is made.
The authority to search is less clear, however, where the
arrest is made outside the car and at a point "substantially re-
moved geographically" from the automobile.2 1' Obviously, the ve-
hicle cannot be searched as "the place of arrest" in this instance.
Nevertheless, an incidental search may be justified if it can be
shown that the automobile is under the "control" of the suspect
or is located within the immediate vicinity of the arrest. But
at what point is the automobile too removed from the place of
arrest to satisfy even these criteria?
While no precise answers can be given on this point, it is
fair to say that the scope of the incidental search has been inter-
preted rather broadly by the lower federal courts. In one case,
police arrested a shoplifter approximately one block away from
a grocery store where the theft had occurred. He had previously
been seen approaching a car parked in a lot adjoining the store,
but he retreated upon seeing the manager and a police officer
nearby. The defendant was taken back to the car following his
arrest, and a search of the automobile yielded several cartons of
stolen cigarettes. Denying habeas corpus relief, a federal appel-
late court ruled, without discussion, that the search of the vehicle
was a reasonable incident of the arrest.2 62 Similarly, cases can
be found in which the courts have sustained the search of an
automobile located "in or about the area" where the defendant
was arrested, 263 four car lengths away from the point of arrest,
264
and 150 feet from arrest of the defendant in a tavern.
26 5
On occasion, the courts have extended the area of search
beyond its usual boundaries where the premises or vehicle was
"intimately connected" with the crime of arrest. Thus, in Rhodes
v. United States,266 the defendant's vehicle was found approx-
imately 100 yards away from the place of arrest. There the car
had been used by the defendant to take raw materials to a still
and to transport the finished product to another location. In
sustaining a search of the vehicle, the court declared that the
close relationship of the arrest and the search in time, "and the
observed connection between the acts of the defendants at the
car and at the still site, made the search reasonable, and the
fact that the car was situated somewhat farther away than in the
reported cases is not a significant distinction." 20 7 A similar result
was reached in a case where the vehicle had been "used to drive
261. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 487, n.5 (1964).
262. Katz v. Peyton, 334 F.2d 77 (4th Cir. 1964).
263. Weller v. Russell, 321 F.2d 848 (3d Cir. 1963),
264. People v. Loomis, 231 Cal. App. 2d 594, 42 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1965).
265. State v. McClung, 66 Wash. 2d 654, 404 P.2d 460 (1965).
266. 224 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1955).
267. Id. at 351.
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to the scene of the alleged crime." The defendant was arrested
in the basement of a state office building and charged with break-
ing and entering. He was then taken to the police station, where
he was booked and "formally detained." An inventory of his prop-
erty revealed the keys to a car "illegally parked in a private
driveway across the street from the building and 250 yards away
from the scene of the breaking and entering. . . . The police head-
quarters, the office building, and the location of the parked ve-
hicle were only one and one-half blocks distance." The officers
returned to the car and located a sawed-off shotgun in the trunk,
which provided the basis for prosecution in a federal court. The
trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence
of the shotgun, holding that the search in this instance was rea-
sonable and valid.26 8 But while Fortier can be looked to as prece-
dent on the distance factor, the practice of booking the suspect
prior to conducting an incidental search may no longer be valid.
26 9
In several instances, where the courts have upheld the search
of a vehicle or premises located some distance away from the
point of arrest, emphasis has been placed on the fact that the two
acts, the arrest and the search, were "part of one continuous
transaction. ' '2TO This consideration relates more directly, of course,
to the question of contemporaneity-that is, proximity of these
matters in time-which will be discussed below. But rarely is
any one factor considered in isolation where the reasonableness
of a search is in issue. A fair reading of the decisional law
indicates that the determination of whether a vehicle is too far
removed from the place of arrest to permit an incidental search
is sometimes influenced by the amount of delay involved. Thus,
if an appreciable lapse of time occurs following the defendant's
arrest, it will be most difficult to bring a distant vehicle within
the normal perimeter of the search.
Of course, where the vehicle plays a substantial role in the
commission of the offense, consideration should also be given
to use of the Carroll doctrine as a method of search or, in the
alternative, to seizure of the car as an instrumentality of the
crime. Since the automobile in this situation is "in open view,"
such a seizure need not be effected as an incident of the arrest.
271
268. United States v. Fortier, 207 F. Supp. 516 (D. Conn. 1962).
269. See Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
270. Rhodes v. United States, 224 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1955); Clifton v.
United States, 224 F.2d 329 (4th Cir. 1955); United States v. Jackson, 149
F. Supp. 937, 941 (D.D.C. 1957), rev'd as to one defendant on other
grounds, 250 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
271. But see the cautionary statements regarding employment of the
latter theory at the end of B. Limitations on the Use of a Warrant.
Although the opinions are divided on this point, it appears
that added justification for the search can also be found where
the suspect is arrested immediately after his departure from the
car. In one case, the defendant was taken into custody while
driving away from the site of an illegal still, and his car was
immediately searched. He was then returned to the location of
the still, where an incidental search was made of a second vehicle
parked nearby. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in this
instance that both searches were reasonable. 272  It would seem
that an even stronger case can be made for the search of a
distant vehicle where the suspect flees from the car while trying
to avoid arrest. Support for this view can be found in several
decisions which have sustained the search of fixed premises where
the defendants ran out of a building on the approach of police
officers.
278
The distance factor becomes even further complicated when
the arrest takes place in a dwelling or other fixed structure. It
is obviously more difficult to maintain that the suspect has con-
trol of a vehicle when he is arrested on the second floor of an
apartment building or in the bedroom of his home, or, for that
matter, that the car is in the immediate vicinity of the arrest.
If one can judge from the line of cases disallowing a search of
fixed premises incident to an arrest on the street, it would seem
that the law would also bar the search of an automobile incident
to arrest in a dwelling.
274
But a broader view has been taken on vehicle searches. Al-
though there are few decisions on point, the majority of courts
considering this problem have allowed the incidental search of
premises to extend beyond the dwelling to include a car parked
in the immediate area.
275
272. Thompson v. United States, 342 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1965).
273. Brock v. United States, 256 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1958); Kelley v.
United States, 61 F.2d 843 (8th Cir. 1932). Contra, United States v. Sala,
209 F. Supp. 956 (W.D. Pa. 1962) (sustained on other grounds, defendant
moonshiner fled upon hearing the words "federal officers" and was arrested
"some distance away from the two motor vehicles involved." Held, a
search of the truck could not be justified as incident to arrest since the
defendant "had no control over said vehicle"). See also Liakas v. State,
199 Tenn. App. 986, 286 S.W.2d 856 (1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 845 (1957).
274. See, e.g., James v. Louisiana, 382 U.S. 36 (1965) (holding that a
search of the defendant's apartment two blocks from the place of arrest
was too remote to be incident to the arrest). Compare King v. Pinto,
256 F. Supp. 522 (D.N.J. 1966) (petitioner arrested in rear of apartment
house. Search of apartment upheld as an area within "immediate and
proximate control" of petitioner).
275. Browning v. United States, 366 F.2d 420 (9th Cir. 1966) (search of
automobile in front of house where subject was arrested upheld as inci-
dent to arrest); Commonwealth v. Harris, 209 Pa. 527, 223 A.2d 881 (1966)
(where the defendant was arrested for possession of stolen goods as he
walked into his house. A search of his car, which was parked outside the
residence "almost directly in front of the house," was held to be con-
temporaneous with the arrest and "in the immediate vicinity thereof");
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This issue was dealt with recently in United States v. Franco-
lino.
276 The defendant in that case had attempted to pass several
counterfeit notes in a local department store. She was stopped
outside by the manager and at his insistence returned several
bills which she had received in exchange for the notes. The
store manager noted a description of the vehicle driven by the
defendant and related the information to the Secret Service. On
approaching the defendant's home, an agent saw the vehicle parked
in an adjacent driveway. He arrested the defendant in the house
and received the keys to the car. A search of the car trunk
produced a large number of counterfeit notes bearing the same
serial numbers as those passed in the store. In ruling on the
question whether the search was reasonably incident to the arrest,
the court said:
We see no reason in principle why a car parked immedi-
ately outside a house should stand better than a room in-
side it which was not the place where the defendant was
arrested. . . . It would violate common sense to draw sub-
tle distinctions between a car in a built-in garage . . ., one
in a detached garage, and one on the driveway. The ques-
tion rather is whether there was fair basis for belief
that the place searched--whether inside the house or im-
mediately outside it--would contain instruments or fruits
of the crime for which the arrest was made .... 27
Although the issue is not free from doubt, the "fair basis
for belief" referred to in the above-quoted language connotes a
less substantial degree of certainty than that normally associated
with "probable cause to search." In most instances the test can
be satisfied merely by showing that the party had unrestricted
access to the place; the search is justified on the assumption that
control over the area furnishes reasonable basis for belief that
evidence of the crime "is probably somewhere on the premises.
'2 78
State v. Watson, 386 P.2d 24 (Mo. 1965) (defendant arrested on a burglary
charge in the apartment of a friend and automobile parked directly in
front of apartment lawfully searched incident to arrest); State v. Hoffman,
64 Wash. 2d 445, 392 P.2d 237 (1964) (defendants arrested in house and
search of car parked beside it upheld as reasonably incident to arrest);
People v. Carrigan, 213 Cal. App. 2d 607, 28 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1963) (search of
car parked in the driveway of apartment house); People v. Burke, 208
Cal. App. 2d 149, 24 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1962) (search of automobile known by
police to be outside hotel at time defendant was arrested in hotel was rea-
sonably incident to arrest); State v. One Buick Automobile, 120 Ore. 640,
253 P.2d 366 (1927) (search of car in apartment house garage two floors
below apartment where arrest was made.).
276. 367 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 943 (1967).
277. Id. at 1017.
278. People v. Rogers, 207 Cal. App. 2d 261, 264, 24 Cal. Rptr. 341, 345
(1962); Browne v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 491, 129 N.W.2d 175, 181 (1964)
This interpretation draws some support from those decisions which
permit an incidental search even though the arrest is made a con-
siderable time after the commission of the crime.
279
In short, while the scope of the search may in some cases
extend outward from arrest in fixed premises to include an auto-
mobile parked nearby, arrest in the vehicle cannot support the
incidental search of a dwelling. The distinction here reflects a
longstanding view of the courts that the degree of protection
accorded motor vehicles is less substantial than that thrown about
the home. As one court put it, entry into an automobile "is
quite a different invasion of the right of privacy than entry into
a man's bed chambers. 28 0
Where the car is situated within the curtilage of a dwelling,
it might also be argued, as an alternative ground, that the vehicle
falls within the usual ambit of a premises search. As a general
proposition, the federal law allows a search of the entire premises
incident to arrest,28' and this is often taken to include the garage
as well.28 2 It should follow therefore, that a vehicle located in
an attached garage or other area immediately adjacent to the
house can be searched or seized in precisely the same manner as
any other personal property found on the premises. The Franco-
lino court expressed at least partial support for this view in a
statement that the search of a car in a built-in garage "under
appropriate circumstances," would appear to be covered by Har-
ris.
2 83
Less certain, however, is the legality of a search incident to
arrest in a public building or business premises. Unless the ar-
restee is the owner or is in lawful charge of the premises, his
control over the area, for search purposes, probably does not ex-
tend beyond the immediate vicinity of his arrest.28 4  This is
particularly true where the arrestee is merely a guest, invitee, or
(". . . '[P]robable cause to arrest' also supports a determination of prob-
able cause to believe that evidence and instrumentalities of the crime are
within the immediate control of the person arrested.")
279. United States v. Kapatos, 255 F. Supp. 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)(valid
search of vehicle incident to arrest of the driver for an impersonation of-
fense committed three years earlier). See LAFAVE, Search and Seizure:
"The Course of True Law ... Has Not... Run Smooth, 1966 U. ILL. L.F.
290-93.
280. Alston v. State, 31 Wis. 2d 88, 140 N.W.2d 286 (1966); see also
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 366-67 (1964) ("What may be an
unreasonable search of a house may be reasonable in the case of a
motor car.")
281. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
282. Charles v. United States, 278 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 831, reh. denied, 364 U.S. 906; Gentry v. United States,
268 F.2d 63 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 866; Johnson v. United
States, 199 F.2d 231 (4th Cir. 1952). See also People v. Rogers, 207 Cal.
App. 2d 261, 24 Cal. Rptr. 341 (1962) (apartment and garage searched).
283. 367 F.2d 1013, 1017 (2d Cir. 1966) (dictum).
284. See, e.g., Carlo v. United States, 286 F.2d 841, 847 (2d Cir. 1961).
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temporary visitor in the building. Consequently, an automobile
parked nearby cannot be brought within the scope of the rule as
part of the usual premises search. But this does not bar an inci-
dental search entirely, for under some circumstances a vehicle
parked in an adjacent area may nonetheless be considered an
item of property under the control of the arrestee.
Most state courts have been liberal in their interpretation of
"control" and "vicinity of arrest" in these situations and have gen-
erally permitted the defendant's car to be searched incident to his
arrest on public or business premises.
28 5
The federal decisions on this point are rather evenly divided.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals suggested recently that the
search of an automobile located on a restaurant parking lot was
properly incident to the arrest of the defendant in the restau-
rant.2 6 The same conclusion was reached by the sixth circuit
in an earlier case where federal agents arrested two defendants in
a tavern and incidental thereto lawfully searched a car from which
they had recently emerged. 287 Yet, when faced with the same
question, some federal courts have taken an opposite view. In
Conti v. Morgenthau,28 8 for example, the defendant and an asso-
ciate were arrested in an apartment for violating federal wagering
tax laws. Following the arrest, agents acting under a warrant
searched Conti's automobile, which was parked on a street near
the premises. Passing on a motion to suppress evidence taken
from the vehicle, the district court held that the warrant was
invalid since it failed to state an adequate basis for the Com-
missioner's determination of probable cause. The court ruled,
moreover, that
the Government cannot and does not justify the search
as an incident of Conti's arrest since the arrest was not
285. People v. Trommell, 65 Ill. App. 2d 331, 213 N.E.2d 74 (1966)
(search of vehicle following arrest in barbershop 20 feet away held valid);
State v. Bourg, 248 La. 844, 182 So. 2d 510 (1965) (search of vehicle outside
tavern held to be extension of search of tavern); State v. Tahash, 273
Minn. 187, 140 N.W.2d 692 (1966) (held, search of car parked outside res-
taurant was lawful); State v. McClung, 66 Wash. 2d 654, 404 P.2d 460
(1965) (lawful search following arrest in tavern); State v. Jackovick, 56
Wash. 2d 915, 305 P.2d 976 (1960) (police arrested defendant in his shop and
searched car parked directly behind it incident to arrest); State v. Cyr,
40 Wash. 2d 840, 246 P.2d 480 (1952) (arrest in a restaurant followed
by search of vehicle).
286. Drummond v. United States, 350 F.2d 983, 987 (8th Cir. 1965)
(dictum), cert. denied sub. nom. Castaldi v. United States, 384 U.S. 944
(1966).
287. Brubaker v. United States, 183 F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1950).
288. 232 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
contemporaneous with or in the vicinity of his car which
was parked around the corner from the apartment. ... A
locked and unoccupied car whose owner is in police cus-
tody at another place can only be searched pursuant to a
valid warrant.
28 9
It is readily apparent that decisions regarding the propriety
of searching incident to arrest in a building are, at best, irrecon-
cilable. In the absence of a definitive ruling from the Supreme
Court on the permissible boundaries of a search in these situa-
tions, federal officers would be well advised to interpret the rule
narrowly and to limit its application wherever possible to vehicles
parked adjacent to a dwelling. As a practical matter, this should
not prove too restrictive since in many cases the search can be
accomplished with equal facility and perhaps stronger legal basis
by employing an alternative rationale. 290 State officers, on the
other hand, should follow the rulings of courts within their re-
spective jurisdictions. While such decisions may not be in full
accord with the federal view, it may be that some flexibility is
left to the states in this area to develop workable rules to meet
"the practical demands of effective criminal investigation and law
enforcement."
291
In the final analysis, there are no precise boundaries delimiting
the proper scope of an incidental search. It cannot be said cate-
gorically, for example, that an automobile located 100 yards from
a place of arrest lies within the lawful perimeter of the rule while
one found 110 yards away does not, or that arrest in a private
dwelling will necessarily support the search of a vehicle parked
in the yard. The question of whether a party arrested outside
the automobile has sufficient "control" under the law to justify
an incidental search is one of degree and, as such, must be an-
swered on the facts of each case. In general, however, the de-
cisions suggest that the most critical circumstances considered in
bringing the car within the lawful scope of the rule are: (1)
proximity of the vehicle to the place of arrest; (2) the probability
that the automobile contains seizable items related to the crime;
(3) the amount of time which has elapsed between the arrest
and the search; (4) the recent departure of the arrestee from the
automobile, particularly where he has taken flight to avoid arrest;
289. Conti v. Morgenthau, 232 F. Supp. at 1009 (S.D.N.Y 1964)
See also Staples v. United States, 320 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1963) (arrest of
defendant in a tavern held not to justify incidental search of his vehicle
parked "some distance away"); United States v. Stoffey, 289 F.2d 924 (9th
Cir. 1960)(arrest in tavern did not justify search of personal automobile
parked at the curb); Lucas v. Layo, 222 F. Supp. 513 (S.D. Tex. 1963)
(arrest in motel room and seizure of car keys from defendant's person
could not support incidental search of vehicle parked directly outside
the room).
290. See earlier discussion on III. Search on Probable Cause (Carroll
rule) and V. Seizure of a Vehicle for Forfeiture Purposes.
291. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
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(5) the fact that the automobile had been employed in some way
in the commission of the crime; and (6) the character of the
place of arrest, that is, was the arrest made on a public street,
in business premises, or in a private home? No single factor,
standing alone, may be decisive in a given case; but collectively
each may have a significant effect on the court's determination
whether the search was a reasonable one.
Since the search authority under this procedure derives from
the right to arrest, it carries no greater validity than the arrest
itself. Should the arrest fail for some reason, the incidental
search will fail and any evidence directly obtained thereby,
whether oral or physical in nature, will be barred from admission
against the accused. 2 Although an arrest may be declared
invalid for a variety of reasons, for example, improper warrant,
failure to comply with statutory requirements, etc., the most com-
mon deficiency is a lack of probable cause. This is not surprising
in view of the inherent vagueness of that term. And because
the concept lacks definition, the officer acting in good faith, on
what he conceives to be a fair belief that reasonable cause exists,
often finds his arrest rejected by the court as based on insufficient
grounds.
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The best assurance of probable cause is found in the warrant
of arrest, for the law has long shown a preference for decisions
made by "the neutral and detached magistrate. '29 4 In an effort
to encourage greater reliance on this procedure, some courts have
stressed that in a doubtful or marginal case of probable cause, an
arrest with a warrant may be sustainable where without one it
would fall. 295 An added advantage lies in the fact that use of the
warrant requires that the arrest decision be reviewed in advance
by the court. This avoids an "after-the-event justification" which,
as the Supreme Court has noted, is "too likely to be subtly in-
fluenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment. '2 6
292. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963). But, as to oral evidence, see Clewis v. Texas, 386
U.S. 707, 711 n.7 (1967).
293. In this connection, see ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PnO-
CEDURE § 9.02, advocating, as to statements made after illegal arrest, that
exclusion ought not to be invoked where the officer was acting "under
emergency circumstances with colorable justification, even though a court
may later determine that he made a mistake."
294. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110 (1964).
295. Ford v. United States, 352 F.2d 932 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See also
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965) (expressing this principle
with regard to search warrants).
296. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
Of course, in many instances it simply is not practicable to
obtain a warrant before effecting the arrest. Where this is the
case, the officer should recognize that probable cause will be
measured by the facts and circumstances available at the time
the arrest is made; it cannot acquire added support by what is
uncovered later on. 297 By divorcing the arrest from the search
in this manner, the law attempts to discourage officers from
searching suspects indiscriminately in the hope of finding evi-
dence to support an arrest. The theory, of course, is that a police-
man who is denied the fruits of his illegal efforts is less likely
to circumvent the law. Application of this rule is found in Beck v.
Ohio,298 where police officers accosted the defendant while he
was driving his vehicle and ordered him to pull over to the
curb. Beck was placed under arrest and a search was made of
his vehicle, but no incriminating evidence was found. He was
then taken to a police station, where a search of his person dis-
closed a number of clearing house slips "beneath the sock of his
leg." The arresting officer testified that he had "information,"
that he had "heard reports," that "someone specifically did relate
that information," and that "he knew who the person was." The
record failed to indicate the nature of information received or
the source of such information or reports. Neither did it show that
the informer had stated Beck could be found at any particular
time or place. Reversing the judgment of conviction, the Court
said: "The constitutional validity of the search in this case . . .
must depend upon the constitutional validity of the petitioner's
arrest. Whether that arrest was constitutionally valid depends in
turn upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the
officers had probable cause to make it .... ,,200 On the basis of
the record before it, the Court concluded that the "case does not
contain a single objective fact to support a belief by the officers
that the petitioner was engaged in criminal activity at the time
they arrested him."3°
But just as the arrest cannot be justified by what is turned up,
so failure to find the item sought or the discovery of evidence of
an unrelated offense does not render the search invalid. The of-
ficer deals in probabilities, not certainties.30 1 Consequently, the
law does not require that his conclusions be correct but only that
they be reasonably drawn from the circumstances. If the arrest is
made, for example, on the basis of a report that the suspect has
stolen a suit from a men's clothing store and a search of the vehicle
297. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S.
28, 29 (1927); Murray v. United States, 351 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1965).
298. 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
299. Id. at 91.
300. Id. at 95.
301. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949); Bell v. United
States, 254 F.2d 82, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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fails to disclose such a suit, but it does reveal several other
stolen garments, the mere fact that the search yielded evidence of a
crime other than the one anticipated does not indicate the officer
acted without sufficient cause. 02 Similarly, the fact that federal
agents looking for whiskey in connection with a known interstate
violation find, instead, stolen radios which are part of an unrelated
offense would not be a decisive issue in determining the question of
probable cause.
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B. When Does the Arrest Take Place?
Inasmuch as the legality of the arrest is judged by the facts
and circumstances known to the officer at the time it is made, it is
important to know precisely what type of police activity constitutes
an arrest. To illustrate, consider the case of Henry v. United
States,30 4 involving a theft from an interstate shipment of whis-
key at a terminal in Chicago. On the day following the offense,
FBI Agents were investigating in the neighborhood of the theft,
when they saw Henry and one Pierotti leave a tavern and enter a
nearby automobile. Pierotti's employer, an officer of a freight
company, had given the Agents "information concerning the im-
plication of the defendant, Pierotti, with interstate shipments."
The Agents followed the car and saw it stop in an alley in a resi-
dential area. Henry got out of the car, entered a gangway, and
returned within a few minutes carrying several large cartons. He
placed the cartons in the automobile and drove away. Although
the Agents were unable to follow, they later located the vehicle
parked near the same tavern. Shortly thereafter the defendants
came out of the tavern, drove back to the alley following an in-
direct route, entered the same gangway, and loaded additional
cartons into the car. The Agents were several hundred feet away
and were unable to determine the size, number, or contents of the
cartons. When the defendants drove off, the Agents intercepted
their car and waved them to a stop. The key question now is,
"does this compulsory detention constitute an arrest?" As we shall
see, the admissibility of evidence and indeed the success or failure
of prosecution in this case depend on the manner in which this
question is resolved.
302. State v. Rye, 148 N.W.2d 632, 634 (Iowa, 1967).
303. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959) discussed below in
detail; Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (sustaining seizure of
illegal draft cards discovered during search incident to arrest for mail
fraud and interstate transportation of forged checks); United States ex tel.
Wilson v. LaVallee, 251 F. Supp. 292 (N.D.N.Y. 1966).
304. 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
If the arrest took place when the car was stopped, it was neces-
sary to establish at that point that the Agents had reasonable
grounds to believe a federal crime was being committed. In the
absence of such a showing, the arrest was illegal and any inci-
dental search thereto was unreasonable; the arrest could not be
saved by what might later be uncovered through interrogation
of the suspects or a search of their automobile.
Before deciding whether probable cause existed, it might be
helpful to reexamine the facts and circumstances as they were
known to the Agents prior to the stopping of the automobile. A
proper evaluation of the arrest decision must necessarily go slightly
beyond the court opinion. First, the information received from
Pierotti's employer was more substantial than the opinion indi-
cates. At the trial the prosecution failed to make clear for the
record the fact that the implicating information concerned "thefts"
from interstate shipments; this was the same type of offense as that
under investigation. Of course, a simple, unsupported accusation
of this kind would not alone justify arrest, but such information
may be taken into account by an officer when it comes from a
credible source. The persuasiveness of this factor, however, will
depend in large measure on the extent to which it can be corrobo-
rated by other circumstances. At the very least, the statement in
this instance served to narrow the focus of the investigation.
Second, the defendant Henry had a prior arrest record and a
reputation for engaging in the sort of criminality for which the
investigation was being conducted. This fact was known to the
Agents at the time of the stop and obviously it was relevant to the
arrest decision.
30 5
Third, the appearance of the defendants at a tavern and their
later return to the same location, where they unloaded several
large cartons, was also pertinent, since the tavern might well have
been an outlet for disposal of the stolen liquor. In addition, the
liquor taken from the trucking terminal had been boxed in cartons
of a similar size and description.
Fourth, when returning to the gangway from which they had
departed earlier, the defendants followed a "circuitous route
through streets and alleys."3 6  This, too, has been found to bear
on the validity of the arrest. If the suspect's behavior is out of the
305. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960) ("petitioner was
known by police to be a user of narcotics"); Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 165 (1949); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 700 (1931);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 160 (1925); United States v. Reincke,
341 F.2d 977 (2d Cir. 1965) (prior criminal record pertinent to determina-
tion of probable cause); Dixon v. United States, 296 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir.
1961) (one of the occupants of car known to officers as a safe breaker);
Ellison v. United States, 206 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (officers investigat-
ing the burglary of a drugstore knew defendant had been arrested for
similar offense one year earlier).
306. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 105 (1959).
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ordinary or if he is conducting himself in a manner not usual for
law-abiding citizens, that fact is relevant to the arrest decision.
On that basis it is reasonable to say that the average person making
two trips between the same given points in the space of a few
hours is not likely to follow a different and somewhat involved
route on each occasion. Moreover, as pointed out in the Govern-
ment brief: "One does not ordinarily make deliveries of mer-
chandise to a bar in a private passenger vehicle. And one does not
ordinarily make repeated deliveries of merchandise in bulk to a
retail dealer unless one is carrying the kind of merchandise which
the dealer is licensed to sell."307
This, then, is the extent of the information available to the
Agents at the time the car was called to a halt. While the situ-
ation indicated an obvious need for prompt investigative action, it
would seem that the evidence, at this point, fell somewhat short
of the amount of proof normally required for arrest and a formal
charge. Nonetheless, the Government conceded both in the lower
courts and on appeal that an arrest took place when the defend-
ant's car was stopped, arguing that the Agents then had probable
cause to believe that a federal crime was being committed. The
Supreme Court accepted the Government's position on the arrest
issue, stating, "That is our view on the facts of this particular
case. When the officers interrupted the two men and restricted
their liberty of movement, the arrest, for purposes of this case,
was complete. '30 8 The Court concluded, however, that there was
insufficient cause either to arrest or to search; consequently, the
examination of the car, which had disclosed not the whiskey which
was sought but stolen radios, was declared invalid and the con-
viction was reversed.
But consider now the events which directly followed the stop-
ping of the car. As the Agents approached the vehicle, Henry was
heard to say, "Hold it, it's the G's. Tell them he [you] just picked
me up."309 The Agents knew this comment to be untrue since they
had seen the defendants together for several hours. By its very
nature, therefore, this obvious attempt to invent an alibi was sug-
gestive of guilt and could properly be relied on in the decision to
arrest.310 Other incriminating circumstances were present. After
307. Brief for Government at 19, Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98
(1959).
308. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. at 103 (1959).
309. Id. at 99.
310. See, e.g., Bell v. United States, 280 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir. 1960)
(suspect walking in opposite direction from his stated destination).
Henry got out of the car, one of the Agents looked through the
open door and saw stacked up inside three cartons resembling those
which had just been taken from the gangway. The cartons bore
"Admiral" shipping labels and were addressed to an out-of-state
company; thus it was readily apparent that they were part of an
interstate shipment. This provided still another element in the
pattern of probable cause. Asked about the cartons, Henry stated
they were in the car when it was borrowed from a friend; here
again the statement was patently untrue. Also Pierotti denied
having just been to the tavern, stating that he might have been
there that morning. Plainly, this was inconsistent with what the
Agents had observed. Moreover, he claimed that he "just got off
work at 2:30," yet he had been seen at the tavern at approximately
2: 10 p.m. In short, several additional and very important elements
of probable cause were developed during the course of the inquiry
at the car.
Justice Clark, who was joined in dissent by Chief Justice War-
ren, refused to accept the prosecution's assessment of what con-
stituted an arrest, declaring, "This Court is not bound by the Gov-
ernment's mistakes."3 1' The dissenters expressed the view that
the activities observed during the surveillance justified stopping
the car and questioning its occupants. Since this did not amount
to an arrest, the Agents were not required at that point to have
reasonable grounds to believe a felony was being committed. How-
ever, subsequent interrogation together with the sighting of the
cartons with interstate labels, Clark concluded, provided sufficient
cause for the search and arrest.
812
The Henry case has been interpreted by some courts as laying
down the broad proposition that any restraint on the suspect's
freedom of movement constitutes an arrest which must be justi-
fied by a showing of probable cause.8 13  This reading would
obviously preclude the police from stopping and questioning per-
sons suspected of crime unless they have the right to make an arrest
at that moment. However, this has not been the predominant view.
Most courts and legal writers addressing the problem have not con-
sidered Henry to be authoritative, since the point at which the
arrest took place was not a contested issue in the case. As indi-
311. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. at 105 (1959).
312. A similar view had been expressed earlier by Justice Burton in
his concurring opinion in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 179
(1949) where he said: "Government agents are commissioned to represent
the interests of the public in the enforcement of the law and this requires
affirmative action not only when there is reasonable ground for an arrest or
probable cause for a search but when there is reasonable ground for an
investigation."
313. United States v. Davis, 265 F. Supp. 358 (W.D. Pa. 1967); United
States v. Washington, 249 F. Supp. 40, 41 (D.D.C. 1965); United States v.
Souther, 211 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Tenn. 1962). See also Ortiz v. United
States, 317 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1963).
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cated earlier, the Government expressly conceded that the arrest
occurred when the car in which the defendants were riding was
intercepted by the Agents; thus, the sole question was whether
they then had probable cause to believe that a federal crime
was being committed. 14 Moreover, the language of the opinion,
specifically limiting the holding to that particular case, suggests
that the Supreme Court did not intend to foreclose' all further
consideration of the question. Indeed, as one federal judge put it,
if Henry is read as holding that any restriction of movement is an
arrest, it propounds a rule that is "more honour'd in the breach
than the observance."3 15
Later in the same term the Supreme Court was presented
with still another opportunity to consider the issue of prearrest
detention. In Rios v. United States,31 police officers were patrolling
a neighborhood which had a reputation for narcotics activity when
they saw the defendant come out of a building, look up and down
the street, walk across a parking lot, and enter a waiting taxicab.
The officers followed for a short distance and approached' the cab
when it stopped at a traffic light. Although the record is not
clear as to the precise sequence of the events which followed, it
appears that, when one of the officers identified himself, the cab
door was opened and Rios dropped a package of narcotics to the
floor of the vehicle. He then fled into a nearby alley, where he
was subsequently apprehended.
Here again, as the Court noted, the "validity of the search.
turns upon the narrow question of when the arrest occurred." If
the arrest took place when the officers approached the cab, at which
time probable cause had not been established, nothing that hap-
pened thereafter could legalize the arrest or support a subsequent
search or seizure. But if the arrest took place after the defendant
had revealed the package of narcotics, the seizure was lawful, since
disclosure of the drugs afforded the officers probable cause to be-
lieve that a crime was being committed in their presence. Because
of the confused fact situation, however, the Court avoided any
decision on that point and, instead, remanded the case to the dis-
314. Rodgers v. United States, 362 F.2d 358, 362 (8th Cir. 1966);
Busby v. United States, 296 F.2d 328, 331 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 876 (1962); United States ex rel. Alexander v. Fay, 237 F. Supp.
142 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); United States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 85
(S.D.N.Y. 1960), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom. United States v. Bufa-
lino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960); ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT
PROCEDURE, § 2.02, comment at 94 (Tent. Draft No. 1).
315. United States v. Thomas, 250 F. Supp. 771, 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
316. 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
trict court for a determination of when the arrest occurred.3 17
While the Supreme Court took no firm position on the Gov-
ernment's plea for explicit recognition of a right to make inquiry
on suspicion, among the alternatives listed in the opinion for guid-
ance of the court below was the prosecution's contention "that the
policemen approached the standing taxi only for the purpose of
routine interrogation and that they had no intent to detain the
petitioner beyond the momentary requirements of such a mission."
The fact that this argument was included as a possible justification
for the officers' conduct seems to suggest that, under some circum-
stances, a stop for routine questioning may be permissible even
though cause to arrest is absent. As a result, several courts have
since cited Rios as precedent for that very proposition.31 8
To date, six federal appellate courts and numerous district
courts have either unequivocally sanctioned the practice of detain-
ing on suspicion or have referred to it approvingly in obiter dic-
tlm.
819
Perhaps the longest line of state cases adopting this position is
found in the California authorities, where precedent for a right to
detain for investigation can be traced back more than half a cen-
317. On rehearing, the district court held that the arrest was lawful,
indicating that it took place after the officer had observed the narcotics.
United States v. Rios, 192 F. Supp. 888 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
318. Brown v. United States, 365 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Wilson v:
Porter, 361 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1966); Nicholson v. United States, 355 F.2d
80 (5th Cir. 1966); Commonwealth v. Lehan, 196 N.E.2d 840, 844 (Mass.
1964).
319. Dupree v. United States, 380 F.2d 233, 235 (8th Cir. 1967); Gil-
bert v. United States, 366 F.2d 923, 928 (9th Cir. 1966); Brown v. United
States, 365 F.2d 976, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1966); United States v. Lewis, 362 F.2d
759 (2d Cir. 1966); Rodgers v. United States, 362 F.2d 358 (8th Cir. 1966);
Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1966); Trusty v. Oklahoma, 360
F.2d 173, 175 (10th Cir. 1966); Nicholson v. United States, 355 F.2d 80, 83
(5th Cir. 1966); Collins v. Beto, 348 F.2d 823, 832, 836 (5th Cir. 1965)
(concurring opinion per Friendly, J.); United States v. Middleton, 344
F.2d 78, 83 (2d Cir. 1965); Davis v. California, 341 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1965);
Schook v. United States, 337 F.2d 563, 566 (8th Cir. 1964); Busby v.
United States, 296 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1961); United States v. Vita, 294 F.2d
524, 530 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 823 (1962); United States
ex tel. Corbo v. LaVallee, 270 F.2d 513, 518 (2d Cir. 1959); McCarthy v.
United States, 264 F.2d 473 (8th Cir. 1959); Smith v. United States, 264
F.2d 469 (8th Cir. 1959); United States ex ret. Spero v. McKendrick, 266
F. Supp. 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); United States v. Katz, 238 F. Supp. 689
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); United States ex ret. Alexander v. Fay, 237 F. Supp. 142
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); United States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 85 (S.D.N.Y.
1960), rev'd. on other grounds sub. nom. United States v. Bufalino, 285
F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960); White v. United States, 222 A.2d 843, 845 (D.C.
App. 1966); District of Columbia v. Perry, 215 A.2d 845, 847 (D.C. App.
1966). For a thorough discussion of the problem and a listing of pertinent
authorities, see United States v. Thomas, 250 F. Supp. 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
In addition, see the following cases holding that a detention for a traffic
check is not an arrest: Myricks v. United States, 370 F.2d 901 (5th Cir.
1965); D'Argento v. United States, 353 F.2d 327, 333 (9th Cir. 1965); Lip-
ton v. United States, 348 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1965); Miney v. District of
Columbia, 218 A.2d 507 (D.C. App. 1966).
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tury. One of the earliest decisions in that jurisdiction to so hold is
Gisske v. Sanders,2 0 involving a civil action for false imprison-
ment. Reversing a lower court judgment for the plaintiff, the
California Court of Appeals ruled that a peace officer had the right
to stop and question a person and, if he refused to identify himself,
to take him to the police station for further investigation. The
Court held, in addition, that a search of the suspect's person which
had occurred on the way to the station was a reasonable safety
precaution which the officer might undertake regardless of whether
or not the party was under arrest. Since the Gisske decision, a
substantial body of opinion has developed in that state recognizing
the right of the police to stop and question where "such a course of
action is necessary to the proper discharging of the officer's
duties."
32
But while a detention may be made on grounds short of prob-
able cause, "there must exist some suspicious or unusual circum-
stance to authorize even this limited invasion of a citizen's pri-
vacy.' 's22 The presence of a reasonable or "founded suspicion"
serves to insure that the detention is not arbitrary or harassing.
For example, adequate cause for an investigative stop has been
found in the following circumstances: a car parked in "lover's
lane" started off at a high rate of speed;3 2 officers observed a ve-
hicle being driven slowly without lights at night; 2 4 a vehicle
fitted the description given the officers or an automobile involved
in a robbery and killing of a policeman; 23 a car was stopped in a
neighborhood notorious for narcotics violations after officers no-
ticed it being driven in an erratic pattern; 26 a suspect getting into
his car at 4 a.m. in front of a recently burglarized business estab-
lishment was questioned and detained while investigation in the
area disclosed that a nearby bar had been broken into;3 27 at 3 a.m.
officers following a car observed in the neighborhood a half hour
earlier ordered the motorist to pull over to the curb after seeing
his companion slide down on the seat as if to place something on
the floor.3 28 In each instance the court held there were adequate
320. 9 Cal. App. 13, 98 P. 43 (1908).
321. Peole v. Machel, 234 Cal. App. 2d 69, 44 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1965).
322. Hood v. Superior Court, 220 Cal. App. 2d 242, 33 Cal. Rptr. 782
(1963).
323. People v. Ellsworth, 190 Cal. App. 2d 844, 12 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1961);
People v. Martin, 293 P.2d 52 (Cal. 1956).
324. People v. Eychas, 182 Cal. App. 2d 360, 6 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1960).
325. People v. Schader, 62 Cal. 2d 716, 44 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1965).
326. People v. Davis, 188 Cal. App. 2d 718, 10 Cal. Rptr. 610 (1961).
327. People v. Rogers, 241 Cal. App. 2d 384, 50 Cal. Rptr. 559 (1966).
328. Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1966).
grounds to detain the motorist even though the officer did not
have a right to make an arrest at the moment; sufficient basis for
arrest was then acquired during the course of the investigation.
Until recently the California decisions, together with isolated
opinions in several other states, provided the only judicial prece-
dent to be found expressly supporting an officer's right to stop
and question in suspicious circumstances. A number of other juris-
dictions recognized an authority to question suspicious persons, but
the decisions failed to indicate whether this authority carried with
it the right to restrain such individuals under force of law. But
perhaps because of the resurgence of interest in the criminal law
and individual rights over the past decade, an imposing body of case
law is rapidly developing among the states on this important issue.
At present, appellate courts in almost a score of state jurisdictions
approve detention on the basis of suspicion and allow a self-pro-
tective search for weapons, notwithstanding the absence of suf-
ficient grounds for arrest. In addition, the practice is authorized
by statute in six states.
29
C. Arrest Must Be Bona Fide
Although an arrest may be lawful in the sense that it is based
upon adequate probable cause, the proceeds of an incidental search
will be inadmissible if the court finds' the arrest was merely a
convenient excuse or pretext for conducting the search.3 30 Police
find the traffic violation the most convenient front, since it pro-
vides the greatest potential for arrest.
Few motorists can drive any substantial distance without
329. ALA. LAWS, Act No. 157, H. 46 Spec. Sess. (1966); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11 § 1903 (1953); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 41, § 98 (1958); NEB. LAWS
ch. 132, at 471 (1965); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 594-3 (1955); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 12-7-2 (1956); N.Y. CODE CSIM. PROC. § 180-a (1967).
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) the Supreme Court faced the issue
whether an officer may seize and search a person for weapons in the ab-
sence of probable cause to arrest. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the
majority, approved a limited search for self-protection where there is a
justifiable belief that the person with whom the officer is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous. Relying on the balancing approach previ-
ously endorsed in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), the
Court suggested that a lesser intrusion on the privacy and liberty of an
individual can be justified on a lesser showing of guilt. The majority rec-
ognized, moreover, that there are differing kinds of "seizures" under the
fourth amendment and that not every seizure need be justified by the
same inflexible standard of probable cause. While declining to rule on
the propriety of a detention for investigation, the Court established the
conceptual framework necessary for eventual approval of such authority.
330. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958); United States v. Lef-
kowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262 (9th
Cir. 1961); Worthington v. United States, 166 F.2d 557 (6th Cir. 1948);
Henderson v. United States, 12 F.2d 528 (1926); United States v.
One 1963 Cadillac Hardtop, 224 F. Supp. 210 (E.D. Wis. 1963); United
States v. Pampinella, 131 F. Supp. 595 (N.D. Ill. 1955); People v. Wolfe,
5 Mich. App. 543, 147 N.W.2d 447 (1967).
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committing some minor infraction of the motor vehicle code.88 '
Consequently, an officer lacking sufficient cause to arrest one sus-
pected of a criminal offense will frequently look to traffic laws as a
means of detaining and perhaps searching the person and his ve-
hicle for evidence of the more serious crime. Apart from the fact
that an incidental search for evidence unconnected with the arrest
offense is generally not permissible, 332 a search in this instance will
fail for the additional reason that it is based upon a sham or pre-
text arrest.8s 3
This does not mean, of course, that a legitimate arrest for one
offense which reveals evidence of another and more serious vio-
lation is rendered illegal because of the prior suspicions or knowl-
edge of the police concerning such other offense.3 4 It means sim-
ply that an arrest cannot be made where it is prompted primarily
by a desire to search for evidence of other crimes, or, as it is some-
times stated, where the arrest is but an incident of the search.335
Thus, one appellate court refused to find that an arrest on a public
drinking charge was a sham, despite the fact that the defendant, a
narcotics suspect, was arrested by a narcotics squad officer follow-
ing a brief surveillance. Upholding the admissibility of heroin
seized from defendant's person, the court noted that every member.
of the police department has the right, if not the legal obligation,
to arrest for misdemeanors committed in his presence.
36
Accordingly, once a bona fide stop or arrest has been made
for a minor violation, the police can make an additional arrest for
any other offense unexpectedly discovered during the course of
the investigation. If, while questioning a motorist regarding the
331. See Brinegar v. State, 97 Old. Cr. 299, 262 P.2d 464 (1953).
332. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Gilbert v. United
States, 291 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1961); but see Watts v. State, 196 So. 2d 79
(Miss. 1967).
333. Montana v. Tomich, 332 F.2d 987 (9th Cir. 1964); Taglavore v.
United States, 291 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1948); State v. Michaels, 60 Wash.
638, 374 P.2d 989 (1962); Huebner v. State, 33 Wis. 505, 147 N.W.2d 646
(1967). But see People v. Watkins, 19 Ill. 2d 11, 166 N.E.2d 433 (1960)
(upholding search following arrest following parking too close to cross-
walk where "the officers had reason to assume that they were dealing with
a situation more serious than a parking violation").
334. Cook v. United States, 346 F.2d 563, 565 (10th Cir. 1965).
335. White v. United States, 271 F.2d 829, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Hen-
derson v. United States, 12 F.2d 528, 531 (1926).
336. Hutcherson v. United States, 345 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See
also Cook v. United States, 346 F.2d 563 (10th Cir. 1965) (defendant, sus-
pected of passing bad checks, was stopped for driving with faulty muf-
flers; a search of his person revealed evidence relating to illegal possession
of selective service notification card).
operation of his vehicle, an officer sees evidence of a criminal
violation in open view, or in some other manner acquires probable
cause on a more serious charge, he may arrest for that offense and
incident thereto conduct an additional search for physical evi-
dence. 33 7  Under these circumstances, neither the arrest nor the





United States v. Owens,339 illustrates good police work by
an alert officer who stopped a speeding automobile and was able to
pyramid subsequent suspicious circumstances into probable cause
to arrest on a felony charge. In that case, a co-defendant, Howell,
accompanied by Owens and one Hightower, was arrested for speed-
ing on a turnpike. He showed the officer his driver's license but
said that Owens had the registration certificate. The registration
card produced by Owens was made out in the name of another
party who Owens said was a "relation to him"; he did not know
the party's address, although the address was shown on the card.340
Questioned further, Howell stated he did not know the owner of
the car and neither he nor Owens was able to show permission to
drive the vehicle. The officer, suspecting the automobile was
stolen, inquired about the contents of the trunk, which Owens
opened, disclosing three suitcases. Owens disclaimed ownership of
one of the suitcases, which he stated was unlocked; opening it, the
officer found in plain view a hypodermic needle of the kind used
by drug addicts. On appeal from conviction of a narcotics vio-
lation, the court upheld the search and said:
It is clear from the facts in the record that the arrest
for speeding was not "a mere excuse to search" for nar-
cotics . . . and was valid under Pennsylvania law. . . .The
surrounding circumstances justified the arresting officer
in suspecting that he was dealing with a situation more
serious than routine speeding and he had reasonable
grounds for believing that the car might be stolen. There
was nothing to indicate that the officer suspected the pres-
ence of any narcotics or other violation until the suitcase
was opened disclosing the needle. Considering the situa-
tion which faced the officer, his attempts to determine
whether the car was stolen was not unreasonable or viola-
tive of the Fourth Amendment, and the evidence which was
turned up was not the fruit of any "poisonous tree."'3 4 1
337. Goodwin v. United States, 347 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Busby
v. United States, 296 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1961); Riggins v. United States,
255 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Tex. 1966); United States v. Barnett, 258 F. Supp.
455 (M.D. Tenn. 1965) (evidence discovered in course of self-protective
search for weapons); United States v. Clark, 247 F. Supp. 958 (D. Mont.
1964).
338. See Brown v. United States, 365 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1966); United
States v. One 1963 Cadillac Hardtop, 224 F. Supp. 210 (E.D. Wis. 1963).
339. 346 F.2d 329 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 855 (1965).
340. See Government brief, pp. 6-7; id.
341. Id.
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Determining the true motives of the arresting officer in these
cases is sometimes difficult. One of the factors looked to by the
courts is whether there has been any significant departure from
normal search and seizure practices. For example, a full-custody
arrest and search of a traffic offender or his vehicle will naturally
be suspect if the established practice for that type of violation is
merely to issue a summons.34 2 It is also considered significant if
an officer acts outside his usual job specialty in making an arrest.
Of course, every policeman has a general responsibility to arrest
persons committing crimes, particularly if the offenses are com-
mitted in his presence.3 43 But it is fair to say that an officer in a
large metropolitan department who is assigned exclusively to
gambling matters, or some other specialized vice unit, does not
ordinarily enforce minor traffic laws, for example, parking too
close to a crosswalk.
344
A combination of these factors led the appellate court in
Taglavore v. United States,345 to conclude that an arrest by war-
rant on a traffic charge was in fact a deliberate subterfuge to
search the defendant for evidence of a narcotics violation. There
an officer on the vice squad saw the defendant, whom he sus-
pected of being engaged in illegal narcotics activities, commit two
minor traffic violations-failing to signal for a right turn and
having faulty brake and signal lights. The officer later testified
that he did not issue a citation at that time because he was "busy
doing other police work." Instead, he swore out a warrant for
the defendant's arrest on the following day. The officers executing
the warrant had been forewarned that there was an excellent
chance the defendant would have marihuana cigarettes in his pos-
session when they found him. When the officers saw Taglavore
on the street later that afternoon and told him they had a warrant
for his arrest, he quickly placed something in his mouth and
dashed toward a nearby bar. The defendant was apprehended
after a brief struggle and the remains of a marihuana cigarette
were forcibly removed from his mouth. On review the appellate
court reversed the conviction, stating that the arrest was a front
to cover a search for marihuana cigarettes. "It is a matter of
common knowledge," the court said, "and it was admitted by one
342. Riddlehoover v. State, 198 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 1967) (and cases cited
therein); State v. Michaels, 60 Wash. 2d 638, 374 P.2d 989 (1962).
343. Hutcherson v. United States, 345 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
344. See TIFFANY, MCINTYIE, AND ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME
136-141 (1967).
345. 291 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1961).
of the arresting officers at the trial, that it is not ordinary police
procedure to physically take a person into custody for a minor
traffic violation . . . especially where no traffic ticket or citation
has theretofore been given." In addition, the court took particular
note of the fact that the warrant had been obtained by an inspector
on the vice squad who had suspected the defendant of being active
in narcotics trade. Under these circumstances, the court concluded,
the true purpose of the arrest was obvious.
Taglavore was a rather clear case of a sham arrest. The
specialized assignment of the complaining officer, his departure
from normal arrest procedures, his prior suspicions concerning the
defendant's narcotics activities, his expressed confidence that a
search would reveal evidence of such activities, and the fact that
he bypassed an earlier opportunity to arrest for another time and
place all provided convincing evidence that the arrest warrant was
used merely as a convenient justification to search. In situations
where the arrest and search are made at the scene, defense coun-
sel may make additional inquiries along the following lines: Was
the defendant under surveillance prior to the stop? Was the arrest
made in a high crime area? Were the officer's initial questions
directed toward the purported traffic charge? Indeed, did he at
any time ask to see the defendant's operator's license or vehicle
registration? Questions of this type can be expected as a matter
of routine whenever a search following a traffic arrest gives an
officer probable cause to arrest for a second more serious vio-
lation.3 14 6 And if it is established that the paramount purpose of
the arrest has been to search, any physical evidence so derived
will be barred from admission against the accused.
D. Search Must Be Contemporaneous With the Arrest
Since the search is said to be an incident of the arrest, these
two acts must be closely related in point of time; in essence, this is
the meaning of the longstanding requirement that the search be
contemporaneous with the arrest. Ideally, then, a vehicle should
be examined for evidence of crime immediately after, and at the
scene of, the arrest. But, of course, it is not always practicable to
do so; consequently, the question here is: When and under what
circumstances may an arresting officer delay his search until a later
time or place without forfeiting his authority under the incidental
search rule?
The leading decision in this area is Preston v. United States,8
4 7
involving the search of an impounded car after the occupants had
been taken into custody. In that case, police received a complaint
at 3 o'clock in the morning that "three suspicious men acting sus-
346. See 1 VARON, SEARCHES, SEIZURES AND IMMUNITIEs 203-205 (1961).
347. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
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piciously" had been seated in a car parked in a business district
since 10 o'clock the previous evening. The officers went to the lo-
cation and found the defendant and two companions in the car.
When asked why they were parked there, the suspects gave un-
satisfactory and evasive answers; they admitted they were unem-
ployed and had only 25 cents among them. Although one of the
men claimed ownership of the vehicle, he could not produce any
title. The officers then arrested the men for vagrancy, searched
them for weapons, and took them to police headquarters. Their
automobile was towed to a garage. After the suspects were booked,
several officers searched the vehicle and found two loaded revolvers
in the glove compartment. They subsequently gained entry to
the trunk and found caps, masks, a false license plate, and other
items implicating the defendant in a conspiracy to commit bank
robbery. On review of the conviction, the Supreme Court held
the search was "too remote in time or place" and therefore the
evidence should have been suppressed.
Too often there is an overreaction to innovative decisions in
the law, with the result that the rules or policies adopted go be-
yond the actual language or intent of the opinion. The Preston
case is no exception. Some enforcement agencies, for example,
have read into the decision the blanket rule that any delay, re-
gardless of the circumstances, will automatically bar the possibility
of conducting a lawful incidental search. This interpretation was
seemingly borne out by an early district court opinion which ex-
cluded physical evidence found in a suspect's vehicle where federal
agents removed the car from the flow of traffic in a town square
before commencing the search. But Preston, itself, does not go that
far, and no appellate case since Preston has suggested that the
requirement of contemporaneity can be satisfied only by a search
conducted at the immediate time and in the immediate vicinity of
the arrest.8 48 Most courts recognize that compelling situations are
certain to arise in which common sense would require that the
search be postponed until a later time.
The prevailing view is that Preston requires simply that there
be a common purpose in making the arrest and the search and,
further, that the two acts be part of a continuous series of events.
The former requirement, of course, introduces no innovation in the
law, since it has long been the rule that one can search only for
physical evidence of the crime for which the arrest is made. Jus-
348. People v. Webb, 66 Cal. 2d 107, 424 P.2d 342, 56 Cal. Rptr. 902
(1967); State v. Wood, 197 Kan. 241, 416 P.2d 729 (1966).
tice Black pointed out in a later opinion that Preston was based
partly on the assumption that the arrest was not related to the
purposes of the search.. 49  Since there are no implements, fruits,
contraband, or other physical evidence connected with the crime
of vagrancy, it was clear that the search had been undertaken for
an exploratory purpose in the hope that it might reveal the com-
mission of some other offense.
In addition to a continuity of purpose, the arrest and the
search must also be part of one continuous operation, without any
sharp interruption between the two acts. This emphasis on "a
continuing series of events" is to be found wherever "contempo-
raneity" is in issue, whether the subject of the search is a motor
vehicle, fixed premises or the person of the accused.3 50
Simply stated, the "continuous operation" concept means only
that there should be no unnecessary delay before making an inci-
dental search. 51 Here again, this is simply a restatement of the
settled rule that the search should follow as soon after the
349. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967). See also State v. Wood,
197 Kan. 241, 416 P.2d 729 (1966); State v. Fioravanti, 46 N.J. 109, 215 A.2d
16 (1965).
350. See, e.g., United States v. Masini, 358 F.2d 100 (6th Cir. 1966)
(search of arrestee after brief delay to allow for telephone call to police
headquarters was "part of one continuous operation"); Arwine v. Bannan,
346 F.2d 458 (6th Cir. 1965); Price v. United States, 348 F.2d 68, 70 (D.C.
Cir. 1965) (held search of vehicle in police parking lot "was part of a
continuing series of events which included the original arrest and con-
tinued uninterruptedly as lawful police investigation and action"); Holt v.
Simpson, 340 F.2d 853 (7th Cir. 1965) (search of premises prior to arrest
sustained as "part of one transaction"); Rhodes v. United States, 224 F.2d
348 (5th Cir. 1955) (part of one continuous transaction); Clifton v. United
States, 224 F.2d 329 (4th Cir. 1955); King v. Pinto, 256 F. Supp. 522 (D.N.J.
1966) (search of petitioner's apartment "a few minutes" after his arrest in
rear of apartment house upheld; quoting from State v. Doyle, 42 N.J. 334,
342, 200 A.2d 606, 611 (1964), the federal district court said: "It is suffi-
cient if the valid arrest and search are reasonably contemporaneous, that
is, they occur as parts of a single transaction, as connected units of an
integrated incident"); United States v. Erskine, 248 F. Supp. 137 (D. Ore.
1965) (valid search of person made 20 minutes after arrest where "the
entire activity was one continuous sequence"); Trotter v. Stephens, 241 F.
Supp. 33 (E.D. Ark. 1965) (held search of car obtained incident to and
contemporaneous with arrest of defendant "was merely part of one con-
tinuous act, even though interrupted by the arrest of [codefendant] in the
interim"); United States v. Jackson, 149 F. Supp. 937, 941 (D.D.C. 1957);
People v. Webb, 66 Cal. 2d 107, 424 P.2d 342, 56 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1967)
(search of car after it had been towed from the scene of the arrest to
police parking lot upheld as part of "continuing series of events"); State
v. Wood, 197 Kan. 241, 416 P.2d 729 (1966) (where rule was phrased in
terms of whether the arrest, removal of automobile, and its search were "a
series of events constituting one continuous happening"); State v. Darba-
basek, 412 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1967) (search of defendant's person 2 hours after
arrest declared permissible as a "continuation of the process of arrest, a
unit of the integrated 'incident' ").
351. An interesting parallel is found in one case where similar ter-
minology was employed in defining "necessary delay" for purposes of the
Federal Prompt Arraignment Statute. Perry v. United States, 347 F.2d 813
(D.C. Cir. 1964); see 54 GEO. L.J. 185, 224, 238-39 (1965).
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arrest as circumstances will permit. Obviously, the examination
cannot be postponed merely to suit the personal convenience of
the investigating officer.3
5 2
If there are "unusual circumstances" in the case which prevent
an immediate search, the car should be removed to the police
station or some other suitable location and searched in the presence
of the accused.313 One such situation is an emergency which
would make it dangerous or otherwise unreasonable for the officers
to search the car immediately at the scene of arrest. Thus, in
People v. Webb,854 the California Supreme Court upheld a later
search of a vehicle at the police station, stressing the fact that gun-
fire and the subsequent crash of the defendant's car had attracted
a large crowd, requiring that additional policemen be summoned to
control the mob. In another case, a federal court pointed out that
the arrest was made in a "crowded, sub-standard neighborhood,"
where a prolonged stay necessary to conduct a thorough search
of the vehicle might "trigger an explosive situation. 35 5
Other delays held not to violate Preston include those occa-
sioned by removal of the car from a heavily traveled highway,3 56
or from a location where it might present a substantial hazard to
oncoming motorists,3 57 or where a burglary suspect was kept in his
automobile for three hours as a decoy for the arrest of his ac-
complice. 5 A later search has also been sustained where it was
necessary to permit a more thorough and scientific examination
of the automobile at a subsequent time; 859 and, more simply, where
it was "prudent" to move the car to a more convenient or suitable
352. United States v. Harvey, 397 F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1968). Defendant
had been arrested and he and his auto taken to police station. The court
held that a warrantless search of the auto at the station was not inci-
dent to arrest and unreasonable. Evidence obtained by such a search
should have been suppressed. Petty v. State, 241 Ark. 911, 411 S.W.2d 6
(1967).
353. See Arwine v. Bannan, 346 F.2d 458 (6th Cir. 1965). See also
Maltos-Rogue v. United States, 381 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1967) (valid reason-
able search where agent stopped car but because of cold he conducted
search in police station one mile away).
354. 66 Cal. 2d 107, 424 P.2d 342, 56 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1967).
355. United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Wallack, 255 F. Supp. 566
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
356. State v. Anderson, 148 N.W.2d 414 (Iowa 1967) (car taken to
police station).
357. State v. Schwartzenberger, 70 Wash. 2d 103, 422 P.2d 323 (1966)
(car moved to off-street parking lot); see also People v. Webb, 66 Cal. 2d
107, 424 P.2d 342, 56 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1967).
358. Arwine v. Bannan, 346 F.2d 458 (6th Cir. 1965).
359. People v. Talbot, 64 Cal. 2d 691, 414 P.2d 633, 51 Cal. Rptr. 417
(1966).
location for the search.8 60 In still another case, the need to pro-
tect the defendants from the elements and to afford the officer
"better conditions for the search" justified a brief delay until the
sheriff's office was reached.30 ' Some leeway can also be expected
where the delay is prompted by concern for the personal safety of
the investigating officer. In most cases it would be unwise for a
patrolman to attempt a search of the vehicle while maintaining
custody over a prisoner; this is particularly true where more than
one suspect is being detained. Only the most doctrinaire reading
of Preston would hold that a postponement under such circum-
stances-to allow for the arrival of additional officers or to permit
removal of the vehicle to a safer location-was unnecessary
delay.
But even though conditions may preclude a complete search
of the automobile at the scene, if the situation will allow, it is
advisable to initiate the search at the time and place of the arrest
and to resume it back at the station. The courts seem to have less
difficulty justifying a delay in these circumstances, since it is
generally reasoned that the later examination is simply part of the
original search. 62  Thus, in People v. Moschitta,313 police of-
ficers searched the interior of the car at the time of defendant's
arrest for auto theft but found no incriminating evidence. How-
ever, a later search at the station disclosed a pistol in the trunk of
the vehicle and led to the defendant's indictment for possession of
a weapon. Reversing an earlier order granting the defendant's
motion to suppress, the court admitted the weapon in evidence,
stating: "The subsequent search at the police station, made in an
effort to ascertain the identity of the owner of an apparently
stolen car, may be characterized as a continuation of the original
search.6 4
Finally, a separate but analogous situation is presented when
incriminating evidence is discovered by the officers, either with
or without a search, at the time the arrest is made, but actual
seizure of such evidence is delayed until a later time. The courts
360. Maltos-Rogue v. United States, 381 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1967)
(search at station due to cold weather); State v. Wood, 197 Kan. 241, 416
P.2d 729 (1966). See also Evans v. United States, 385 F.2d 824 (7th Cir.
1967). There the search of an auto belonging to one for whom a warrant
had been issued was reasonable when it began in a substandard neighbor-
hood, was discontinued when a crowd gathered, and 15-20 minutes later
was resumed in federal building.
361. State v. McCreary, 142 N.W.2d 240 (S.D. 1966) (suspects arrested
on an open highway on a "typically cold winter evening in northern
South Dakota").
362. People v. Webb, 66 Cal. 2d 107, 424 P.2d 342, 56 Cal. Rptr. 902
(1967).
363. 25 A.D.2d 684 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966).
364. Accord, People v. Hatch, 25 A.D.2d 606 (4th Dept. 1966); see also
Drummond v. United States, 350 F.2d 983 (8th Cir. 1965) (search of vehicle
initiated outside restaurant in which defendant was arrested and con-
tinued back at police lot).
Search of Motor Vehicles
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
have generally sustained this practice on the theory that the prop-
erty is taken into custody by the police at the time of the arrest,
and by removing the car to the police station and taking away the
items already observed in the vehicle, the police do no more than
effectuate the seizure made at the moment of arrest.305 This is so,
even if the latter examination discloses additional evidence of the
crime. In effect, the initial invasion of the defendant's privacy
occurs when the arrest is made, and, where the evidence is in open
view, no further breach is involved by its subsequent examination.
For example, in Price v. United States,16  a store was reported
burglarized, and among the items stolen were a safe, an envelope
containing $500 in bills, and several rolls of quarters including two
in orange-colored paper bound in an old rubberband. The police
found the getaway car four hours later, parked near the scene of
the crime. Plainly visible through the windows of the car were a
spare license plate, burglary tools, an envelope, and two orange-
colored rolls of quarters wrapped together with an old rubber-
band. A few minutes later the defendant arrived at the vehicle
and was arrested. He was then taken to the station house while
an officer drove his automobile to the parking lot. Upon arrival,
the items seen by the officers were immediately removed from the
vehicle. The envelope was later found to contain brass fittings
also identified as having been in the stolen safe.
The circuit court affirmed the conviction, ruling that the
search at the station was valid under Preston because these articles
were seen by the officers at the time the arrest was made. Since
the property came under the control of the police when they first
arrested the defendant, they could lawfully have taken possession
of the articles at any time thereafter.3 67 The fact that they chose to
delay the technical seizure until after such evidence was trans-
ported in the defendant's car to headquarters did not affect its
admissibility in court
s68
In summary, where there are unusual circumstances such as
365. State v. Fioravanti, 46 N.J. 109, 215 A.2d 16 (1965).
366. 348 F.2d 68 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 888 (1965).
367. People v. Webb, 66 Cal. 2d 107, 424 P.2d 342, 56 Cal. Rptr. 902
(1967).
368. Rodgers v. United States, 362 F.2d 358, 362 (8th Cir. 1966); People
v. Webb, 66 Cal. 2d 107, 424 P.2d 342, 56 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1967); People v.
Evans, 240 Cal. App. 2d 291, 49 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1966); State v. Putnam,
178 Neb. 445, 133 N.W.2d 605 (1965); State v. Fioravanti, 46 N.J. 109, 215
A.2d 16 (1965). See also State v. Hunt, 198 Kan. 222, 424 P.2d 571
(1967) (search of vehicle and seizure of cigarettes from trunk after re-
moval of vehicle to station were "merely cumulative" to seizure of ciga-
rettes seen in rear of car at time of arrest).
those described above, the arresting officer may defer his search
until after the suspect and his vehicle have been removed to the
police station or to some other suitable location. In such a case
the search should be initiated immediately upon arrival and, pref-
erably, in the presence of the accused.
69
The brevity of the delay in conducting a search has been
emphasized in several decisions and, as indicated, is one of the
underlying notions in the "continuous operation" concept often
expressed by the courts in this context. 70 Thus, it is fair to
assume that any postponement to permit booking of the suspects
or the completion of other administrative procedures prior to exam-
ination of the car would fall within the prohibitions of the Preston
doctrine.
The Supreme Court again had an opportunity to consider the
propriety of a warrantless vehicle search conducted at a police
station in Cooper v. California.71 There the defendant was ar-
rested for selling heroin, and his car was taken into custody under
a state statute which provides that any vehicle used to store, con-
ceal, transport, sell, or facilitate the possession of narcotics should
be impounded and held as evidence pending forfeiture proceedings.
Eight days after the defendant's arrest and the seizure of his ve-
hicle, the car was searched and evidence was discovered which was
used to obtain a conviction. In a decision written by Justice
Black, the Court held that under the circumstances of this case the
examination or search of the car validly held by the police for
use as evidence in a forfeiture proceeding was reasonable under
the fourth amendment. Preston was distinguished on the ground
that the officers in that case had impounded the vehicle simply for
the defendant's convenience following his arrest on a vagrancy
charge. There was no indication "that they had any right to im-
pound the car and keep it from Preston or whomever he might
send for it." Here, seizure and custody of the vehicle were re-
quired because of the nature of the crime for which the petitioner
was arrested. And once custody was so acquired, "It would be un-
reasonable to hold that the police, having to retain the car in their
garage [pending forfeiture proceedings], had no right even for
their own protection, to search it.
' '372
369. See Arwine v. Bannan, 346 F.2d 458 (6th Cir. 1965) (stressing
"presence" as one of the factors distinguishing that case from Preston).
370. E.g., United States v. Dento, 382 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, (1967). Police made warrantless arrest of defendant on highway
389 U.S. 944. His automobile was driven to police barracks before a
search was conducted. The search was upheld as not too remote in time or
place as incidental to arrest, where the search was completed within 20
minutes of arrest and arresting officers had seen defendant put something
under seat. United States v. Price, 348 F.2d 68 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 888 (1965); Arwine v. Bannan, 346 F.2d 458 (6th Cir. 1965);
People v. Webb, 66 Cal. 2d 107, 424 P.2d 342, 56 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1967);
State v. McCreary, 142 N.W.2d 240 (S.D. 1966).
371. 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
372. Id. at 61-2.
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The reaction among the lower courts to Cooper has been mixed.
Some judges have read the opinion, as did the four dissenting jus-
tices, as overruling the Preston case.3 73 Others have indicated
that Cooper modified Preston to the extent that the police may
now search an impounded vehicle at a time and place remote from
the arrest so long as the search is for evidence connected with the
crime for which the arrest was made.37 4 It is doubtful that either
view is entirely correct. The latter interpretation would trivialize
Preston by applying its restrictions only where the search was for
physical evidence unrelated to the crime of arrest. But an exam-
ination of this type has long been held to exceed the bounds of a
legitimate incidental search. T5 Moreover, Preston was the first
unanimous search and seizure opinion handed down by the Su-
preme Court in over thirty years. At the very least, it is unlikely
that the Supreme Court would overrule the decision or so emascu-
late the doctrine as to nullify it just two short years after its
pronouncement. And since Justice Black authored both opinions,
it can hardly be said that he was unaware of the full implications
of the previous ruling.
It is submitted that while Cooper undoubtedly broadens po-
lice authority to examine certain impounded cars for evidence of
crime, it in no way undercuts the requirement that an incidental
search be conducted at the same time and the same place as the
arrest. It is more accurate to say that the concern of Cooper is less
with the search of a vehicle incident to arrest than with the exam-
ination of a car which has lawfully been seized and is held as
evidence by the police. In Cooper, the car was taken into custody
pursuant to a state forfeiture provision. Once seized, the police
had complete dominion and control over the vehicle; consequently
no further trespass against the property was committed by the
subsequent examination. Since the seizure of forfeitable ve-
hicles is well established in the law, this aspect of the opinion was
fully consistent with existing doctrine."'
Justice Black was careful to point out, however, that the
Court's opinion was not based solely on the application of state for-
feiture laws. The real inquiry, he said, is "whether the search was
reasonable under the fourth amendment." The facts in this case
373. See People v. Webb, 66 Cal. 2d 107, 424 P.2d 342, 56 Cal. Rptr.
902 (1967), Peters, J., concurring.
374. See, e.g., Stewart v. People, 426 P.2d 545 (Colo. 1967); State v.
Hunt, 198 Kan. 222, 424 P.2d 571 (1967).
375. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925); Gilbert v. United
States, 291 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1961).
376. See discussion V. Seizure of a Vehicle for Forfeiture Purposes.
indicated that the automobile had been used to carry on the posses-
sion and transportation of narcotics. As a result, it was itself evi-
dence of the crime rather than, as one court put it, "merely a con-
tainer of incriminating articles."877 Thus, the search "was closely
related to the reason petitioner was arrested, the reason his car
had been impounded, and the reason it was being retained." The
broad implications of this language are that the defendant's ve-
hicle could properly have been taken into custody as an instru-
mentality of the crime at the time the arrest was made. In this
respect the case is similar to the Price decision, discussed earlier,
where it was held that police officers, who had made what was
tantamount to a contemporaneous seizure of evidence within the
car, had the right to examine such evidence at a later time. In
Cooper, the entire automobile, not simply its contents, was evidence
of the crime, since it had been used to transport contraband items.
It was, therefore, an implement of the offense found in the control
or possession of the accused at the time of his arrest.
Johnson v. State,78 1 offers an excellent illustration of the appli-
cation of this approach. There the suspect was arrested on a
charge of rape and his vehicle was towed to a police station,
where a search disclosed incriminating evidence. Three days later
sweeping and dust samples were taken from the car. In sustaining
these delayed searches, the Maryland Supreme Court distinguished
Preston on the ground that the "automobile had been used as an
instrument in the perpetration of the alleged crime." Consequently,
"the automobile itself could have been offered in evidence at the
trial. Having lawfully seized it, the police had the right to examine
it after the seizure for evidence in connection with the crime."8 79
In short, the Cooper decision seems to indicate that the par-
ticular basis on which the vehicle was seized was immaterial; in
that case, custody could have been acquired on probable cause to
believe either that the car had been used in violation of forfeiture
laws, or that it was an implement of the crime for which the arrest
was made. In either event, once the vehicle was lawfully seized,
377. People v. Webb, 66 Cal. 2d 107, 424 P.2d 342, 56 Cal. Rptr. 902
(1967).
378. 238 Md. 528, 209 A.2d 765 (1965) (discussed in Section II.V. Limi-
tations on the Use of a Warrant). See cases in note 79 supra.
379. Trotter v. Stephens, 241 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Ark. 1965) (sustaining
search where defendant's "automobile was an instrumentality of the crime,
and unlike Preston ... it was examined closely at the time of arrest and
searched a few hours later"); Abrams v. State, 223 Ga. 216, 154 S.E.2d 443
(1967) (suspect's vehicle seized at time of his arrest "as an implement used
in the commission of the crime of rape"); State v. Anderson, 148 N.W.2d
414 (Iowa 1967) (search of vehicle at police garage was reasonable because
the car was an instrumentality used in the carrying of concealed weapons
and the possession of burglary tools). See also United States v. Yant,
373 F.2d 543 (6th Cir. 1967); People v. Webb, 66 Cal. 2d 107, 424 P.2d 342,
56 Cal. Rptr. 902 n.3 (1967); People v. Miller, 245 Cal. App. 2d 112, 130-31,
53 Cal. Rptr. 720, 738-39 (1966).
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it could properly have been searched without a warrant regardless
of whether such search was contemporaneous.
Logically, this seizure concept should go beyond implements of
the crime to include, as well, situations in which the suspect's auto-
mobile was a fruit of the offense (if stolen), a form of derivative
contraband (where put to illegal use), or even where it constituted
"mere evidence" of the offense for which the arrest was made.880
If it can reasonably be said that under the crimunstances the
automobile falls within one of these conventional categories of
seizables, the officer theoretically can lawfully take the car into
custody and examine it at a later time, without obtaining a war-
rant. This broadened approach is highly speculative at this time;
it ought not to be implemented by any department without first
consulting the prosecuting attorney's office. Nonetheless, Cooper
argues well for the acceptance of a general seizure authority which
would permit the police to obtain custody of a motor vehicle in the
same manner as any other item of personal property deemed of
offend the law.
This is not to say, however, that the police may dispense with
the usual constitutional requirements simply because a car is in
lawful custody. The question to be answered in each instance is:
How, and for what purpose, was custody of the vehicle acquired?
But where, as in Preston, the suspect's automobile was in no way
connected with the offense for which the arrest was made, it
could only be impounded by the police for purposes of safekeeping.
Plainly, there was no legal justification for a seizure of the car in
the sense that it could be held against the demands of the defend-
ant or "whomever he might send for it." It is fair to say that the
impounding officer in this case was acting in the status of an
agent for the defendant and acquired only such authority over the
car as was necessary to insure its safekeeping. Under these cir-
cumstances the examination was for inventory purposes alone and
it could not have as its objective the discovery of evidence of
crime.""
Thus, where the car is not related to the arrest offense and
cannot be held as evidence, the Cooper doctrine is inapplicable,
even though the vehicle may contain items of evidentiary value.
In the absence of a warrant or lawful consent, an officer must
380. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
381. See discussion IV. Examination of an Impounded Vehicle, supra.
See also Draper v. Maryland, 265 F. Supp. 718 (D. Md. 1967); People v.
Prochneaw, 251 Cal. App. 2d 22, 59 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1967); Heffley v. State,
423 P.2d 666 (Nev. 1967).
look either to the Carroll rule or to the search incident to arrest as
a basis for his entry into the vehicle. Should he resort to the latter
alternative, the full requirements of Preston are applicable. Ac-
cordingly, any delay in the search which is not justified by "un-
usual circumstances" will invalidate the evidence.
E. Scope, Intensity, and Objectives of the Search
Even though each of the above prerequisites is met in a given
situation-that is, a lawful, bona fide arrest made in or near a
vehicle is followed by a contemporaneous search-the inquiry does
not end here. Additional limitations concerning the objectives,
scope, and intensity of the search remain. The mere fact of a
legitimate arrest does not give the officer an absolute right to
search the person or vehicle indiscriminately." 2  On the con-
trary, more questions must now be asked: What may the officer
search for? What may he seize? Where, and with what degree of
thoroughness, may he look for these items?
It is an established rule that an incidental search may be
made only for weapons or implements that a suspect might use to
harm the officer or make an escape and for the fruits, instrumen-
talities, contraband, or mere evidence of the crime for which the
person was arrested. But if, while legitimately searching the auto-
mobile for weapons or physical evidence of the crime, the officer
unexpectedly discovers objects of a totally unrelated offense, he
may seize those items without a warrant. The law does not require
that he close his eyes to evidence of other crimes. Finally, the
officer may look any place in the vehicle where the item sought
might logically be concealed, and he may search with as much
intensity as is reasonably necessary to disclose its presence. In
brief, these are the broad limitations within which the search
must be conducted. While the rules are easily stated, they are of-
ten difficult to apply in a specific situation.
1. Search for Weapons and Means of Escape
Among the justifications for allowing a search incident to
arrest is the obvious need to seize weapons and other objects that
might be used to assault the officer or effect an escape. 8 3 As
Judge (later Justice) Cardozo put it, "The peace officer em-
powered to arrest must be empowered to disarm. If he may dis-
arm, he may search, lest a weapon be concealed.138 4  Most courts
are in agreement that a self-protective search may be made follow-
ing an arrest for a criminal violation, regardless of the severity of
382. State v. Jackson, 4 Conn. Cir. 125, 226 A.2d 804 (1966); Lane v.
Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1965).
383. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964).
384. People v. Chiagles, 237 N.Y. 193, 142 N.E. 583 (1923).
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the offense involved. Difficult questions arise, however, concern-
ing the propriety of searching persons who are taken into custody
for a traffic violation. Part of the uncertainty stems from the fact
that the traffic offense is often a hybrid of the law; that is, it
may be both regulatory and criminal in nature, depending on the
type of violation involved.38 5
Where circumstances indicate that the motorist may be armed
or that the police are dealing with a situation more serious than a
routine traffic violation, the officer is justified in searching both the
person and his vehicle for weapons. 386 A search for self-protection
has also been allowed where the occupants of the car were known
to be dangerous,387 or the motorist fitted the description of a per-
son suspected of serious crimes.3s8
In the absence of aggravated circumstances, however, or good
reason to believe a search is necessary for reasons of safety or pre-
venting escape, several courts have taken the position that a traffic
arrest will not support an incidental search for weapons. In Peo-
ple v. Marsh,389 for example, the New York Court of Appeals
reversed a conviction for possession of policy slips discovered by
officers while frisking the defendant for weapons at the time of
arrest. The defendant, a traffic offender, had been taken into
custody under a warrant of arrest for ignoring a previous summons.
"There is something incongruous," the court said, "about treating
traffic offenders as noncriminals, on the one hand, and subject-
ing them, on the other, to the indignity of a search for weapons.
' 390
385. See, e.g., State v. Bookbinder, 82 N.J. Super. 179, 197 A.2d 35
(1964); Varlaro v. Schultz, 82 N.J. Super. 142, 197 A.2d 16 (1964).
386. United States v. Owens, 346 F.2d 329 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 855 (1965); People v. Thomas, 31 Ill. 2d 272, 201 N.E.2d 413 (1964);
People v. Zeravich, 30 Ill. 2d 275, 195 N.E.2d 612 (1964); People v. Wat-
kins, 19 Iil. 2d 11, 166 N.E.2d 433 (1960). Compare People v. Reed, 37
Ill. 2d 91, 227 N.E.2d 69 (1967) (search incident to arrest for missing license
plate invalid since its only justification was the nervous behavior of the
motorist).
387. Sanders v. State, 341 P.2d 643 (Okla. 1959); Duncan v. State,
191 Tenn. 427, 234 S.W.2d 835 (1950).
388. State v. Quintana, 92 Ariz. 267, 376 P.2d 130 (1962) (driver's con-
duct gave rise to suspicion that he was driving a stolen car); People v.
Cantley, 163 Cal. App. 2d 762, 329 P.2d 993 (1958) (motorist matched de-
scription of murder suspect); State v. Harris, 121 N.W.2d 327 (Minn.
1963); State v. Edwards, 319 P.2d 1021, 1031 (Okla. Crim. App. 1957).
389. People v. Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d 98, 228 N.E.2d 783, 281 N.Y.S.2d 789
(1967).
390. United States v. One Cadillac Hardtop, 224 F. Supp. 210 (E.D. Wis.
1963); State v. Scanlon, 84 N.J. Super. 427, 202 A.2d 448 (1964). Would the
New York court also deny the police the right to search the arrestee at the
police station prior to booking and incarceration? See Commonwealth v.
While the Marsh decision might tidy up the symmetry of the
law, it tends to overlook the sometimes harsh realities of police
work. Experience amply demonstrates that regardless of the na-
ture of the offense, every arrest situation is potentially hazard-
ous. In numerous instances, police officers have routinely stopped
motorists on traffic charges only to discover later that the party
was wanted for a felony or had recently committed a serious,
and as yet unreported, offense. 9' Often these facts are not un-
covered until after the officer has attempted to make a full-custody
arrest, in which case his failure to examine the suspect for
weapons might well prove to be a costly error. As one writer
aptly pointed out, "Even the respectable citizen who finds himself
under lawful arrest may panic or attempt to escape or perhaps
use a weapon which he might have lawfully in his possession to
harm the officer."
A more reasonable view, and one that most courts can be
expected to follow, was expressed by the Supreme Court of Wis-
consin in Barnes v. State.39 2 In that case it was ruled that the
search of a motorist for weapons following his arrest on a minor
traffic charge for a faulty brakelight was proper, but a further me-
ticulous search suspected by the court of being used to discover
narcotics was unlawful. As to the search for weapons, the court
said:
We are not persuaded that where a traffic offender ac-
tually is arrested, as distinguished from being handed a
summons to appear in court at some future time, that it is
unreasonable for the arresting officer to search his person
for weapons. In a recent California case the court took
note of numerous attacks which have been made upon law
enforcement officers seeking to interrogate occupants of
automobiles. People v. Davis (1961), 188 Cal. App. 2d 718,
722, 10 Cal. Rptr. 610. A striking example of this is afforded
by Brook v. State (1963), 21 Wis. 2d 32, 123 N.W.2d 535.
Some of the most dangerous criminals are as well dressed
and peaceful appearing as the majority of law-abiding
citizens. It seems to us that the protection of the lives of
our law enforcement officers outweighs the slight affront
to personal dignity of the arrested person who undergoes
a search for weapons.
398
Perhaps what troubled the court in Marsh was the possibility
that the police might misuse this authority to search for evidence
of another crime. Indeed, one might well question how policy slips
were discovered during the course of a legitimate frisk, which, as
a general rule, is limited to a patting down of the suspect's outer
Bowlen, 351 Mass. 655, 223 N.E.2d 391 (1967) (upholding search of traffic
offender who was about to be jailed).
391. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Murphy v. State of New Jersey,
260 F. Supp. 987 (D.N.J. 1965); People v. Zeravich, 30 Ill. 2d 275, 195 N.E.2d
612 (1964).
392. Barnes v. State, 25 Wis. 2d 116, 130 N.W.2d 264 (1964).
393. Id. at 221, 130 N.W.2d at 268-69.
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clothing. But if the bona fides of the search is the real issue, the
answer does not lie in an absolute prohibition against all self-
protective searches. As the Wisconsin court indicated, it is still
free to reject as unreasonable a search of the person incident to a
full-custody arrest for a minor traffic violation where it finds that
the arrest or search was conducted for some other purpose.
3 94
Where the search for weapons or means of escape extends
beyond the person of the accused to include the vehicle as well,
some rather definite limitations have been set by the courts. Since
the rule is justified on necessity, it is commonly held that the officer
can examine only those portions of the vehicle that are accessible to
the arrestee. If for some reason the suspect cannot reach a
weapon, it obviously does not pose a threat to the arresting officer.
And once the threat from such an item terminates, so does the
authority to search for that item. For example, in United States v.
Tate, 95 a highway patrol officer on routine duty saw the defend-
ant speeding on the highway at night and arrested him after a
100-mile-an-hour chase. The officer had to subdue the defendant
physically, and after doing so, handcuffed the defendant, placed
him in the front of the police car, and shut the door. The officer,
who was alone, felt secure, as he testified at trial, and proceeded to
search the defendant's car. Under the front seat he found a sawed-
off shotgun, the possession of which constituted a violation of fed-
eral law. The court held the search unreasonable and stated that
the officer could not have been searching for instrumentalities,
fruits, or contraband of the offense of speeding for there are none.
He had no authority to search for weapons, the court said, because
the secure condition in which the defendant was held made it im-
possible for him to obtain any weapon that he might have had in
his car. As a result, the search was solely exploratory and, as the
courts have long held, all such searches are unreasonable. 8 6
As a practical matter, if one literally follows the rule of Tate,
there will be few situations in which he may properly search a
vehicle (as distinguished from a person) for purposes of securing
weapons or possible means of escape. Such a case arose in con-
nection with an arrest for an illegal U-turn. The officer examined
the defendant's driver's license, and when he requested the ve-
394. See, e.g., People v. Rodriguez, 47 Misc. 2d 551, 262 N.Y.S.2d 859
(1965).
395. United States v. Tate, 209 F. Supp. 762 (D. Del. 1962).
396. Grundstrom v. Beto, 273 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Tex. 1967); United
States v. Tate, 209 F. Supp. 762 (D. Del. 1962). See also State v. Michaels,
60 Wash. 2d 638, 374 P.2d 989 (1962).
hicle registration card, the motorist hesitated and appeared to be
nervous. Although there was conflicting testimony, the defendant
later claimed that the officer opened the glove compartment be-
cause he feared it might contain a weapon. As he did so, several
envelopes similar to those used in numbers operations fell to the
floor of the vehicle. In denying the motion to suppress this evi-
dence, the court pointed out that it did not condone the search of
an entire vehicle incident to a traffic arrest; however, a limited
search of the glove compartment, where the defendant himself
had indicated the car was located, was held to be a reasonable
self-protective measure. 97
A search would also be allowed where an officer having the
right to arrest, on a warrant or probable cause, first seizes a weapon
or other object lying within easy reach of the suspect and then
makes the arrest.39 8 But in most instances, particularly those
involving full-custody arrest on a criminal charge, the suspect will
immediately be removed from the automobile. Once this is ac-
complished, it is difficult to argue that any weapon or other ob-
jects inside the vehicle present a threat to the officer.
2. Search for Physical Evidence of the Crime
Unlike a search for weapons, the search for physical evidence
of a crime is dependent in large measure on the nature of the
violation. If the offense is such that there may be fruits, instru-
mentalities, contraband, or mere evidence of the crime that might
assist the police in apprehending or convicting the suspect a search
for these items is proper.3 99
Obviously, a search cannot be made where there is no tangible
evidence connected with the arrest offense. That is usually the
case where violations of motor vehicle codes are involved. With
the exception of driving while under the influence of alcohol or
narcotics, there are few traffic offenses in which any object other
than the vehicle itself can be considered evidence of the crime.
40 0
397. United States v. Washington, 249 F. Supp. 40 (D.D.C. 1965).
398. Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1966); Busby v. United
States, 296 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1961); United States ex tel. Wilson v. LaValle,
251 F. Supp. 292 (N.D.N.Y. 1962). The fact that the search and seizure in
this circumstance preceded the formal arrest by a few moments is not vital.
See, e.g., Cipres v. United States, 343 F.2d 95, 98-9 (9th Cir. 1965); Dickey
v. United States, 332 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1964); United States v. Boston, 330
F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v. Devenere, 332 F.2d 160 (2d Cir.
1964) (sustaining prior seizure to prevent destruction of evidence). See
also Holt v. Simpson, 340 F.2d 853 (7th Cir. 1965) (upholding prior search
despite the absence of immediate threat of destruction to property or po-
tential danger to officer).
399. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); Abel v. United States, 302
U.S. 217, 238 (1960); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); Agnello
v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).
400. Brinegar v. State, 97 Okla. Crim. 299, 262 P.2d 464 (1953); Church
v. State, 206 Tenn. 336, 333 S.W.2d 799 (1960); Thompson v. State, 398
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For this reason, the search incident to a traffic arrest is not per-
mitted in most jurisdictions.
40 1
While the right to search for physical evidence is somewhat
limited, in the sense that it must be tied to some item connected
with the arrest offense, the scope of this search has been broadly
interpreted by the courts. Unlike the examination for weapons or
means of escape, a search for physical evidence of a crime is not
confined to those areas of the automobile to which the arrestee has
immediate access. As a general rule, the search may encompass
the entire vehicle, including the glove compartment, trunk space,
or any other portion of the car that might reasonably conceal one
of the items sought.402 Thus while the officer in Tate could not
look under the front seat of the car for self-protective reasons,
a search of that area would have been proper had the offense in-
volved fruits, instrumentalities, contraband, or mere evidence,
and had the purpose of the search been to seize one of those items.
In this context, the officer's authority to search would not termi-
nate simply because the suspect was handcuffed and safely out of
reach of any evidentiary items in the car.
Admittedly, the search under these circumstances does not
S.W.2d 942 (Tex. Crim. 1966); Richardson v. State, 163 Tex. Crim. 585,
294 S.W.2d 844 (1956); State v. Taft, 144 W. Va. 704, 110 S.E.2d 727 (1959).
See also People v. Lujan, 141 Cal. App. 2d 143, 296 P.2d 93 (1956) (arrest
for driving while under influence of drugs held to support search of en-
tire vehicle for narcotics).
401. Amador-Gonzales v. United States, 391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968)
(minor traffic violation will not support search for heroin); United States
v. One 1963 Cadillac Hardtop, 224 F. Supp. 210, 213 (E.D. Wis. 1963) ("In the
case of a stop sign violation there is no fruit of the crime. The means
whereby the crime was committed is the vehicle itself."); United States
v. Tate, 209 F. Supp. 762, 765 (D. Del. 1962) ("There are no fruits of
speeding."); State v. Michaels, 60 Wash. 2d 638, 642, 374 P.2d 989, 992
(1962) ("a search of the automobile could reveal nothing useful in estab-
lishing the offense for which the defendant was arrested-failure to signal
for a left turn-and there was no reason to suspect that he would attempt
to flee with the aid of something that might be found in the trunk of his
car."); Travers v. United States, 144 A.2d 889, 891 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App.
1958) (". . . [T]he search could not be justified as one aimed at discovering
the 'fruits and evidences' of the instant crimes, i.e., the traffic violations.");
Barnes v. State, 25 Wis. 2d 116, 123, 130 N.W.2d 264, 269 (1964) (holding
that there are no fruits or instrumentalities connected with the offense of
driving a vehicle with a defective tail light). But see Watts v. State,
196 So. 2d 79 (Miss. 1967).
402. United States v. Doyle, 373 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1967) (search of floor
in front of driver's seat); United States v. Francolino, 367 F.2d 1013 (2d
Cir. 1966) (trunk); Welch v. United States, 361 F.2d 214 (10th Cir. 1966)
(trunk); United States v. Gorman, 355 F.2d 151 (2d Cir. 1965); United
States v. Washington, 249 F. Supp. 40 (D.D.C. 1965) (trunk); State v. Hunt,
198 Kan. 222, 424 P.2d 571 (1967) (search of seat and trunk).
square with a literal reading of the purposes behind the rule. The
Supreme Court stated in Preston v. United States4 03 that the
search incidental to arrest "is justified by the need to seize weapons
and other things which might be used to assault the officer or
effect an escape, as well as by the need to prevent the destruction
of evidence of the crime-things which might easily happen where
the weapon or evidence is on the accused's person or under his
immediate control." As we have already seen, if the weapon is
inaccessible to the accused, the officer cannot search for it because
it no longer presents a threat of escape or bodily harm.
By the same reasoning, it would seem that physical evidence
that lies beyond the reach of the arrestee cannot be searched
for, since it is no longer exposed to destruction or immediate re-
moval. But here the law makes an exception: accessibility is
not a determining factor where a search for fruits, instrumentalities,
contraband, or mere evidence of the crime is involved. Indeed,
so permissive is the law in this area that several courts have
allowed a search to be made of the defendant's vehicle after he
had been removed from the scene in a patrol wagon. In Adams v.
United States,404 for example, the accused was arrested for armed
robbery as he was getting into a car in a parking lot. A search of
the trunk of the vehicle yielded evidence which the defendant later
sought to suppress in a pretrial motion. Since the trunk of the
car was locked and the keys had been turned over to the police,
there was no danger that he could have used any weapons or
destroyed evidence of the crime. Under these circumstances, the
defendant contended, the officers were required to obtain a war-
rant before searching the car. While recognizing the logic of this
argument, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated
that ". . . as far as we are aware, no court has yet held that a car,
including its trunk, may not be searched without a warrant at the
time and place its occupants are placed under lawful arrest. We
are not persuaded that we should be the first to do so.
''4°5
Several federal courts have sustained searches conducted un-
der similar circumstances on the reasoning that the list of justifi-
cations set out by the Court in Preston was not intended to be all-
inclusive. 40 8  In support of this contention, the courts frequently
point to the Harris case wherein the Supreme Court upheld the
seizure of an article found in a bedroom bureau drawer, following
the defendant's arrest in the living room of his aparment. The
403. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
404. 336 F.2d 752 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 977 (1965).
405. Id. at 753. See also United States v. Gorman, 355 F.2d 151, 155
(2d Cir. 1965); State v. Wilson, 70 Wash. 2d 638, 424 P.2d 650 (1967); State
v. Schwartzberger, 70 Wash. 2d 103 (1966).
406. Arwine v. Bannan, 346 F.2d 458, 465 (6th Cir. 1965); Crawford v.
Bannan, 336 F.2d 505, 506-07 (1964). See also People v. Robinson, 62 Cal.
2d 889, 402 P.2d 834, 44 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1965).
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control of the person arrested, the Court said in Harris, extended
as much to the bedroom of the apartment as to the living room in
which he was arrested.
407
While these decisions have not indicated what other justifica-
tions might be applicable, several later cases have suggested that
one further basis for the rule is the obvious public interest in "a
speedy search that may disclose information useful in tracking
down accomplices still on the move. '40 8 In still another case, a
search made after the defendant was removed from the vehicle
was sustained on the ground that it was "proper to attempt to find
at the earliest possible moment the pistol used in a holdup."40 9 The
clear implication of these and other similar opinions is that the
rule supporting an incidental search for physical evidence is based
less on the need to prevent destruction of evidence than on the
broader consideration of reasonableness which has so long gov-
erned fourth amendment practices.
410
3. Seizure of Items Pertaining to Another Crime
As the foregoing discussion has indicated, the search incident
to arrest must be confined to fruits, instrumentalities, contraband,
and mere evidence of the crime for which the arrest was made and
to weapons of injury or escape.411 The arrest merely serves the
function of a search warrant for things seizable in connection with
that particular offense.412 It does not in any way allow a gen-
eral or exploratory search for other evidence that might incrimi-
nate the suspect in crime. In many cases, however, a legitimate
search turns up objects of a totally different violation and one
unsuspected by the arresting officer. The question then is: What
is the officer's authority with regard to such property? Can he
seize it? If so, must he first obtain a warrant?
407. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
408. United States v. Gorman, 355 F.2d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 1965).
409. United States v. Doyle, 373 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1967), as quoted in
Kuntz v. United States, 265 F. Supp. 543, 548 (N.D.N.Y. 1967).
410. People v. Webb, 66 Cal. 2d 107, 424 P.2d 342, 56 Cal. Rptr. 902
(1967); People v. Green, 235 Cal. App. 506, 45 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1965);
People v. Robinson, 62 Cal. 2d 889, 402 P.2d 834, 44 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1965);
State v. Collins, 270 Mian. 581, 132 N.W.2d 802 (1964). For a well rea-
soned analysis of this problem see, Comment, Search and Seizure in the Su-
preme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, U. CHI. L. REV. 666
(1961).
411. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); Abel v. United States, 362
U.S. 217, 238 (1960); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); Agnello
v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925); United States v. Barbanell, 231
F. Supp. 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
412. Papani v. United States, 84 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1936).
It is generally acknowledged that a police officer is not re-
quired to close his eyes to the realities of the situation. He is
fully empowered to seize the fruits, instrumentalities, or mere evi-
dence of the later-discovered offense and even property that is
presumptively contraband.413 Here again a distinction must be
made between the right to search and the right to seize. While an
officer cannot properly search for articles related to another crime,
the law does not require that he "must impotently stand aside and
refrain from seizing such contraband materials. ' 414
The application of this rule is well illustrated in Abel v. United
States,415 where officers of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service arrested the defendant in his hotel room on a warrant
calling for deportation and lawfully searched him for weapons and
evidence of his alien status. During the course of this search, they
found a piece of graph paper, which the defendant had used in his
espionage activities. In upholding the seizure of this item and its
use in evidence, the Court ruled that once the paper came into the
officer's hands, it was not necessary for him to return it, since it
was an instrumentality in the crime of espionage. "This is so,"
the Court stated, "even though [the officer] was not only not look-
ing for items connected with espionsage but could not properly
have been searching for the purpose of finding such items. When
an article subject to lawful seizure properly comes into an officer's
possession in the course of a lawful search, it would be entirely
without reason to say that he must return it because it was not
one of the things it was his business to look for.
'416
The Court has justified the seizure of such property on the
ground that its discovery reveals a crime "being committed in the
very presence of the agents conducting the search. 41 7 Thus, as
a practical matter, a contemporaneous arrest could then and there
be made for the unrelated offense.4 18 Indeed, at least one state
court has suggested that a second arrest is necessary to support
the seizure.41 9 While this procedure has been followed in several
413. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925);
Seymour v. United States, 369 F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 1966); Boucher v.
Reincke, 341 F.2d 977, 980 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. Sorenson, 330
F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1964); Palmer v. United States, 203 F.2d 66 (D.C. Cir.
1953); United States v. Follette, 257 F. Supp. 922, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
United States v. LaVallee, 251 F. Supp. 292 (N.D.N.Y. 1966); United States
ex rel. Robinson v. Fay, 239 F. Supp. 132 (S-D.N.Y. 1965); United States v.
DeCiccio, 190 F. Supp. 487 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).
414 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 155 (1947).
415. 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
416. Id. at 238.
417. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 155 (1947).
418. Charles v. United States, 278 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 831 (1960).
419. People v. Roach, 44 Misc. 2d 40, 253 N.Y.S.2d 24 (N.Y. S. Ct. Crim.
Session 1964).
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cases, the federal law appears not to require it.420 By making an
additional arrest, however, the officer can often resolve the legiti-
macy of the seizure and of any further search for additional evi-
dence of the newly discovered violation.
VII. ABANDONMENT
The central concern of the fourth amendment is to protect the
privacy and sanctity of one's property against arbitrary intrusion
by officers of the state. Should the party intentionally abandon
or discard the property, however, he relinquishes any such in-
terests therein and cannot later complain of a taking by the police
or of its use against him in court. 421 Under these circumstances,
it is said, there is neither a search nor a seizure, and the police are
free, without more to take the property into custody.
422
It is generally stated that abandonment is largely a question
of intent that must be determined from the facts and circumstances
of the case. 423 Unfortunately, this approach offers the police of-
ficer little guidance for the future, particularly where, as in most
cases, the court states its opinion in conclusory fashion, without
indicating the basis for its decision. For that reason, it is often
difficult to apply the concept in a given situation with any real
assurance that it will be acceptable to a reviewing court.
In a typical case, the occupant of a vehicle furtively drops
contraband to the street on the approach of a policeman,424 or
throws incriminating evidence from a vehicle when pursued by
police officers.42 5 Although the party might not intend to rid him-
self permanently of the property-indeed, he may well wish to
420. See Bartlett v. United States, 232 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1956) (terming
the additional arrest a "useless formality").
421. Fegeur v. United States, 302 F.2d 214, 250 (8th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 872 (1962) (rented room abandoned); TIFFANY, MCINTYRE,
AND ROTENBERO, DETECTION OF CRIME 175 (1967).
422. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58 (1924); United States v.
Zimple, 318 F.2d 676, 678 (7th Cir. 1963); Trujillo v. United States, 294
F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1961); Burton v. United States, 272 F.2d 473 (9th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 951 (1960). See also Fox v. United States, 381
F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1967), wherein the court held defendants lacked standing
to object to admission of "hash" removed from car on theory that it was
illegally seized when they claimed no interest in the car.
423. United States v. Minker, 312 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 953 (1963); United States v. Wheeler, 161 F. Supp. 193, 198 (W.D.
Ark. 1958); Hawley v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 479, 144 S.E.2d 314 (1965).
424. Lopez v. United States, 370 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1966); Jackson v.
United States, 301 F.2d 515 (D.D.C. 1962), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 8, 59
(1962); Murgia v. United States, 285 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1960); Lee v.
United States, 221 F.2d 29 (D.D.C. 1954); United States v. Copeland, 263
F. Supp. 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
425. Stack v. United States, 368 F.2d 788 (1st Cir. 1966); Haerr v.
United States, 240 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1957).
return later to recover the narcotics he has discarded by the road-
side-it is sufficient for abandonment purposes that he has tem-
porarily parted with possession of the item . The property may
now be taken into custody by the officer, examined, retained, and
used as evidence if it bears on the case. This is so even though he
is not able immediately to identify the object as an item that of-
fends the law, since it is neither a search nor a seizure to pick up
abandoned property.
4 6
Of course, the doctrine is not without its limitations. First,
it cannot be applied to property that has been discarded in response
to some unlawful act by a police officer. If the defense can show,
for example, that the item was thrown away in the course of an
illegal arrest of the defendant or an unlawful search of his person
or vehicle, any evidence "come at by the exploitation of [the]
• . .illegality" will be suppressed.
427
Second, there can be no abandonment in the legal sense unless
the property is thrown to the street or onto some other area out-
side the protections of the fourth amendment.4 28 Thus the rule
is inapplicable to evidence dropped within the defendant's vehicle
or in any place in which he enjoys a constitutional right of pri-
vacy. As the Supreme Court said in Rios v. United States,429 "A
passenger who lets a package drop to the floor of the taxicab in
which he is riding can hardly be said to have abandoned it. An
occupied taxicab is not to be compared to an open field . . . or a
vacated hotel room.
'4 0
This does not mean, of course, that an officer is powerless to
act once the property is taken out of the abandonment category.
It means simply that retrieval of the item by the police must now
satisfy the reasonableness requirements that the fourth amend-
ment applies to seizures generally. If the item is identifiable on
sight as the fruit, instrumentality, contraband, or mere evidence of a
known offense, it can be seized without a warrant or a supporting
arrest. The law does not prevent an officer who is lawfully present
426. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Hester v. United
States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924); Vincent v. United States, 337 F.2d 891, 897 (8th
Cir. 1964); United States v. Zimple, 318 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1963); Trujillo
v. United States, 294 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1961); Burton v. United States, 272
F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1960); Murgia v. United States, 285 F.2d 14 (9th Cir.
1960); Haerr v. United States, 240 F.2d 533, 535 (5th Cir. 1957); Lee v.
United States, 221 F.2d 29 (D.D.C. 1954); Henderson v. Warden, 248 F.
Supp. 917 (D. Md. 1965).
427. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); United States v.
Merritt, 293 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1961); Hobson v. United States, 226 F.2d 890,
893-894 (8th Cir. 1955); United States v. Festa, 192 F. Supp. 160 (D. Mass.
1960).
42B. Work v. United States, 243 F.2d 660, 662 (D.D.C. 1957); Hobson
v. United States, 226 F.2d 890 (8th Cir. 1955).
429. 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
430. Accord, People v. Adorno, 37 Misc. 2d 36, 234 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1962)
(contraband dropped to floor of cab is not abandoned).
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from seizing evidence of a crime-or property which he has good
reason to believe is evidence of a crime-lying in open view on a
suspect's premises. 431 Furthermore, the very act of throwing away
the item will often provide the added element of probable cause
necessary to support an arrest of the suspect and an incidental
search of his person and surroundings. Thus the officer may
arrest the defendant and recover the article, or he may choose to
recover the article first. In either case, a legitimate seizure has
been effected.
Police officers, and the courts as well, often fail to realize
that the abandonment theory applies to any property in the posses-
sion of a suspected motorist, including the vehicle itself. As a
suspect may rid himself of incriminating articles in his possession
so may he "discard" or "abandon" his automobile to avoid arrest
or detection. 432 The legal consequences in each case are the same.
The car may be recovered by the police, examined thoroughly
without a warrant, and retained for use as evidence against the
accused. Since the fourth amendment concerns are inapplicable,
there are no limtations on the scope, intensity, or objectives of
this examination.
Because the courts have had relatively few opportunities to
examine the doctrine in this context, no clear guidelines have
emerged from the case law. However, several factors have been
recognized as bearing on the abandonment issue. Chief among
these is the sudden flight of a suspicious motorist from a vehicle
on sighting the police, particularly where the occupant deserts the
car while under "hot pursuit."4 a3  Situations of this type can be
likened to the "throwaway" cases in that the suspect's conduct
seems clearly to evidence an intent to discard the property (in this
case, his vehicle) to avoid detection or arrest. In Caldwell v. United
States,43 4 the defendant, fleeing from a bank after robbing a teller,
was pursued by bank guards who saw him enter a nearby ve-
431. Ellison v. United States, 206 F.2d 476, 478 (D.D.C. 1953). See
People v. Adorno, 37 Misc. 2d 36, 234 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1962) (since police
committed an unlawful trespass by opening the door of the taxicab with-
out sufficient cause, prior to discovery of two glassine envelopes contain-
ing hereoine that a passenger had dropped to the floor of the vehicle, the
motion to suppress such evidence was granted).
432. See People v. Smith, 63 Cal. 2d 779, 409 P.2d 222, 237, 48 Cal. Rptr.
382 (1966) (analogizing circumstances in Abel v. United States, 362 U.S.
217 (1960), with abandonment of rented automobile); Hawley v. Com-
monwealth, 206 Va. 479, 144 S.E.2d 314 (1965).
433. People v. Harper, 26 Ill. 2d 85, 185 N.E.2d 865 (1962).
434. 338 F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1964).
hicle. They continued the pursuit and, as the court put it, found
"the robber's abandoned car three blocks away." The keys were in
the ignition and an overcoat "was partly inside and partly outside
the closed door." An FBI Agent who arrived at the scene thirty
minutes later removed the coat, searched the vehicle, and trans-
ferred it to a Government garage. Subsequent investigation dis-
closed that the automobile was registered to the defendant. In
sustaining the retrieval of the coat and its admission into evidence
against the defendant, the court held that there had been neither a
search nor a seizure since "the overcoat . . . was found abandoned
in a public place ..
As an alternative ground, the court indicated that "[t]he
expediency of the events following the crime justified the investi-
gating officer's confiscation of the felon's clothing and car in order
to swiftly determine his identity and thereby effectuate his cap-
ture before he could make good his escape or destroy other evi-
dence of the crime."
A similar emphasis on exigent or compelling circumstances can
be found in other abandonment cases. In fact, it is often unclear
whether examination of the car is sustained on abandonment prin-
ciples or a broad application of the exceptional circumstances
rule.435  But regardless of the precise legal rationale involved,
it is difficult to fault the result. In these circumstances it seems
not only reasonable but imperative that an immediate search be
made to determine the possible identity of the escaping felon and
to recover evidence or contraband that is threatened with removal
or destruction.
43 6
435. See, e.g., Murray v. United States, 351 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1965)
(officers investigating a bank burglary acted reasonably in searching a
vehicle parked nearby where it was shown that the car had not been
parked there 2 hours before, and they found the engine warm and saw
the keys on the floor); People v. Moore, 35 Il. 2d 399, 220 N.E.2d 443
(1966); People v. Grub, 63 Cal. 2d 614, 47 Cal. Rptr. 772, 408 P.2d 100 (1965).
436. Cf. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (sustaining warrantless
search of premises for "a man or the money" where officers were in pur-
suit of armed robber); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948)
(dictum suggesting rule might apply to allow entry where there is threat
of destruction or removal of evidence); McDonald v. United States, 335
U.S. 451, 454, 456 (1948). In some cases the abandonment rule was applied
to allow the examination of a "getaway" car found in the course of a fresh
investigation. See Hiet v. United States, 372 F.2d 911 (D.C. Cir. 1967);
Bayless v. United States, 200 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1952); People v. Smith, 63
Cal. 2d 779, 43 Cal. Rptr. 382, 409 P.2d 222 (1966); People v. Miller, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 720, 738 (1966); People v. Moore, 35 Ill. 2d 399, 220 N.E.2d 443 (1966);
People v. Harper, 26 Ill. 2d 85, 185 N.E.2d 865 (1962). The search of an
abandoned car may be supported in the alternative under the Carroll rule,
see Pegram v. United States, 267 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1959); Harman v.
United States, 210 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1954); United States v. O'Leary, 201 F.
Supp. 926 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); State v. Banks, 265 N.C. 587, 144 S.E.2d
661 (1965) (by implication); or as a search incident to arrest, provided the
arrest is made in close proximity to the vehicle, see earlier discussion,
VII. Search Incident to Arrest, A.
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Finally, in the absence of sudden flight or compelling circum-
stances, the courts often find that there has been an abandonment
in law by looking to such factors as the condition of the vehicle,
its location, and the length of time it has remained there. Thus,
in one case, a stolen vehicle was characterized as abandoned when
it was found mired on a little-used side road.437 In another, a
court sustained the examination of a car that had been parked on
the wrong side of the road protruding onto the traveled portion of
a highway.438 Similarly, when an automobile was found by of-
ficers at midnight, with license tags indicating that its owner lived
seventy miles from the place where it was parked, and residents
questioned did not recognize the vehicle, it was reasonable for the
officers to believe the automobile had been abandoned.43 9 And in
Hawley v. Commonwealth,440 abandonment was established when
it was shown that at no time during the five months since the de-
fendant fled from the vehicle did he attempt to retrieve the car or
to find out whether it had been moved from the place where he
had left it. But unless a car has been parked in an area for a sub-
stantial period of time, as in Hawley, other supporting factors may
be necessary. A New York court, for example, ruled that the mere




Searches conducted at the international boundaries of the
United States are unique in the sense that they are not dependent
upon a showing of probable cause. Statutory authority in immi-
gration and customs laws specifically empowers federal border
officials, on suspicion alone, to search persons, vehicles, and effects
entering the country.442 No supporting arrest, search warrant, or
consent is required. 4 3 This is not to say that border searches are
437. United States v. Angel, 201 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1953). See, also,
McIntosh v. United States, 341 F.2d 448 (8th Cir. 1965) (by implication)
(defendant left stolen truck following accident).
438. People v. Grub, 63 Cal. 2d 614, 47 Cal. Rptr. 772, 408 P.2d 100
(1965).
439. Croker v. State, 114 Ga. 43, 150 S.E.2d 294 (1966).
440. 206 Va. 479, 144 S.E.2d 314 (1965).
441. People v. James, 46 Misc. 2d 138, 259 N.Y.S.2d 241 (1965).
442. 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (a) (3) (1964) (immigration officers can search for
aliens "within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the
United States"); 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1964) (search of vehicles or persons); 19
U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1964) (enabling customs agents to board and search ves-
sels or vehicles) ; 19 U.S.C. § 1582 (1964) (search of persons and baggage).
443. Rodriguez-Gonzalez v. United States, 378 F.2d 256, 258 (9th Cir.
totally exempt from the requirements of the fourth amendment,
only that they need not meet the usual standard of probable cause
for believing that a traveler is carrying contraband or illegal
merchandise.
444
This broad and extraordinary grant of authority is based on
the paramount necessity of national self-protection. 445 The courts
have long acknowledged that greater latitude must be permitted
border searches if the illicit flow of aliens, contraband, and dutiable
items is to be effectively controlled. 46 In support of these meas-
ures, it has been pointed out that the first statute empowering cus-
toms agents to search for taxable goods on suspicion was passed
by the same Congress that "submitted for adoption the original
amendments to the Constitution." It would appear, therefore, that
"the members of that body did not regard searches and seizures
of this kind as 'unreasonable. . .. ' ",44T
The difficulty lies not with the constitutionality of the doctrine
but with the establishment of some practical definition of the term
"border." It seems clear that a border search is not limited to the
precise moment a traveler is in the physical act of crossing the
international boundary line.448 But there must come a point at
which entry into the United States is complete, when a search of
the person or his conveyance is governed by the usual standard of
reasonableness. Otherwise, those who have entered the country
would be subjected "to almost unlimited arrest and search without
any cause save the simple request of a border officer to one at an
1967); Thomas v. United States, 372 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1967); Alexander
v. United States, 362 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 1966) (and cases cited therein);
Valdez v. United States, 358 F.2d 721, 722 (5th Cir. 1966) (per curiam);
Denton v. United States, 310 F.2d 129, 132 (9th Cir. 1962); Mansfield v.
United States, 308 F.2d 221, 222 (5th Cir. 1962).
444. Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967); Thomas
v. United States, 372 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1967); Marsh v. United States,
344 F.2d 317, 324 (5th Cir. 1965).
445. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-154 (1925); Cross v.
Harrison, 57 U.S. 164, 166 (1853); Lee v. United States, 14 F.2d 400, 404
(1st Cir. 1926), rev'd on other grounds, 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
446. Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967); Morales
v. United States, 378 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1967); Thomas v. United States, 372
F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1967); King v. United States, 348 F.2d 814, 818 (9th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 926 (1965); Marsh v. United States, 344 F.2d
317 5th Cir. 1965); Witt v. United States, 287 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961); Cervantes v. United States, 263 F.2d 800
(9th Cir. 1959); Kelly v. United States, 197 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1952); Lan-
dan v. United States Attorney, 82 F.2d 285, 286 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied,
298 U.S. 665 (1936) (border searches are of "the broadest possible charac-
ter"); United States v. McGlone, 266 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Va. 1967).
447. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925); Boyde v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886); see, Comment, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 276 (1966).
448. Morales v. United States, 378 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1967); Thomas v.
United States, 372 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1967); Murgia v. United States, 285
F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 977 (1961); United States v.
Rodriguez, 195 F. Supp. 513, 516 (S.D. Tex. 1960), aff'd, 292 F.2d 709
(5th Cir. 1961).




Whether a search falls within the "border" category is deter-
mined from the total circumstances of the case, including the dis-
tance between the border and the place of search, the time
elapsed between the crossing and the search, and perhaps equally
important, any factors that would indicate the condition of the ve-
hicle had remained unchanged since the crossing. In King v.
United States,450 customs agents acting on information from an
informant followed the appellant's car after it crossed the border.
The vehicle was stopped and searched eight miles beyond the
boundary line, and drugs were seized from a secret compartment
in the trunk. In sustaining the conviction, the court of appeals
agreed with the trial court that this was a border search and as
such was not dependent upon probable cause for its validity. The
court emphasized that the search had been conducted within a
reasonable time and distance of the crossing and, further, that the
vehicle had been under almost continuous surveillance from the
point of entry until it was stopped and searched. Thus, there "is
no reason to believe that there is any change in condition of such
person or vehicle from that at the border so that whatever such
vehicle contains or such person possesses at the time the search is
made is the same as it was at the border .... -451
The decisions support the suggestion in King that continued
surveillance of a car can be one of the critical circumstances in
bringing a search within the broad "border" concept, particularly
if the search is made at a time and place remote from the point
of entry. By maintaining a constant watch over a vehicle, an of-
ficer can often provide convincing evidence that any contraband
found in it "at the time of the search was aboard the vehicle at
the time of entry into the jurisdiction of the United States."
452,
This proved to be a persuasive factor in Rodrigues-Gonzales v.
United States,45 3 where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals sus-
tained a search made some fifteen miles and twenty hours after
the crossing occurred. In that case an informant supplied customs
officers with three license numbers, each of which was registered
to a known narcotics dealer. He stated that a vehicle bearing one
of these numbers and carrying marihuana would cross the border
into the United States at a designated entry point. The officers
449. Thomas v. United States, 372 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1967).
450. 348 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1965).
451. Id. at 816.
452. Id. at 816.
453. 378 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1967).
observed a car with one of these numbers enter the country,
driven by a male occupant (not the defendant) and a female
companion. The car was followed to San Diego, California where
it was parked on a public parking lot. At this point the two
occupants departed the vehicle. On the following day the defend-
ant entered the car and drove toward Los Angeles, but he was
stopped by the customs officers several miles from the parking lot.
A search of the vehicle disclosed marihuana in the door panels.
In affirming the conviction, the court held it was not necessary to
decide. whether the officers had probable cause to stop and search
the car since the search was a valid "border search." The manner
and extent of the surveillance, the court said, exclude the possi-
bility that the marihuana had been placed in the vehicle after it
entered the country. "From the time the car in question crossed
the international border at San Ysidro until it was stopped a few
miles north of San Diego, it was under constant surveillance by a
team of officers. Nothing occurred during that period of time
which would suggest the marihuana (hidden behind the door
panel secured with screws) might have been placed in the car after
it crossed the border."
As a practical matter, of course, keeping a constant watch over
a suspect's vehicle is not always possible, particularly where the
surveillance must be maintained through heavily populated areas.
But the key consideration in each case is not whether there has
been a continued and uninterrupted surveillance but whether it
can be established with reasonable certainty that there was no
"change of condition of the auto from the time it crossed the border
until it was stopped. '45 4  Thus, the mere fact that the car was
"momentarily out of sight of all the officers," 45 5 or was "lost from
view for a brief period" does not alter the character of the search
as a "border search."
456
Finally, greater leeway in defining the "point of entry" has
also been allowed where a search was conducted at a regular
checkpoint which "of necessity, [was] somewhat removed from
the border,' 45 7 and where it was made so near the boundary line
that it was reasonably clear that the car had come from the
border.4 58 These same guidelines are applicable to routine stops
by immigration officers checking for illegal aliens. While the stat-
ute allows this authority to be exercised within "a reasonable
distance" of the border, it has been limited by administrative regu-
lation to 100 air miles of any external boundary.
5 9
454. Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1967); Rodri-
guez-Gonzalez v. United States, 378 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1967); King v.
United States, 348 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1965).
455. Leeks v. United States, 356 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1966).
456. Alexander v. United States, 263 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 1967).
457. Ramirez v. United States, 263 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1959).
458. Kelly v. United States, 197 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1952).
459. 8 C.F.R. § 287.1.
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Of course, the courts will still look to the general circumstances
of each case in deciding whether an officer's conduct falls within
the rubric of "border search." Thus, in Fernandez v. United
States,460 the appellant was stopped by immigration officers at a
roadblock located sixty to seventy miles north of the Mexican
border on Route 101, a main highway in California. The officers
were stopping cars in a random manner to detect aliens who had
illegally entered the country, and they had no reason to suspect that
the occupants of appellant's vehicle had violated the law. After
Fernandez advised he was an alien coming in from Mexico, he was
directed to pull over to the side of the road for further questioning.
As one of the officers approached the automobile, he detected
what he thought to be the odor of marihuana coming from under
the hood of the vehicle. When he opened the hood, he discovered
five packages of marihuana wrapped in brown paper. In affirming
the conviction for possession of narcotics, the court ruled that es-
tablishment of the check point at that site was neither arbitrary
nor capricious, citing the following facts introduced by the Gov-
ernment: (1) Highway 101 is one of two main arteries connecting
Los Angeles with the Mexican border; (2) the large Mexican popu-
lation of Los Angeles naturally attracts Mexican aliens; (3) Ti-
juana, which was the apparent point of entry, is a center of aliens
of any nationality seeking to enter the United States illegally; (4)
the stops were conducted with a minimum delay to the motorists,
often amounting to thirty seconds or less, and the intrusion was
reduced even further when traffic conditions were heavy; and
(5) the checkpoint had been in operation for thirty-one years and
had been successful in uncovering many aliens illegally entering
the United States.
461
An additional question raised in Fernandez concerned the le-
gality of the search conducted after the car was stopped. While
the right to search under the customs and immigration laws is
unlimited in that it need not ground on probable cause, the scope
and intensity of that search must be consistent with the purposes
of the statute. This limitation is less restrictive in a customs search
where the objective is to find dutiable goods or contraband, since
these items can often be secreted in small recesses of the vehicle
and even within the body cavities of the individual. Consequently,
a thorough and comprehensive examination into all such areas
460. 321 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1963).
461. See also Marsh v. United States, 344 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1965)
(invalidating search 63 miles from border); Plazola v. United States, 291
F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1961) (search 50 to 60 miles from border unlawful).
would be reasonable. 462
A search for immigration purposes, on the other hand, is some-
what more limited for the obvious reason that it is more difficult
to conceal a person than it is to hide contraband or taxable items.
Thus, if the sole reason for a stop is to determine the citizenship
status of the occupants or to search the vehicle for illegal aliens,
an officer has no authority to examine a paper sack lying on the
front seat of the vehicle. 463 But where, as in Fernandez, an officer
discovers the drugs through the use of his senses, without a tres-
pass and during the course of a legitimate stop, he has sufficient
cause to arrest the appellant and conduct an incidential search
of his vehicle.
462. But as to searches of body cavities "there must be a clear indi-
cation of possession of narcotics" or a plain suggestion of the smuggling
which must be over and beyond "a mere suspicion." Henderson v. United
States, 390 F.2d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1967).
463. Contreras v. United States, 291 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1961); United
States v. Hortze, 179 F. Supp. 913 (S.D. Cal. 1959) (cigarette package can-
not possibly contain an alien).
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